Ali Akbar Qureshi, J:- This appeal was dismissed with cost of Rs.50,000/- by this Court vide judgment dated 30.11.2016, for the reasons stated there in. Appellants being aggrieved thereof challenged the same before the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan through civil petition No.3778 of 2016. The Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan remanded the matter for afresh decision with the following observation: "While hearing the learned counsel for the parties we find that the learned High Court did not take into consideration some of the important documentary evidence which was relevant for the purposes of disposing of the issues between the parties particularly if the respondent was a bona fide purchaser of the property in question and had acquired a lawful title from the actua l owner vide sale deed; that the suit land even was excluded from the graveyard by the Committee through an order passed under the relevant law and that such exclusion was given due effect in the relevant revenue record as is envisaged by the jamabandi (Exh.P19). This undoubtedly is tantamount to non-reading of the evidence. Obviously , in such circumstances the impugned judgment cannot be sustained. Resultantly , this petition is converted into an appeal and allowed. The impugned judgment is set aside and the matter is remanded to the learned High Court for disposal of the case after taking into account the essential evidence produced by the petitioners within a period of four months from today .
The afore-noted judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan requires adjudication on the following points:
1. To take into consideration the documentary evidence produced by the parties for the purpose of disposing of the issues between the parties.
2. The appellant was a bona fide purchaser of the property in question and had acquired a lawful title from the actual owner vide sale deed.
3. The suit land even was excluded from the graveyard by the Committee through an order under the relevant law and that such exclusion was given effect in the relevant revenue record as is envisaged by the jamabandi (Exh.P19).
In post remand proceedings both the parties put their appearance through their learned counsels and the case was reheard accordingly .
2. It would be appropriate to narrate the necessary facts of the case. Appellants, Ch. Muhammad Anwar and others, filed a suit for Permanent Injunction on 24.08.2004 on the ground, that the mother of the appellants was owner of land measuring 1 kanal 1 marla on the basis of sale deed dated 18.02.1958; bearing khasra No.12656/6660/2 registered with the Sub-Registrar Lahore on 22.03.1958; in the year 1964-1965, construction consisting of five shops, two garages, four portions and courtyard, was raised; that the mother of the appellants in the year 1965 filed an application to the Deputy Commissioner/ Chairman, Miani Graveyard Committee, Lahore, for the allotment of 1/2 marla land; the application was allowed subject to deposit of price of the land; the appellants deposited the price of the land in the year 1965.
The mother of the appellants again filed an application to the Deputy Commissioner/Chairman, Miani Graveyard Committee, Lahore, for the allotment of additional land measuring 1 marla 90sq.ft. for construction of garage, which was also allowed against consideration; after the allotment of land, a garage was constructed and for a long time nobody raised any objection on the allotment of the land and construction of the garage.
3. The land in question was gifted by the mother of the appellants to the appellants on 21.12.1987 through a Gift Deed, which too was registered with the Sub-Registrar , Lahore. After the death of the mother of the appellants, the respondent-Graveyard Committee tried to demolish the property of the appellants , whereupon the appellants filed the suit praying therein, that the respondents be restrained to interfere into the physical possession of the appellants.
4. The suit was contested by the Miani Sahib Graveyard Committee through a detailed written statement asserting therein that the property in question bearing khasra No.12656/6660 is included and specified in Block-A of Schedule of Miani Sahib Graveyard Ordinance, 1962, therefore said khasra numbers vest in the Miani Sahib Graveyard, which is a "Trust" under the West Pakistan Graveyards (Preservation and Maintenance) Act, 1958.
Further asserted, that the land was taken over as a part of Miani Sahib Graveya rd under Martial Law Ordinance and no transaction of the said land would create any right or the title in favour of the appellants.
5. The learned trial Court out of contentious pleadings of the parties framed the following issues:-
1. Whether plaintiff has no cause of action? OPD
2. Whether the suit has not been properly valued for the purpose of Court fee and jurisdiction? OPD
3. Whether the suit is not maintainable in its present form? OPD
4. Whether provisions of Martial Law Order No.131 are allowed the land in question falls within the revenue record for the year 1856 as part of Miani Sahib Graveyard? OPD
5. Whether alleged area bearing khasra No.12656/6660 is specified Block-A of the Schedule of Miani Sahib Graveyard and is a trust? OPD
6. Whether the alleged sanction of 1-1/2 marla land in favour of the plaintiff is misnormer and as such the same does not create any right or title in favour of the plaintiffs?
