' This order shall also dispose of other petitions (W.P. 7640, 7641, 7642, 7643, 7644, 7645 and 7646 of 1979). The petitioner claims to be an employee of respondent No, 2 and challenges through this petition the order dated 28th May, 1979, whereby he was placed on the cadre of Lahore Engineering and Foundry Limited (hereinafter called LEFO) which had been denationalized and finally handed over to respondent No, 2.
2. Briefly, the facts leading to this petition are that the petitioner was employed on 15th January, 1974, as a Personnel Manager with LEFO. Earlier this company had been nationalized under Economic Reforms Order (P.
0. 1 of 1972). On 15th September, 1973 the Economic Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1973 was promulgated. It added sections 7-A and 7-E to P.
0. 1 of 1972. Section 7-E enabled the Government to transfer the management of any such shares or proprietary interests of such establishments to any Corporation wholly owned or controlled by the Federal Government or a Corporation to be set up for the purpose. Section 7.E (2) further laid down that such a Corporation shall be subject to the general supervision and control of such Board, in exercise of its powers and performance of its functions.
3. By about the same time, respondent No, 2 was set up and LEFO was placed under its control and management. On 13th June, 1974, the petitioner was confirmed against a permanent post. It is stated that the petitioner's employment came to be governed thereafter by the administrative instructions Annex. B to I issued by respondent No, 2., and therefore, he became in fact and law its employee for all intents and purposes. The other petitioners also have similar claims and make the same prayer.
4. The petitioner was promoted with effect from 6th November, 1974, as Assistant General Manager (Admn). It is supported by Annexs. J and K as well as Annexs. D and E filed with the written statement. The petitioner was thereafter promoted to grade IV in accordance with the procedure laid down in Annex. L under the orders of Chairman of respondent No, 2, vide Annexs. M, N and 0. He also worked temporarily as General Manager. On 7th October, 1976, the services of the petitioner were terminated. For the reason, that he was rendered surplus, and so his services were terminated.
5. The petitioner challenged that order under Martial Law Order No, 23 passed by the Chief Martial Law Administrator, His representation succeeded and he was re-instated on 17th May, 1979 (Annex.
R/Z). The petitioner then sent a telegram to the Chairman of respondent No, 2 on 23rd May, 1979, reporting for duty and requesting for a posting order. The Managing Director of LEFO placed the petitioner on the cadre of LEFO vide letter dated 28th May, 1979 (Annex. Z) and posted him as Officer on Special Duty till further orders (Annex. AA). On 18th June, 1979, the petitioner reported for duty to respondent No,
3. The petitioner also wrote to respondent No, 1 for absorption in respondent No,
2. He also wrote to respondent No, 2 that respondent No, 3 was not permitting him to report. He thereafter reported daily to respondent No, 2.
6. Meanwhile P.
0. 12 of 1978 were promulgated on 16th September, 1978. It authorised the Federal Government under Article 4 to transfer the shares or proprietary interests in respect of a managed establishment to persons specified if it considered it necessary in the national interest. It's Article 10 provided that all persons employed in, by or for the purpose of business of establishment in respect of which an order under clause (1) of Article 6 is issued, shall continue in such employment on the same terms and conditions as were applicable to them immediately before the issue of such order. This enactment overrode all other laws as stated in its Article 3. The LEFO was ultimately handed over to respondent No, 3 on 16th June, 1979.
7. It is contended by the learned counsel that the petitioner had become an employee of respondent No, 2 and so his services could not be transferred to respondent No,
3. According to him, neither could respondent No, 2 ask him to serve respondent No, 3 nor should he have refused him to join respondent No,
2. It is further stated that though respondent No, 2 is a private limited company, registered under the Companies Act, yet in fact it is a body of the Federal Government as its general supervision and control rests with the Government.
8. To support his contentions the learned counsel relied on his letter of appointment (Annex. A/1) as well as his terms and conditions as contained in the administrative instructions Annexs. B to I, issued by respondent No,
2. He also referred to the LEFO service rules, copies of some of which are placed on this record as Annex. XX to DDD. Learned counsel also cited a number of judgments to support his plea but none is applicable as will be discussed later.
9. Admittedly, the petitioner was appointed on 10th January, 1974, by LEFO. He was confirmed by LEFO on 13th June, 1974. His pay scale was revised by LEFO on 30th April, 1975 (Annex. K). On 30th April, 1976, the petitioner took over charge of Administration Division of LEFO from the General Manager (Admn.). On 7th October, 1976, his services were terminated as an employee of LEFO. He was re-instated in LEFO on 28th May, 1979, by LEFO. On 30th May, 1979, he applied to LEFO (Annx. BB) that be being the senior most manager, be absorbed elsewhere after denationalization. He admitted in this application that he remained an employee of LEFO throughout. He in fact visited LEFO to join on 18th June, 1979, but the Managing Director refused to see him (Annex. DO). In his application of the same date to the Secretary to the Government of Pakistan (Annex. EE) he admitted that till his services were terminated he was an employee of LEFO. It is only thereafter that the petitioner started making efforts to get a job with respondent No, 2.
