1. MUHAMMAD AFZAL ZULLAH, J.-Leave to appeal has been sought from judgment dated 8-2-1982 of the Lahore High Court; whereby a writ petition arising out of a rent case filed by the respondent landlady, was allowed and the petitioner (tenant) was ordered to vacate the shop in dispute (an evacuee property).
2. The respondent's husband was the transferee of the shop under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Laws. He was issued all the necessary documents in this behalf; whereafter it was alienated through a registered deed to the respondent landlady. The petitioner admittedly was a tenant in the shop before its transfer to the predecessor-in-- interest of the respondent. Despite service of notice, he failed to clear the arrears of rent whereupon proceedings having been initiated against him under the Rent Restriction Ordinance, he was ordered to be evicted on ground of default in payment of rent.
3. The petitioner in the first appeal reiterated the plea that in reality he was the owner because he had given the sum to the transferee of the shop who had paid the same as auction price, therefore, the transferee according to the petitioner, was merely a benami owner; and that he being the real owner was not liable to be evicted. The learned District Judge allowed the appeal mainly on the consideration that no rent note was executed between the parties and further that no rent was paid for nearly eighteen years.
4. On a constitutional petition filed by the respondent landlady a learned Single Judge in the High Court held that the predecessor-in-interest of the respondent having admittedly been transferred the shop in dispute by the Settlement Authorities and all necessary documents having admittedly been issued in his favour, the petitioner was a statutory tenant and further, that the District Judge had no jurisdiction on account of the nature of the proceedings before him to decide the question of title regarding 6enami ownership Accordingly the petition was allowed and the order of the learned Rent Controller was restored with the direction for the eviction of the petitioner within two months. The petitioner has now sought leave to appeal.
5. The point pressed by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the second appellate jurisdiction having been withdrawn, the High Court was not competent in exercise of its writ jurisdiction to set aside the order passed by the learned District Judge which purported to decide the question of fact in favour of the petitioner. After hearing the learned counsel in support of the plea we regret, in the circumstances of the case, it cannot be accepted. The petitioner was undoubtedly a statutory tenant at the time of the transfer of the shop to the predecessor-in-interest of the respondent. The learned Rent Controller had considered the question whether in the summary proceedings before him the tenant could claim the ownership, deny the ownership of the transferee and establish adverse title in the property by verbal statement of his own. It merely amounted to denial of the right of ownership of the landlady and that a tenant once having admitted his tenancy and on the principle underlying section 116 of the Evidence Act cannot deny the title of landlord. It may be added that this Court in a number of cases has held that the Rent Controller cannot go beyond what is contained in the transfer documents in so far as evacuee property transferred under Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Laws is concerned. In these circumstances, the learned Single Judge in the High Court rightly held that "the learned District Judge was not competent to decide the title of the disputed property. He had transgressed the jurisdiction vested in him". Obviously the first appellate order in this case was without lawful authority and constitutional petition was rightly entertained and decided in favour of the respondent. However, the learned Single Judge took care to observe that the decision by the High Court in a petition arising out of the Rent Restriction case would not prejudice the case of either of the parties if the question of title is sought to be raised in a Court of general jurisdiction.
6. In the light of the aforegoing discussion, we find no merit in this petition and the same is dismissed.