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1982 PLC (C. S.) 293

MIRAJ MAHMOOD REHMANI vs DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, RAHIMYARK HAN AND

Citation1982 PLC (C. S.) 293
CourtPunjab Service Tribunal
Judge(s)S. Hafizur Rahman, Sardar Abdul Jabbar Khan
ResultOrder accordingly

' S. ABDUL JABBAR KHAN (CHAIRMAN).-Meraj Muhammad Rehmani has filed this appeal under section 4 of the Punjab Service Tribunal Act, 1974, in which he has impleaded the aforementioned three officials as respondents. By virtue of this appeal be has prayed that the order dated 29th April, 1978 passed by the Deputy Commissioner/Collector, Rahimyar Khan as well as the order passed in appeal by the Commissioner, Bahawalpur Division, dated 9th June, 1979, be set aside and he be re-instated in service with all back benefits.

2. Briefly facts of the case are that while posted at Khanput, District Rahimyar Khan as a junior clerk/registration clerk a complaint was made against the appellant by one Abdul Ghafoor son of Maula Bakhsh that the appellant in collision with one Sajjad Haider got a registered deed executed in favour of Fayyaz Hussain to show that Abdul Ghafoor complainant was the executant of said document in which he had agreed to sell House No, 246/C situated in Sattelite Town Mumtazabad, Multan and had also delivered the possession of the same after receiving the sale price. However, the document in question was in the form of a registered agreement for sale and not out right a sale-deed. On 20th December, 1976 the Additional Commissioner (General) acting as an authorised officer served a charge-sheet against the appellant to which the appellant gave his reply on 7th January, 1977. An Inquiry Officer was appointed who conducted the inquiry and vide his report dated 6th October, 1977 found that the appellant was guilty of misconduct. After adopting all the procedure and formalities the appellant was given a show-cause notice for a major penalty on account of the said misconduct. He was heard in person on 15th April, 1978 by the competent authority who vide his judgment dated 29th April, 1978 dismissed him from service. He filed an appeal before the learned Commissioner, Bahawalpur on 26th April, 1978 but the same was rejected vide order dated 9th June, 1979 maintaining the order of the competent authority, hence this appeal.

3. We have heard the learned counsel for the appellant as well as the learned District Attorney assisted by the Representative of the Department and have perused the record of this case carefully with their assistance. It has been submitted on behalf of the appellant through his learned counsel that respondent No, 2 Mainly depended on the report of the Inquiry Officer and failed to apply his own mind, therefore, the order was liable to be set aside on this score alone. He has also made grievance about the conduct of the inquiry so conducted by the Inquiry Officer and has dubbed the same against the principle of audi alteram partem. According to the learned counsel the document in question was a duly registered document attested by the Sub-Registrar and therefore, no exception could be taken to it and if any flaw was found the responsibility in that matter was that of the Sub-Registrar and not of the appellant. A further plea has been taken about the genuineness of the complaint, relying on the observation of Mian Ghulam Ahmad, District Judge in which the learned Judge has observed that prima facie the signatures of Abdul Ghafoor complainant on the document registered on 14th December, 1972 did tally with those found on other documents including the ejectment application dated 8th September, 1972. In this way it has been argued that unless and until the case was finally decided by the civil Court where the main case was pending it was not proper for the competent authority or the appellate authority to take such a drastic action against the appellant. The learned counsel has attributed malice to respondent No, 2 on the ground that he had earlier passed an order of dismissal against him but the said order was set aside in appeal by the learned Commissioner, Bahawalpur therefore he had grudge against him. In this way it has been claimed that the competent authority was out to dismiss the appellant and when another complaint gave him a chance to do so he jumped at the same. While concluding the arguments it has been submitted that if at all any lapse had occurred on the part of the appellant by omitting to incorporate the said registered deed into the Bahl Book the same may be ignored as the appellant omitted to do so on account of rush of work and at the most it would be an act of negligence and not of misconduct.

4. On the other hand, the learned District Attorney has submitted that this was a complete act of fraud and forgery committed by Sajjad Hussain and Fayyaz Hussain with the blessing of the appellant who played a pivotal role in the matter and thus deprived the complainant both of his ownership right as well as the ancillary benefits. According to the District Attorney the property was situated in Multan but the deed was registered in Khanpur which by itself was a violation of the mandatory rules laid down in this behalf in the Registration Manual. He has pointed out that the person who identified Abdul Ghafoor was nobody else but the brother-in-law of the appellant.

Therefore, it can be safely assumed that all was done by an act of unholy alliance between the appellant, Sajjad Haider, Fayyaz Hussain and the brother-in-law of the appellant i,e, Muhammad Nawaz, Advocate, for ulterior motives. With regard to the plea of rush of work it has been submitted that the perusal of the Behi Book would show that this was the only solitary document which was not incorporated otherwise all other documents found their way in the record. It has been frankly conceded by the learned District Attorney that the Sub-Registrar being the ultimate authority who attested this document cannot also be absolved of the responsibility and have informed this Court that the Deputy Commissioner has mentioned in the parawise comments that the action is also being taken against the said officer.