7. Whether plaintiffs are entitled to the decree for permanent injunction restraining defendants to demolish the land in question being owned and possessed by them? OPD
8. Relief.
6. Learned trial Court after recording the evidence of the parties and hearing the arguments dismissed the suit vide judgment and decree dated 23.05.2012. Hence, this first appeal.
7. Learned counsel for the appellants reiterated the grounds of appeal in his argum ents and mainly submitted, that the appellants are lawful owners in possession of the suit land on the basis of a registered sale deed dated 18.02.1958; that at one point of time, the property of the appellants was included in the Schedule "A" of Miani Sahib Graveyard Ordinance, 1962, but subsequently the land was excluded and effect of the same was given in the revenue record (Exh.P19); that no notice was given to the appellants before including the land in the Schedule of Miani Sahib Graveyard Ordinance, 1962; that the appellants filed a suit only to the extent of the land purchased by the appellants from the Miani Sahib Graveyard Committee, therefore, rest of the property was not part of the case; that the appellants are residing over there from the last four decades and no objection was raised by anyone including the Miani Sahib Graveyard Committee. Lastly prayed, that the appeal be accepted and suit of the appellants be decreed. Reliance is placed on "Ali Muhammad Y/S Muhammad Hayat and others" (1982 SCMR 816), "Syed Niamat Ali and 4 others Y/S Dewan Jairam Dass and another" (PLD 1983 SC 5), "Syed Akhtar Hussain Zaidi Y/S Muhammad Yaqin ud din" (1988 SCMR 753), "The Evacuee Trust Property Board and others Y/S Haji Ghulam Rasul Khokhar and others" (1990 SCMR 725), "Province of Punjab through Collector, Faisalabad and 2 others Y/S Nishat Textile Mills Limited Sheikhupura Road, Faisalabad" (2002 CLC 1029), "Sultan Mahmood Shah through LRs and others Y/S Muhammad Din and 2 others" (2005 SCMR 1872), "Mst.
Hameeda Begum and others Y/S Mst. Irshad Begum and others" (2007 SCMR 996), "Mazloom Hussain Y/S Abid Hussain and 4 others" (PLD 2008 SC 571), "Qamar-ud-Din Y/S Province of Singh through Secretary, Land Utilization, Board of Revenue, Hyderabad through Deputy Commissioner, Ghotki and others" (2002 CLC 825), "Messrs A.R. Builders (Pvt.) Ltd. Y/S Faisal Cantonment Board and 4 others" (PLD 2004 Karachi 492) and "Aamar T ufail V/S Muhammad Sadiq and others " (2006 CLD 91 ).
8. Conversely, learned Legal Advisor of respondent Committee submits, that the land in question possessed by the appellants is part of Schedule "A" of the Miani Sahib Graveyard Ordinance, 1962, and the appellants have no concern whatsoever with the land in question that once the property vest in the "Trust" all the transaction regarding the trust properties are void; that the Miani Sahib Graveyard Committee had no authority in law to exclude the property in question from the Schedule of Miani Sahib Graveyard. Reliance is placed on "Noor Din V/S the Chairman, Miani Sahib Graveyard Committee, Lahore" (PLD 1973 Supreme Court 17), "Sultan Mahmood Shah through LRs and others V/S Muhammad Din and 2 others" (2005 SCMR 1872), "Muhammad Afzal V/S Matloob Hussain and others" (PLD 2006 SC 84), "Rehmat Ullah and others V/S Saleh Khan and others" (2007 SCMR 729), "Mubarak Ali and others V/S Khushi Muhammad and others" (PLD 2011 SC 155), "Jam Muhammad Ismail and others V/S Jam Bahawal and others" (2012 MLD 1545), "Syed Rashid Arshad V/S Fazal-e-Azeem and 3 others" (2012 CLC 1871), "Muhammad Nawaz alias Nawaza and other V/S Member Judicial Board of Revenue and others" (2014 SCMR 914), "Messrs Essa Engineering Company Pvt. Ltd. and another V/S Pakistan Telecommunication Company Limited and another" (2014 SCMR 922), "Farzand Ali and another V/S Khuda Bakhash and others" (PLD 2015 SC 187), "Ghulam Farid and another V/S Sher Rehman through LRs" (2016 SCMR 862), "Province of Punjab through Collector , Sheikhupura and others V/S Syed Ghazan far Ali Shah and others " (2017 SCMR 172 ), and " Mst. Fatima Khanum V/S Ashiq Ali" (PLD 1988 Karachi 433 ).