10. Section 6 of P.
0. 1 of 1972, provided that all persons employed in, by or for the purpose of the business of the establishment by whomsoever appointed or engaged shall continue in their respective employments on the same remuneration or other conditions of service as were applicable to them immediately before the appointment of the Managing Director of the establishment unless the Managing Director otherwise directs in a particular case. This means that only the Managing Director was competent to pass any order with regard to the employees of his establishment and no one else.
11. The Federal Legislature, on 25th September, 1972, enacted Development of Industries (Federal Control) Act (Act XVI of 1972), in order to constitute a Board to ensure that the managements taken over under P.
0. 1 of 1972, are managed efficiently and in accordance with sound business principles.
12. It will be seen that the terms and the conditions of the persons appointed thereunder by the Board from time to time for the efficient performance of its functions could be settled by the Board and that too not by way of any rules, regulations or other legal instruments but otherwise as it may deem fit. Under section 6 (l) (a) of the Act the Board could exercise such of the powers of a Managing Director under P. O. Of 1972, and issue such directions to him as it may consider necessary. Section 6 (2) laid down that any exercise of the powers by the Board under section 6 (1) would mean as if the Managing Director had exercised it. Thus no person other than the Managing Director had such powers. In view of the above, it cannot be said that the petitioner, who throughout remained an employee of LEFO became at any time the employee of respondent No, 2.
13. The main emphasis of the learned counsel for the petitioner was on the documents Annex B to I and K and Y. These are directions issued by respondent No, 2 and are applicable generally to the entire taken over or amalgamated establishment. Annex. L and EEE are general instructions issued by the Ministry of Production, Government of Pakistan. As said above, the Government, the Board of the Corporation (respondent No, 2) had been given, powers of general supervision under Article 4
(3) of P. 0 1 of 1972, and section 7 of Act XVI of 1972. According to section 7-E (1) the management of the establishment could be transferred to the Corporation subject to the control of the Board or other authority of the Federal Government set up for that purpose. So it cannot be said that just because of issuance of the instructions, the petitioner became an employee of respondent No, 2.
14. In any case, the petitioner could only claim the protection of these instructions. There are no legal instructions affording any guarantee or protection against termination of service. There can be thus no entitlement to invoke the constitutional jurisdiction of this Court. Annex. CCC, the service rules of LEFO lay down that services of and employee can be terminated on one month's notice. It is, therefore, quite clear that the petitioner could claim only one month's pay if his services were terminated in violation of the instructions, but no relief from this Court in this jurisdiction. Reference is made to the case of R. T. H. Janjua (1) where it was held that the safeguards provided for civil servants cannot be availed of as legal right by an employee of a statutory Corporation. This case considered practically the entire {{FOOT NOTE}}
(1) PLD 1974 SC 146 {{FOOT NOTE}} ' important case-law on the point. The petitioner is not even an employee of a statutory Corporation. In Muhammad Shari v. Secretary (1), the Court ruled that rules made for internal management only by the College Governing Council could not be enforced by the High Court as they did not have the status of statutory rules.
15. The learned counsel for the petitioner then urged that the action of respondent No, 2 to send the petitioner to respondent No, 3 and the refusal on its part not to let him join service with respondent No, 2 is ultra vires his powers. He relied on Abdur Razzaq Malik v. WAPDA etc. (2) to say that the Court can declare an executive act of a Corporation as illegal if such act is not within its statutory powers expressly or by necessary implication. The Court further ruled that a mandamus may issue to enforce a statutory duty, a legal right or performance of a public duty. In Gul Mohammad v.
Chairman, Road Transport (3), the Court set aside an order terminating service which was in violation of the agreement kept alive by service rules. In the case of Habibullah (4) I held that a petition asking for performance of action in accordance with law would lie. However, as said above, the-petitioner never enjoyed any statutory terms and conditions of service. He was an employee of LEFO which was denationalized. According to Article 10 of P. O. 12 of 1978, all employees were to continue in employment on the same terms and conditions of service as before. B According to the service rules the petitioner was entitled to only one month's pay in lieu of notice. His employer is now a private company. As found above,' he had nothing to do with respondent No, 2 though it is also a private limited company. There is thus no right to invoke the constitutional jurisdiction of this Court or to ask for any relief at all.
16. The learned counsel also challenged the impugned order on the basis of discrimination. He stated that as some of his other colleagues had been absorbed in respondent No, 2 the decision to send him to respondent No, 3 was unlawful. He referred to Annexs. FFF and GGG. These documents give names of the employees who had been absorbed elsewhere. As said above, the petitioner was and remained throughout an employee of LEFO which was ultimately denationalized.
According to Article 10, all persons employed in, by or for the purpose of business of an establishment in respect of which an order under Article 6 (1) is issued shall continue in such employment on the same terms and conditions as were applicable to them immediately before the issue of such order. Thus the only right that the petitioner could claim was service in LEFO and nowhere else. So no other employer could be asked or compelled to employ the petitioner. The fact that "some others were absorbed or employed would not afford the petitioner an opportunity to challenge that or claim a similar right for himself on the basis of discrimination or otherwise. The plea thus has no merit whatsoever.
' In view of the above, there is no merit in this petition and the same is dismissed with costs. {{FOOT NOTE}}
(1) PLD 1973 SC 497 (2) PLD 1973 Lah. 188
(3) PLD 1973 Lab. 240 (4) PLD 1980 Lab. 737 {{FOOT NOTE}}