' SHAMS MEHMOOD MIRZA, J.--As the issues raised in this writ petition and other connected writ petitions bearing W.P. No,14322 of 2016, W.P. No,144595 of 2016 and W.P. No,14227 of 2016 are identical, the same are, for the sake of convenience, considered together and decided through this common judgment.
2. The challenge in all the writ petitions is to the legality and validity of Notification dated 27.04.2016 (the Notification) issued by the Ministry of Information, Broadcasting and Heritage/respondent No,1 (the Ministry of Information) whereby the Urdu feature film "Maalik" was declared as uncertified film in the whole of Pakistan.
3. Facts of the case are not in dispute and shall appear shortly in this judgment. The task of this Court is to determine the validity of the power exercised by the Ministry of Information under section 9 (2) of the Motion Pictures Ordinance, 1979 (the Ordinance) in decertifying the film "Maalik" in the context of Article 19 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 which guarantees freedom of speech and expression. The film "Maalik" was granted a censorship certificate on 06.04.2016 on the recommendation of Central Board of Film Censors
(CBFC) but said film was subsequently decertified by the Ministry of Information in exercise of powers under section 9 (2) of the Ordinance. In order to have a better understanding of the controversy, section 9 of the Ordinance to the extent it is relevant is reproduced hereunder.
' Revisional powers of the federal Government.--(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Ordinance, the Federal Government may at any stage call for the record of any proceedings in relation to any film which is pending before or has been decided by the Board and, after such inquiry into the matter as it considers necessary, and without notice to the person who has applied for certification of the film or to whom a certificate in respect of the film has been granted or to the distributor or exhibitor of such film, make such order in relation thereto as it thinks fit.
(2) Without prejudice to the powers conferred on it by sub section (1), the Federal Government may, by notification in the official Gazette, direct that--
(a) a film or class of films in respect of which a certificate has been granted under this Ordinance or under the Censorship of Films Act, 1963 shall be deemed to be an uncertified film or class of films in the whole or any part of Pakistan: ' Provided that no such order shall be made by the Federal Government unless it is satisfied that it is necessary to do so in the interest of the glory of Islam or the integrity, security or defence of Pakistan or any part thereof, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency or morality, or to prevent the commission of, or incitement to, an offence.
' The Notification itself is remarkable in that it does not contain any reasons for the exercise of power under the Ordinance. The parawise comments filed by the Ministry of Information, however, do furnish the reasons for placing a ban on the said film by decertifying it. It was stated that after the release of the film in question, a number of complaints were received by CBFC from the general public pointing towards the following controversial scenes and the dialogues: i. The movie contains poignant criticism against the judiciary by apparently depicting a character of a judge who deliberately prolongs the cases by not issuing judgments. The dialogues in the films deliver a serious threat and warning for the judge and the judiciary to dispose of the cases urgently. ii. The movie presents Pakistan as a lawless state where the state institutions are shown as crippled, inefficient, incapacitated hence openly inciting the common citizen to take law in their own hands. iii. The law enforcement agencies have been shown as incapable and corrupt thus the sacrifices made by them as a front defense line in the war against terrorism have been dishonored by hurting the sentiments of families of Shaheed police personnel in an insolent manner. iv. The police force has been characterized in the movies as kidnapers, pimps and always working in the interest of the politicians by disregards its duties. v. The movie projects a 'celebrated and heroic death' of a former Afghan Jihad Mujahid which is against the spirit of the National Action Plan being successfully implemented jointly by the political and the military leadership of the country. vi.
The central characters of the film have shown a feudal politician who rises to the seat of Chief Minister through unfair means. The politicians, as a whole, have been shown to be corrupt, immoral and dishonest with the people. A rape scene containing Pashtun girl by a Sindhi politician has also been depicted in the movie and revealed that the entire political system is unjust, corrupt and incapable and all the politicians are busy in minting money under the name of democracy. vii. As per complaints by the viewers, the movie has disconsolately targeted all the linguistic communities living in Pakistan. The Pashtuns, the Balochs. and Sindhis have lodged their protest in particular that their communities have been shown in an unwanted and insulting manner in the movie which hurts their sentiments. viii. Political activists also expressed their reaction to the CBFC aboht the way the movie has demeaned the sanctity of vote during elections. The movie has humiliated the voters by showing the politicians who are elected through their votes as of a villain character: ix. The families of the shaheed police officials from across the country also complained after watching the movie that the police is shown as a crippled and contemptuous force and as a whole an unjust and corrupt force. The police force is presented in the movie as always working in the interest of the politicians disregarding its duties. The film has given the impression that the entire police force of the country is incapable and corrupt thus draining down the sacrifices made by the police as a front defence line in the war against the terrorism. x. A large number of complaints from KPK province has also been received which state that the movie has hurt the sentiments of Pashtun community by showing the rape of a Pashtun girl by a seemingly Sindhi politician. The complainants have expressed that the rape scene has caused bias, prejudice and hatred among different communities of the society living together in Sindh.