9. Heard. Record perused.
10. In order to appreciate the contentions of the learned counsel for the parties it would be appropriate to firstly go through the law relating to the preservation and maintenance of graveyards in Pakistan including the Miani Sahib Graveyard, Lahore. Firstly in the year 1958 an Act namely "West Pakistan Graveyards (Preservat ion and Maintenance) Act, 1958 " was promulgated in order to maintain the graveyards and the provisions of this Act were made applicable on the Miani Sahib Graveyard Lahore. Section 1(2) of the Act is re-produced as under:- Section 1...
(2) It extends to the graveyard known as the Miani Sahib Graveyard, Lahore, and the government may, by notification, extend all or any of the provisions of this Act, to any other Graveyard in W est Pakistan."
Thereafter , the then Martial Law authorities issued a "Press Note" on 29.04.1962, demarcated the area of Miani Sahib Graveyard measuring 1,248 kanals 14 marla and 28 sq.ft. The khasra numbers of the demarcated land were also given in the said Notification by the Committee after going through the relevant revenue record and having heard objection making on the spot inspection and inquiries. In the said Press Note dated 20.04.1962, the Khasra No.12656/6660 of the property in question is included.
Another legislation specifically pertainin g to the Miani Sahib Graveyard namely "Miani Sahib Graveyard Ordinance, 1962 ", was made. Alongwith the Ordinance a "Schedule" was annexed, wherein the khasra numbers of the property in question is also included. The appellants mainly claiming the title of the property on the basis of sale deed dated 18.02.1958 allegedly executed in favour of mother of the appellants and jamabandi (Exh.P19) issued in the year 1963 to show that the property of the appellants once included in the Schedule of Miani Sahib Graveyard Ordinance, 1962, but subsequently on the application of the appellants was excluded by the Miani Sahib Graveyard Committee. These are two intricate questions seeking consideration and adjudication by this Court.
11. Learned counsel for the appellants repeatedly argued, that although the property in question was included firstly in the "Press Note" and secondly in the Schedule of Ordinance, 1962, but on the application of the appellants the same was excluded by the Miani Sahib Graveyard Committee. To decide the lis, it is necessary to see the formation/domain of the Miani Sahib Graveyard Committee in the light of the enactment. The "Committee" and its "Functions" are specifically defined in Section 2(2), 3 and 14 of the West Pakistan Graveyard (Preservation and Maintenance) Act, 1958 (Act of 1958).
It would be beneficial to re-produce the Sections 2(2), 3 and 14 of the Act ibid:
2. Definitions.---- (1).....
(2)"Committee" means a Committee constituted under Section 3 of this Act.
3. Constitution of a Committee.- (1) As soon as may be, after the enforcement of this Act, or the extension of all or any of the provisions of this Act, to any graveyard, the Government shall appoint for one or more of such graveyards a Committee which shall consists of a Chairman, and such number of other official and non-official members as may from time to time be specified by the Government.
14. Function of the Committee.- The Committee shall, subject to the control and superintendence of the Government-
(1) protect the graveyard from encroachments ;
(2) Maintain the graveyard in a fit and proper condition and take steps to improve it ; (3)Employee and pay such staff as may be necessary ; and
(4) Do all such acts and things as may be necessary for the preservation and proper maintenance of the graveyard.
As per section 6 of the Act, 1958, any person, who claims to have acquired any title to any land or property may within three months of the date of such notification apply to the Government for the exclusion of such land. Section 6 of the Act, 1958, is re-produced as under:-
6. Application for exclusion of land from the area of graveyard.- Any person who claims to have acquired any title to any land or property included within the limits defined in the notification issued under section 5. may within three months of the date of such notifica tion, apply to the Government for the exclusion of such land or property from the area of the graveyard.