5. We have given our anxious thought to the arguments advanced by both the parties and to satisfy ourselves on the procedural matters we called upon Mr. Awan, Head Clerk Registration, and Lahore, to assist us in this regard. The said Head Clerk appeared before us and submitted that according to para. 70 of the Punjab Registration Manual it was the duty of the appellant that he should have incorporated in Book No, 1 this deed (agreement to sell) in its additional volume. If it was found that the deed was in English language then the appellant was required to paste a copy of the same and in the margin. The Sub-Registrar was required to put down his signature and also to issue a certificate to that effect. We were further fold by him that since 1969 to make the record more authentic and unchallengeable another register was introduced which was known as "Thumb Impression Register". According to him it was the duty of the appellant to secure the thumb-impression of the executant so that if the same is challenged at some stage it would become difficult to disown the same.

6. While going through the record another very important point has come to our notice which goes to the very root of the case and makes the case of the prosecution impressive. The trouble in this case started when Abdul Ghafoor, complainant, who had orally rented out his house to Sajjad Haider lodged a suit for ejectment in the Court of the Rent Controller against the latter. In that suit Sajjad Haider took the plea that in fact he was not only the tenant but his mother had actually purchased this house from said Abdul Ghafoor in lieu of certain agreement between the parties.

We find that the plea so taken by said Sajjad Haider did not find favour with the Rent Controller who decided the case against Sajjad Haider on 8th September, 19,75. After this order, Fayyaz Hussain, brother of Sajjad Haider, filed a civil suit against Abdul Ghafoor in which it was claimed that a registered deed had been executed at Khanpur between Fayyaz Hussain and Abdul Ghafoor in which Abdul Ghafoor had accepted that the disputed property was duly sold by him and the said Abdul Ghafoor had received the sale price for the same. It was only when this peculiar feature of the case came to the notice of Abdul Ghafoor that he lodged a complaint with the Deputy Commissioner, Rahimyar Khan against the appellant for forgery etc. Keeping this background in view we fail to understand as to why this document if it was in existence as early as in 1972 was not produced in the Court of the Rent Controller by Sajjad Haider or Fayyaz Hussain whereas they contended them by a verbal plea in support thereof. This omission to produce this document before the Rent Controller would gravely reflect on the belated stand taken by Fayyaz Hussain before the civil Court. However, we will not go into the merits and demerits of the claim because the matter being still sub judice before a Court of competent jurisdiction and thus leave the issue for that forum. But we cannot remain oblivious of this pertinent point in the matter of misconduct which we are required to adjudicate vis-a-vis the appellant and the complainant in this case. It definitely would raise strong presumption in favour of the complainant particularly when we are satisfied that Fayyaz Hussain or Sajjad Haider did not make mention of any document at the proper time. We are fortified in this in order to believe that the appellant stood fully involved in the matter as the said document was processed by the appellant in this own handwriting.

7. There is one other important factor which also goes against the appellant and leads to his misconduct i,e, that the property in this case was situated in Multan but the document was registered at Khanpur. We are not impressed with the plea of the appellant that such like documents were permissible to be registered anywhere in the country despite the fact that the property was situated beyond the jurisdiction of the Registration Officer. Section 20 of the Registration Act is very clear on this point which lies down that every document is required to be presented for registration in the office of the Sub Registrar in whose jurisdiction the property is situated. The appellant when faced with this situation came out with an argument that as this transaction was not a transaction of complete sale, therefore the document was immune from the mischief of section 28 of the Registration Act. According to him it was only an agreement to sell, therefore, the same could be registered at Khanpur or anywhere else at the choice of the parties.

We have looked into this plea carefully and agree with the learned Commissioner when he says that in fact this was not an agreement to sell but it was an agreement of sale, ''{{URDU TEXT}}''.

These two terms on the face of it looks Synonymous but when the document in question is perused minutely the difference becomes ipso facto clear. If the document had only contained a stipulation that A will sell his property to X within certain specified period then according to our interpretation it would be an agreement to sell, "{{URDU TEXT}}". But when the contents of the document reveal that the property has been sold, possession has been delivered and the sale consideration has been received, then the document assumes the status of a full-fledged sale. A certificate at the end of the document which is also a part of the record makes this proposition-very clear. We also feel that this document which is now the subject matter of dispute between the parties before the civil Court is a Bizari document. This document is in English while a note on it is in vernacular which clearly indicates that on 16th December, 1972 complainant Abdul Ghafoor handed over the possession of the house, received Rs, 13,000 as the sale price and for all practical purposes the sale had taken place. The case of the appellant has been fully considered from all angles and we are of opinion that there is hardly any cause but to presume that the appellant did display his ingenuity and brought out a document which did help the stand of Fayyaz Hussain to the detriment of the complainant.

8. We have also taken into consideration the plea of rush of work but consider this plea nothing but an apology for a plea. The Behi Book does find mention of all documents attested prior to and after this transaction but this is the only document which has been brought on the record without any attestation of the Registration Officer or any certificate so required under the rules. We also find that no thumb-impression was secured of Abdul Ghafoor complainant in the register so maintained in this regard after the year 1969.

9. We have gone through the detailed judgment of the learned Collector as well as that of the appellate authority (the Commissioner) and find that both the judgments are lucid as well as based on cogent grounds. The case of the appellant has been fully considered in these two judgments from all angles and we are of the considered opinion that there is hardly any cause of interference with the same. The procedure adopted) in this case is also regular and no exception can be taken to it and the punishment awarded also, to our mind, is fully in consonance with misconduct of the appellants. We therefore, dismiss this appeal as being without any merits.

Cited by 2 cases

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