It was further stated that the film in question has not been banned but only decertified under section 9 of the Ordinance.
4. The documents appended with the parawise comments show that the Chairman CBFC on receipt of the alleged complaints moved a summary wherein the following was proposed ' The Censor certificate hearing No,54/M-112016 dated 6th April, 2016 which was granted to M/s Footprint (Pvt.) Limited Karachi for the film "MAALIK", on the recommendation of the members of the Board, may kindly be revoked in the prescribed manner by the M/s Information, Broadcasting and national Heritage declaring the subject movie as uncertified film by involving section 9(2) a of the Motion Pictures Ordinance, 1979. Draft Notification is also enclosed for perusal and approval.
(Annex-E)
' The Secretary, Ministry of Information upon receiving the summary simply made a note thereon as follows.
"Approved to decertify"
5. In the present case, it may relevantly be pointed out that CBFC at the time of initial screening of the film did not find anything objectionable in it and granted it the requisite certificate for public exhibition. Section 5 of the Ordinance stipulates that a film shall not be certified for public exhibition if, in the opinion of the Board, the film or any part thereof is prejudicial to the glory of Islam or the integrity, security or defence of Pakistan or any part thereof, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency or morality or amounts to the commission of, or incitement to, an offence. So apparently, CBFC, at the time of reviewing the film "Maalik", did not find the content thereof to be in any way non-compliant of the requirements of section 5 of the Ordinance. It was only on the receipt of the alleged complaints that CBFC took the action of recommending to the Ministry of Information to decertify the film. No doubt the Ministry of Information reserves the power to decertify any film in terms of section 9(2) of the Ordinance. However, such power by virtue of the proviso to section 9(2) of the Ordinance is circumscribed by the satisfaction of the Ministry of Information that such decertification is necessary in the interest of the glory of Islam or the integrity, security or defence of Pakistan or friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency or morality, or to prevent the commission of, or incitement to, an offence. It is evident from the record that no such determination was made by the Ministry of Information regarding its satisfaction of the objective criteria provided for in the proviso to section 9 (2) of the Ordinance. It is furthermore apparent that the Chairman. CBFC simply recommended decertification of the film to the Ministry of Information which, without application of mind, acted upon the said recommendation.
6. In Messrs Baho Film Corporation v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan PLD 1981 Lahore 295, this Court had the occasion to examine subsections (1) and (2) of section 9 of the Ordinance. The import of both the subsections was explained in the following terms ' Section 9 is pre-fixed with a heading which reads "Revisional Powers of the Federal Government".
The heading pre-fixed to a section is generally intended to give an indication as to the scope or object of the whole section of its main part. However, when one reads the whole of section 9 of the Ordinance, its becomes clear that only subsection (1) thereof deals with revisional powers of the Federal Government, whereas subsection (2) does not do so, subsection (2) of section 9 gives the Federal Government further powers, without prejudice to the revisional powers available to it under subsection (1), to decertify films for violation of the "ground norm" stated in section 6 To understand the thin umbilical chord that connects subsection (1) with subsection (2), an examination of clause
(a) of sub section- (2) of section 4, subsection (2) of section 5 and section 6 are necessary, under sections 5(1) and 6, the Board after examining the film, has to find it suitable for public exhibition and if it considers that it is so suitable for unrestricted public exhibition, under section 4(2)(a), it must grant a "U" certificate for unrertricted (sic) public exhibition. Under subsection (1) of section 9, the Federal Government can revise the first decision, on the ground that it violates the "grund norm" stated in section 6 or the second decision, on the ground that the certificate should have been granted only for restricted public exhibition. This is possible in cases of new films submitted to the Board for certification after the coming into force of the Ordinance, as they all would be dealt with by the Board. But since the bulk of the films would be those certified under the earlier Act of 1963, the cases of these films coming up before the Board for decertification or for change of the character of the certificate and thus before the Federal Government in revisional jurisdiction under subsection (1) of section 9 on a different "grund norm" and granted a "U" certificate by the earlier authority under the 1963 Act and not by the. Board constituted under the present Ordinance. To meet these cases, subsection (2) of section 9 has been enacted. And since subsection (2) of section 9 grants powers of an original nature, it has been enlarged to also meet similar cases relating to films certified after the coming into force of the Ordinance. Thus, with regard to films certified after the coming into force of the Ordinance, the Federal Government can either decertify the same for the violation of the "grund norm" stated in section 6 or alter the character of the certificate granted from "U" to "R" in revisional jurisdiction under subsection (1) of section 9 or by original proceedings decertify the film or change the character of the certificate under subsection