And under Section 7 of the Act, a "Tribunal " is to be appointed by the Government to dispose of the applications presented under section 6. Section 7 of the Act is re-produced:-
7. Appointment of Tribunal. --The Government shall appoint a Tribunal consisting of a person who is, has been or is qualified to be appointed a District and Sessions Judge to dispose of the applica tions presented under Section 6 in accordance with the provisions of Sections 8 and 9.
It is made clear, that the provisions of the Act ibid are applicable on the affairs of the Miani Sahib Graveyard, Lahore. As per the arguments of the learned counsel for the appellants and the contents of jamabandi (Exh.P19) issued in the year 1963, the land in question was excluded by the Miani Sahib Graveyard Committee, in the year 1963. As per the aforesaid provisions of Act 1958 the Committee had no jurisdiction to entertain the application or to exclude the land which is part of the Schedule, therefore, the order allegedly passed in revision by the Committee was without lawful authority and jurisdiction and have no effect qua the rights of the Miani Sahib Graveyard, which is a "Trust". The appellants, if aggrieved, had to file an application under section 6 within three months to the Government and the same application has to be decided by the "Tribunal" appointed under Section 7 of the Act ibid and the "Committee" constituted under the provisions of Miani Sahib Graveyard Ordinance, 1962 (Ordinance 1962) has no concern whatsoever with the inclusion or exclusion of the land in the Schedule. But the appellants did not file application to the Government for exclusion of the land in question within the stipulated period in accordance with the afore-referred provisions of law .
12. Secondly , it is to be seen, as to whether the appellants have succeeded to prove jamabandi (Exh.P19) in accordance with the principle laid down by the Apex Court in plethora of judgmen ts. The appellants produced the said document in the statement and failed to produce the scribe or the signatory of Exh.P19. Even the Record Keeper of Revenue Department has not been summoned by the appellants to prove the validity and sanctity of Exh.P19. There is another aspect of the matter that the appellants had failed to place on record the order dated 16.07.1963 allegedly passed by the Miani Sahib Graveyard Committee, whereby the land in question was excluded from the Schedule. The appellants, as appears from the record did not make any effort to summon the record of the order dated 16.07.1963, allegedly passed by the Miani Sahib Graveyard Committee. As regard the sale deed dated 18.02.1958 through which the property was purchased by the mother of the appellants, no exercise was made to summon the record of the concerned Registrar . It is the requirement of law that the document is to be proved by adducing signatory and scribe of the same. The respondent, as evident from the record could not produce the revenue officials to prove the gift as well as the sale deed, which is against the principle laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in judgment cited as titled "Khan Muhammad Yousaf Khan Khattak v. S.M. Ayub and 2 others " (PLD 1973 Supreme Court 160) . The relevant paragraph is re produced as under:- "When I say that the document Exh.P.E. is unproved, I have in mind the mandatory provisions of Section 67 of the Evidence Act, which lay down that "if a document is alleged to be signed or written wholly or in part by any person, the signature or the handwriting of so much of the document as is alleged to be in that person's handwriting must be proved to be in his hand-writing". If the case of the respondent was that the appellant had signed the original Exh.P.E. or the certificate appended to it, it must have been proved that it was in the appellant's handwriting, for which no effort whatsoever was made. In the case of Bengal Friends & Co. v. Gour Benode Saha & Co., this Court had expressed itself on this point as follows:- "Documents which are not copies of judicial record, should not be received in evidence without proof of signatures and handwriting of persons alleged to have signed or written them."
I am of the view that even if such documents are brought on record and exhibited without objection, they remain on the record as exhibits' and faithful copies of the contents of the original but they cannot be treated as evidence of the original having been signed and written by the persons who purport to have written or signed them, unless the writing or the signature of that person is proved in terms of the mandatory provisio ns of section 67 of the Evidence Act. If instead of the copy Exh.P .E., the original form "E" which formed the primary evidence, had been exhibited on the record without proving as to who was its author can it be argued that by merely exhibiting it, the document should be taken for granted as bearing the signature of the appellant without proof that in fact it was written and signed by him. The onus obviously lay on the respondent to prove this act and his failure to prove it did not cast any responsibility on the appellant to negatively disprove it."
