' The facts briefly stated are that defendant No, 2 is a company wherein is employed defendant No,
1. The plaintiffs as per averment made in para. 2 of the plaintiffs issued a group insurance policy in favour of the said defendant No, 2, wherein according to them there is an exception to the effect that the case under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 and Social Security Ordinance, 1965 were not covered under it. The plaintiffs further pleaded that there is similar provision under Standing Order No, 10-B of the West Pakistan Standing Orders Ordinance which exclude the case covered under the Workmen's Compensation Act and Social Security Ordinance from the purview of group life insurance policy.
' On 25-5-1976 defendant No, 1 a workman employed by defendant No, 2, filed an application for compensation and group insurance benefit under the Standing Order No, 10-B of the West Pakistan Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968 alleging therein that on 27-6-1972 he met with an accident injuring his left knee, received treatment from the Social Security Institution and was cured but there remained disability to the extent of certain percentage. He resumed his formal duties after 4 months of medical treatment. Subsequently in the end of the year 1974 he felt severe and unbearable pain in his left leg, informed his employer who sent him for treatment to the Social Security institute where it was disclosed that he was suffering from cancer of the leg which was therefore amputed above the knee to save his life.
2. According to defendant No, 1 as per his statement in the application before the Commissioner for Worksmen Compensation at Karachi as a result of the amputation of his leg, suffered 70 % partial disability and that he was earning Rs, 315 per month as wages. He claimed that the plaintiffs and defendant No, 2 be directed to pay him group insurance money amounting to Rs, 14,000 and costs and medical treatment and certificate charges. The said case was contested by the present plaintiffs and defendant No,
2. The Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation after hearing the parties by order passed on 9-10-1977 allowed the said application and ordered the plaintiffs to deposit Rs, 14,500 within 10 day of the passing of the said order for payment to defendant No, 1 and further held that defendant No, 2 were also liable for this amount in case for any reason the amount could not be recovered from the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs have challenged the above- mentioned order by filing the present suit on the plea that the said order is illegal mala fide, arbitrar without jurisdiction and void, and hence not binding. In the suit the plaintiffs have claimed the following reliefs :-
(a) Declaration that the order dated 9-10-1977 passed by defendant No, 3 in application 102/76 (under Standing Order 10-B) is illegal, mala fide, void and without jurisdiction and not binding on the plaintiff.
(b) Permanent injunction restraining defendant No, 3 personally or through any other agency to execute the above order against the plaintiff.
(c)Cost of the suit.
(d) Any other relief which this honourable Court may deem fit and proper."
3. For the purposes of court-fee and jurisdiction the suit has been valued as per para. 19 of the plaint as follows :- "The suit for the purposes of court-fee and jurisdiction is valued at Rs, 26,000 for declaration and Rs, 200 for injunction and court-fee I paid accordingly."
4. During the proceedings of the suit notices were issued to the learned Advocate for the parties to address the Court on the question as to whether the value put by the plaintiffs in para. 19 reproduced above is arbitrary and if so whether the suit ought to have been filed in the first instance in the Court of the lowest grade competent to try the same under section 15, C. P. C.
5. Pursuant to the above notices the learned Advocates for the parties were heard on the questions referred to above. Mr. Pishori learned counsel for the plaintiff submitted that though the award in question sought to be set aside and declared as illegal, mala fide, void and without jurisdiction, is for Rs, 14,500 it was open to plaintiffs within the purview of section 7 (iv) (c) of the Court Fees Act in their absolute discretion to decide and fix the value of the suit for the purpose of Court-fee and jurisdiction. Reliance was placed by the learned counsel upon the case of Mian Karam Elahi v.
Muhammad Bashir (1) and Ghulam Qadir v. Messrs Balak Mal & Sons (2).
6. I have carefully considered the arguments of the learned counsel for the parties and finding that the value put by the plaintiffs on the subject matter of the suit at Rs, 26,000 for purposes of declaration and Rs, 200 fo injunction is arbitrary and is liable to be reviewed by the Court in exercise o its power under Order VII, rule 11, C. P. C.
