IKRAMULLAH KHAN, J.---Through the instant petition, filed under section 561-A, Cr.P.C. the petitioner namely, Aqeel Khan, seeks quashment of proceedings pending before the learned Judicial Magistrate Dassu under section 15 of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Arms Act, 2013.
2. Brief facts leading to the instant petition are that Arshad Khan lodged a report against the petitioner and his co-accused vide FIR No.125 dated 11.07.2014 under sections 302/324/109, P.P.C. registered at Police Station Komila District Kohistan wherein, the petitioner, along with his co- accused namely, Hijab, was arrested and both the accused were tried by the learned Sessions Judge Kohistan, .who vide judgment dated 08.10.2015 acquitted the accused, however, due to abscondence of their co-accused namely, Sabab Shah, Zarnosh and Boraq,being found guilty of the offences, they were declared Proclaimed Offenders and, as such, perpetual warrants of arrest were issued against them.
3. The only ground agitated by learned counsel for the petitioner was that the petitioner had already faced prosecution in case FIR No.125 dated 11.07.2014 under sections 302/324/109/34, P.P.C. read with section 15 of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Arms Act, 2013 before the learned Sessions Judge Kohistan; therefore, he cannot be prosecuted again in the same FIR by the learned Judicial Magistrate Dassu, for an offence which is later on inserted by, the prosecution.
4. On the other hand, the learned Additional Advocate General argued that the offences committed by the petitioner fall within two different heads of law and no embargo in such like matter has legally been placed on the jurisdiction of law enforcing agency or courts for prosecution of such offences or trial of cases in courts of competent jurisdiction. .5. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner as well as the Additional Advocate General and gone through the record.
6. The main contention of learned counsel for the petitioner is that proceedings before the court of learned Judicial Magistrate Dassu are misuse of process of court as the trial of the petitioner under section 15 of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Arms Act, 2013 was also conducted in the court of learned Sessions Judge Kohistan and the learned Sessions Judge has not believed the recovery of pistol in his acquittal order dated 08.10.2015, however, bare perusal of the record including heading of the judgment of acquittal would show that the learned Sessions Judge has only tried the petitioner under sections 302/324/34/109, P.P.C. and not under section 15 of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Arms Act, 2013.
7. Though it is a settled principle of law that an accused may not be punished for the same offence twice but here in case in hand, the petitioner has been tried and later on acquitted and that too, only under sections 302/324/34/109, P.P.C. while sending his case for trial before the learned Judicial Magistrate Dassu for trial under section 15 of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Arms Act, 2013 is very much in accordance with law.
8. The contention of the learned counsel for petitioner that he could not be prosecuted and punished for the same offence more than once is misconceived one.
9. Article 13(a) of the Constitution provides that no person shall be prosecuted or punished for the same offence more than once, is applicable only if the accused is convicted and punished. In case of acquittal, the second prosecution is not prohibited, however, in such state of affairs; section 403, Cr.P.C. would be applicable as section 403, Cr.P.C. prohibits the second trial for an offence during the course of existence of conviction or acquittal of a person, as the case may be, in consequence of final adjudication.
10. The offences, wherein he has been acquitted, are independent one while the present proceedings under section 15 of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Arms Act, 2013 have no nexus with the aforementioned offences.
11.The principle enshrined in Article 13(a) of the Constitution as well as the doctrine of law, contained in section 403, Cr.P.C. is century old principle of law based and derived therefrom the ancient maxim that "Absoluta sententia expositore non indiget" meaning thereby that no accused shall be subject to peril twice for the same offence.
12.But as discussed hereinabove, neither the offence, petitioner charged with, is one and the same nor petitioner has previously put to trial for the same offence.
13.Therefore, for the reasons mentioned hereinabove, this petition filed under section 561-A, Cr.P.C., could not be entertained, being devoid of the legal merit, and is dismissed accordingly.