In a latest judgment cited as "Province of the Punjab through Collector, Sheikhupura and others v. Syed Ghazanfar Ali Shah and others" (2017 SCMR 172), as regard the admission of a document and its exhibition, the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan has laid down as under: "9. The argument that where a party did not raise objection as to the admission of a document and its exhibition, it cannot subsequently complain about its mode of proof has not impressed us as the provisions governing the mode of proof cannot be compounded or dispensed with, nor can the Court, which has to pronounce a judgment, as to the proof or otherwise of the document be precluded to see whether the document has been proved in accordance with law and can, as such, form basis of a judgment. In the case of Messrs Bengal Friends and Co., DACCA v.
Messrs Dour Benode Saha and Co., and The Deputy Registrar of Trade Marks, Chittagong (PLD 1969 SC 477) this Court while dealing with the mode of proof of the documents not properly brought on the record held as under:- "Besides the authenticity of the account books relied upon by the respondent that were not properly brought on record as evidence of the transactions mentioned therein. The learned Chief Justice in the High Court ruled out the objection raised by the appellant on the view that it related to mode of proof of the entries in the account books and was not raised before the Deputy Registrar of Trade Marks. It was omitted from consideration that under section 34 of the Evidence Act entries in books of account regularly kept in the course of business are only declared to be relevant whenever they refer to a matter into which the Court has to enquire. But this does not dispense with the requirement of section 67, that if a document is alleged to have been written by any person, the signature or the handwriting of so much of the document as is alleged to be in that person's handwriting must be proved to be in his handwriting. Mere production of account books kept in regular course of business, therefore, does not constitute evidence of entries contained therein. The Legislature has made an exception in this behalf in the Bankers' Books Evidence Act. Section 4 provides as follows: "Subject to the provisions of this Act, a certified copy of any entry in a banker's book shall in all legal proceedings be received as prima facie evidence of the existence of such entry , and shall be admitted as evidence of the matters, transactions and accounts therein recorded in every case where, and to the same extent as, the original entry itself is now by law admissible, but not further or otherwise."
In the absence of such a provision in the Evidence Act regarding entries in books of account kept in regular course of business the mere production of the account books does not constitute evidence of the transaction and accounts therein recorded. Mr. Israrul Hossain further pointed out that the account books containing Exh.
G.B.3 series were not even exhibited by the Deputy Registrar. In the affidavit of the respondent sworn on the 25th August 1958, in paragraph the genuineness of the records not constitute proof of the entries in these series unless they were in his handwriting and he swore to the correctness of the transactions mentioned therein. The documents Eshs. G.B.3 series relied upon by the respondent No.1 in support of his claim that since 1937 he had been selling on large scale in Bengal and Assam including the riverine districts now constituting East Pakistan coaltar bearing trade mark "Jahaj Marka Al-katra" with a device of a ship were in this view wrongly treated as evidence by the Courts below ."
Further reliance is placed on the judgments cited as "Gulzar Hussain V/S Abdur Rehman and another " (1985 SCMR 301), "Malik Zafar Ali V/S Malik Khalid Aziz and others " (1991 SCMR 1362 ), "Mst. Hameeda Begum and others V/S Mst. Irshad Begum and others " (2007 SCMR 996), "Muhammad Ashraf V/S Muhammad Tahir Ismail and others " (2011 MLD 1848 ) and " Allah W asaya and 13 others V/S Yar Muhammad and others " (2015 MLD 272 ).
13. As regard the bona fide purchaser as observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan while remanding the matter , the appellants claimed that the land in question was purchased by their mother in the year 1958 and the same was gifted to the appellants through gift deed dated 21.12.1987 registered with the Sub-Registrar on 14.01.1988. The Martial Law Authorities in order to demarcate the area of Miani Sahib Graveyard issued a "Press Note " on 29.04.1962 under Martial Law Order 48 read with Regulation No.20, giving the khasra numbers of the total area of the Miani Sahib Graveyard measuring 1,248 kanals 14 maralas and 28 sq.ft. including the Khasra number pertaining to the property in question. Subsequently , the area mentioned in the Press-Note dated 29.04.1962, vested in and became the part of a "Trust" i.e. Miani Sahib Graveyard Trust. The proposition, relating to the status of a property mentioned in the Press-Note and subsequently in Schedule of Ordinance, 1962, has already been discussed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in the judgment cited as "Noor Din Y/S the Chairman, Miani Sahib Graveyard Committee, Lahore" (PLD 1973 Supreme Court 17). Subsequently, the property in question was gifted out as alleged by the appellants, in their favour by their mother in the year 1987; it is pertinent to note here, that when the property in question was gifted by the mother of the appellants in their favour, the mother of the appellants had no title or the ownership of the property in question because the property in question had already vested in the Trust made under the Act of 1958. Meaning thereby, the mother of the appellants had no better title to convey, transfer, alienate by way of gift in favour of the appellants.
