' ASIF SAEED KHAN KHOSA, J. --- Amjad All and Khizar Hayat appellants had allegedly murdered three persons namely Muhammad Aslam, Muhammad Ramzan and Mst. Kausar Parveen and had also injured another namely Mst. Bashiran Bibi in a gory incident taking place at about 05.30 am. on 15.04.2005 in village Kesupur in the area of Police Station Bhera, District Sargodha and for commission of the said offences they were booked in. case F.I.R. No, 89 registered at the said Police Station in the same morning. After a regular trial conducted by an Anti-Terrorism Court the appellants were convicted for offences under Sections 302(b)/34, P.P.C., 7(a) of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, 324/34, PPC, 336/34, P.P.C., 337-F(iii)/34, P.P.C. and 449/34, P.P.C. and they were sentenced to death on three counts of the charge under Section 302(b), P.P.C. read with Section 34, P.P.C. besides having been sentenced to death on the charge under Section 7(a) of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 in addition to their sentences .passed for the other offences. An appeal filed by the appellants before the High Court had subsequently failed, their convictions and sentences recorded by the Trial Court were upheld and the sentences of death passed against them were confirmed. Hence, the present appeal by leave of this Court granted on 10.02.2012.
2.Leave to appeal had been granted in this case in order to reappraise the evidence, to attend to the question of the sentences of death passed against the appellants and also to consider as to whether the convictions and sentences of the appellants for an offence under Section 7(a) of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 were justified. in the circumstances of the case. With the assistance of the learned counsel for the parties we have considered all the above-mentioned aspects of the case on which leave to appeal had been granted, 3.In the case In hand three persons had been done to death, Including a lady, and another lady had been Injured In an incident taking place in daylight, An F.I.R in respect of the said incident had been lodged with sufficient promptitude inasmuch the matter had been reported to the police within two hours of the occurrence at the local Police Station which was situated about 7 kilometers away from the scene of the crime: Both the appellants had been nominated In the FIR, and specific roles had been attributed to them therein: The prosecution had produced three eye-witnesses before the Trial Court and they were Jahan Khan complainant (PW-18), the father of all the three deceased, Mat. Bashiran Bibi (PW-14), who was an injured witness besides being a sister of all the three deceased, and Ahmed Bakhs.h (PW-15), The eye-witnesses produced by the prosecution, particularly Jahan Khan complainant (PW-16) and Mat. Bashiran Blbi (PW-14), were natural witnesses because they were Inmates of the house wherein one part of the occurrence had taken place. The said eye-witnesses had made consistent statements before the Trial Court fully incriminating the present appellants in the offences alleged against them and the medical evidence had provided sufficient support to them. It has been argued by the learned counsel for the appellants that the distances between the victims and the assailants stated by the above- mentioned eye-witnesses were not supported by the medical evidence but we note that the occurrence in issue had developed in many phases at the spot and the assailants as well as the victims were running around and the arena extended from a mosque to the nearby street and then finally to the house of . the complainant party, In that kind of a situation It would be quite difficult to say with exactitude as to what exactly was the distance between the assailants and the victims at the time when the victims were fired at The motive set up by the prosecution was based upon a dispute between the parties over some landed property and the suggestions made by the defence to the eye-witnesses produced by the prosecution went a long way in accepting the motive set up by the prosecution, Some crime-empties secured from the place of occurrence had matched with the fire-arms recovered from the present appellants and that aspect of the case had provided, corroboration to the ocular account, After an exhaustive analysis of the evidence available on the record both the Courts below had concurred in their conclusion regarding guilt of the appellants having been established beyond reasonable doubt and upon our own independent evaluation of the evidence we have not been able to take a view of the matter different from that concurrently taken by the Courts below.
4. We have particularly attended to the question of the appellants' sentences of death and have observed that the appellants had demonstrated extreme high-handedness and brutality inasmuch they started firing in a mosque, chased the victims in a street and then followed them inside the complainant party's house and throughout they kept on firing and murdering three innocent persons and Injuring another. This kind of conduct displayed by the appellants surely detracted from any sympathy to be extended to them in the matter of their sentences of death.
5.It has been pointed out by the learned counsel for the appellants that a partial compromise had been arrived at between the appellants and the heirs of the deceased but we note that the said aspect of the case is highly contentious. The asserted compromise is denied by the complainant party and the issue as to who were actually the heirs of the deceased and who could enter into a compromise with the appellants is already sub judice before a civil Court through an appeal. We have, therefore, decided not to enter into the said aspect of the case, particularly when the last order passed by. this Court on 21.12.2017 shows that it had been held by this Court on that date that the partial compromise between the parties was not acceptable.
6.The last aspect of this case highlighted in the leave granting order is as to whether the Courts below were justified in convicting and sentencing the appellants for an offence under Section 7(a) of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 or not. We note in that context that a mere firing at one's personal enemy in the backdrop of a private vendetta or design does not ipso facto bring the case within the purview of Section 6 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 so as to brand the action as terrorism.. There was no 'design' or 'object' contemplated by Section 6 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 involved in the case in hand. We further note that by virtue of item No, 4(ii) of the Third Schedule to the Anti- Terrorism Act, 1997 a case becomes triable by an Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 a case becomes triable by an Anti-Terrorism Court if use of fire-arms or explosives, etc. in a mosque, imambargah, church, temple or any other place of worship is involved in the case. That entry in the Third Schedule only makes such a case triable by an Anti-Terrorism Court but such a case does not ipso facto become a case of terrorism for the purposes of recording convictions and sentences under Section 6 read with Section 7 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997. The case in hand had. thus. rightly been tried by an Anti-Terrorism Court but the said Court could not have convicted and sentenced the appellants for an offence under Section 7(a) of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 as it had separately convicted and sentenced the appellants for the offences of murder, etc. committed as ordinary crimes.
7. For what has been discussed above this appeal is partly allowed and the appellants' convictions and sentences recorded and upheld by the Courts below for the offence under Section 7(a) of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 are set aside but as regards the remaining convictions and sentences of the appellants the same are upheld and maintained and this appeal is dismissed to that extent.