' In order to determine the value of the subject matter involved in the suit the principal observations in the case of Bai Lilavanti and others v. Vadilal Purshottamdas (3) cited with approval in the case of Muhammad Siddiq v. Haji Ahmed & Co. (4) may be referred. The learned Division Bench in their own words summarised the position as follows :- "Similarly, in the case of Bai Lilavanti and others v. Vadilal Purshottamdas it was held that section 8 of the Suits Valuation Act is not applicable to suits under section 24 of the Bombay Civil Courts Act.
Under it the jurisdiction is to be determined according to the amount or value of the subject- matter. If the subject-matter exceeds an amount or value of Rs, 5,060 then the second class Subordinate Judge had no jurisdiction to try the suit. In that case the subject-matter of the plaintiff's suit was the setting aside of the two decrees under which he was liable to pay Rs, 5,366- 4-6. That was held to be the value of the subject-matter of the suit and the second class Subordinate j Judge was found to have no jurisdiction to try such suit."
(1) PLD 1949 Lah. 8 (2) PLD 1949 Lah. 61
(3) AIR 1945 Bom. 474 (4) PLD 1967 Kar. 468
7. The learned Division Bench in the case of Muhammad Siddiq after thorough review of the case law on the subject and the principles followed in this part of the country since the decision of the Sind Court in Lakhomal Deepchand and another v. Deepchand Tolaram and others (1) held :- "It seems to us that ordinarily in suits falling under section 7(iv)(c) a plaintiff is entitled to put his own valuation but in the case the Court comes to the conclusion that it is arbitrarily fixed it can put its own valuation and ask the plaintiff to pay Court-fee on the valuation. We are in respectful agreement with the view of Davis, C. J. That absence of the rules under section 9 of the Suits Valuation Act is no bar to the exercise of the power under Order VII, rule 11, C. P. C. And that the question as to what is proper valuation depends upon the circumstances of each suit and the judicial decision of the Court. To hold otherwise would mean to give unlimited power to litigants in drafting their prayers so as to include or exclude relief with a view to confer jurisdiction on the Court to try the suit."
8. Reference may also be made here to the case of Badrul Islam v. Qamarul Islam and 4 others (2) where a learned Single Judge of this Court after reviewing the case reported in AIR 1937 Sind 241 ; PLD 1959 Kar. 802 ; PLD 1964 Kar. 386 and PLD 1967 Kar. 168 came to the conclusion that the plaintiffs cannot value the relief claimed arbitrarily and that this principle is applicable to suits for accounts as to suits for declaratory relief. The view expressed in the case of Ch. Muhammad Val v.
Mst. Ahmad Jahan Be gum (3) which followed the principle laid down by the learned Laboure High Court in Mian Karam Elahi and Ghulam Qadir, was not followed as not applicable to this part of the country.
9. Lastly reference may be made to the case of Rachappa Subrao Jadhay Desai v. Shidappa Venkatra (4) where the practice of valuing a prayer for a declaratory decree at a certain amount was condemned with the observation that if any part of the fee payable and paid was a fixed fee under Schedule II of the Act, then the notional value of the property or any part of it could not displace its real value for the purpose of jurisdiction.
10. In the circumstances the inescapable conclusion is that the subject matter in the present suit is the award for Rs, 14,500 which is sought to be set aside and got rid of. The Commissioner for Workmen Compensation awarded the said amount to be paid to the present defendant No, 1, the subject-matter of the suit could not therefore be other than Rs, 14,500. The value put by the plaintiffs cannot be accepted as the same is obviously, so as to enable them to file the suit in this Court.
' In the light of the above discussions the suit ought to have been filed in the first instance in the Civil Courtsat Karachi, as required by section 15 of the C. P. C. Which provides that every suit shall be instituted in -the Court of lowest grade competent to try it.
11. For the reasons stated above the plaint is ordered to be returned, to be presented to the Court of competent jurisdiction.
(1) AIR 1937 Sind 241 (2) PLD 1971 :Car. 682
(3) PLD 1970 Kar. 548 (4) AIR 1918 P C 118