Even otherwise, the burden heavily lies upon the appellants to prove the stance of bona fide purchaser through convincing evidence. The appellants, as evident from the record, could not bring any oral as well as documentary evidence except sale deed, which was not proved in accordance with law particularly in the circumstances when the property in question was part of the Trust namely Miani Sahib Graveyard Trust.
14. Needless to mention, that the Miani Sahib Graveyard as per Section 13 of the Act, 1958, is a "Trust" and all the properties mentioned in the Schedule annexed with the Ordinance, 1962, have vested in the Trust and status of those properties cannot be questioned in any manner whatsoever . In the judgment cited as "Noor Din Y/S the Chairman, Miani Sahib Graveyard Committee, Lahore " (PLD 1973 Supreme Court 17), the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan has observed as under:- "The Miani Sahib Graveyard Committee, by a Press-Note dated 29 April 1962, announced the limits of the graveyards. The land claimed by both the appellants were included in the said Press- Note. The demarcation of the graveyards was taken up on the 22 February 1962. Noor Din's case was decided by the Chairman on the 12 May 1962 and he was ordered to vaca te the graveyard. The second appellant Pir Mahmood Ashraf was also ordered to vacate the premises on 14 May 1962, by the Chairman and the property in dispute was acquired by the Miani Sahib Graveyard Committee. These action clearly show that the before the 8 June 1962, the Martial Law Authorities have assumed possession of the property in dispute.
The Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in the judgment supra has reproduced a paragraph of a case titled "Azizur - Rahman Choudhury v . M. Nasir -uddin and others " (PLD 1965 SC 236 ). The same is re produced as under:- "It has next to be considered whether , even though the validity of the said orders and acts cannot be challenged, the action purported to be taken there under can be questioned, on the ground that they were not in accordance with the Martial Law Order . If these were completed acts (underlined mine ) and the protection given by Marital Law Regulation's Nos.88 and 93 was available for such acts then the language of clause II of Martial Law Regulation No.88 as amended by Martial Law Regulation No.93, renders them immune from attack. The utter regulation has expressly widen the immunity so as to include any "Order made or anything done whether the order or the thing is done within scope of the Regulation or Order, or not, or whether the Authority making the order of doing a thing had jurisdiction in the matter or not." Furthermore, under this even persons authorized by or under a Martial Law Regulation or Order to perform any function or exercise any power would be Martial Law Authorities within the meaning of the said Regulations. Thus the Provincial Government and the Administrator would have also become Martial Law Authorities pro tanto for the purposes of the said Martial Law Order No.104 and their acts would not have been open to question whilst those Regulations Nos.88 and 93 were in force. If those acts were consummated acts, then on the principle of past and close transactions those acts will still enjoy the same immunity given to them by those Regulations by reasons of the provisions of Article 250 of the Constitution."
While concluding the judgment Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan holds as under:- "In the light of the above observations, I am satisfied that the transaction in question was completed past and closed for all practical purposes before the 8 June 1962. The above mentioned actions taken by the Martial Law Authorities were, therefore, saved by the President Order No.29 of the 1962 and Article 250 of the Constitution.
These actions were rightly held to be immune from attack before the High Court. There is, therefore, no ground to interfere with the orders of the High Court.
The afore-referred paragraph of the esteemed judgment is self-explanatory and in the present case, all the actions i.e. including the property in question in Press-Note and thereafter in Schedule annexed with the Ordinance, 1962, were taken by the Martial Law Authorities and the person authorized by order under a Martial Law Regulation before, 08 June 1962.
15. For what has been discussed above, I am of the considered view, that the learned trial Court as appears from the findings, attended all the aspects of the case including the oral as well as documentary evidence and finally dismissed the suit through a well worded and well-reasoned judgment, therefore, there is hardly any reason to interfere therewith. The learned counsel despite arguing the case at length could not point out any misreading and non-reading of evidence, therefore, the instant appeal is not maintainable in law. Resultantly this first appeal having no force stands dismissed with no order as to costs.