(2) of section 9, but with regard to films certified earlier by the authority constituted under the 1963 Act, if no proceedings with regard to decertification or alteration of the certificate are pending before the Board, then action can only be taken under subsection (2) of section 9. Now then turning to revisional jurisdiction in general, one would assume that revisional interference is intended to correct orders which have been passed and are without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or which have been passed with material irregularity, but under subsection (1) of section 9, the Federal Government, by calling for the record of any proceedings of a Board and without hearing the party affected, not only can make an order in respect of a case which has been decided by the Board, but also make an order where no order is passed and the case is still pending. The opening words "Notwithstanding anything contained in this Ordinance", do not relate to or amplify the nature of order which the Federal Government can pass when exercising revisional jurisdiction, but relates to the stage at which any proceedings can be called for scrutiny. For instance, a Board may have initiated action under subsection (1) of section 8, but it cannot, without holding some inquiry and coming to the finding that the films has been exhibited in contravention of any of the conditions subject to which it has been certified, suspend exhibition and refer the case to the Federal Government for decertification of the film. But notwithstanding anything contained in subsection (1) of section 8, the Federal Government can call for the record of the case from the Board, even though no final order has been passed, can make such order as it may deem fit. The words "make such order in relation thereto as it thinks fit" do not mean any order as it may deem fit, but such orders as the Board itself in the given circumstances of a case on the basis of its inquiry or evidence before it, was expected to pass within the compass of the provisions of law in which action was initiated and/or could have been concluded. If the Federal Government is given unabridged powers to pass any order in any given case, on the pretext of exercising revisional jurisdiction it would be giving the Federal Government a lever to lay down new principles of policy or establish new standards for various matters, not fixed or established by the President in the Ordinance. Such unfettered liberty cannot be given to the Federal Government as a reward for exercising revisional jurisdiction. The scope of the words "make such orders in relation thereto as it may deem fit" must be allowed to remain in channelized banks and not be allowed to vagrantly over-flow. #TBS NJ) #TBE It is evident, therefore, that the satisfaction of the Ministry of Information that a movie and its content violates the "ground norms" mentioned in section 9(2) (a) of the Ordinance is a sine qua non, for the decertifying the said movie. The Ministry of Information has, however, failed to present a demonstrable case either that the decision to decertify the film was premised on valid reasons that meet he satisfaction required by proviso to section 9(2)(a) of the Ordinance or that the movie and its content in fact offend the class of things mentioned therein. The film "Maalik" is at best a work of fiction. Its plot and the characters portrayed therein may or may not have similarity and relevance to the real persons or situation in this Country. But is this justification enough to place a ban on the screening of the film? The reasons furnished in the parawise comments for decertifying the decertification of the film do not, in the opinion of this Court, meet the requirements of section 9(2)(a) of the Ordinance.
7. It would be in order to cite certain judgments touching upon the subject of censorship from the other jurisdictions as none was cited from our jurisdiction. K.A. Abbas v. Union of India [1971] 2 SCR 446 was a case concerning pre-censorship of the movie "A tale of Four Cities". The case was decided on the issue that pre-censorship will not be tolerated vis-a-vis, the freedom of speech and expression. Justice Hidayatullah, C.J., made the following observations that are relevant to the present case.
' The standards that we set out for our censors must make a substantial allowance in favour of freedom thus leaving a vast area for creative art to interpret life and society with some of its foibles along with what is good. We must not look upon such human relationships as banned in toto and forever from human thought and must give scope for talent to put them before society. The requirements of art and literature include within themselves a comprehensive, view of social life and not only in its ideal form and the line is to be drawn where the average man moral man begins to feel embarassed or disgusted at a naked portrayal of life without the redeeming touch of art or genius of social value. If the depraved begins to see in these things more than what an average person would, in much the same way as it is wrongly said, a Frenchman sees a woman's legs in everything, it cannot be helped. In our scheme of things ideas having redeeming social or artistic value must also have importance and protection for their growth.
8. The task of censorship is always delicate and a balance has to be struck between the right to freedom of expression and the various limitations mentioned in proviso to section 9(2) (a) of the Ordinance on the said right. In this context, the High Court of Nagpur in the case of Bhagwati Charun Shukla v. Provincial Government AIR 1947 Nag 1 laid down the standard for judging the content under review. was thus held .... that the effect of the words must be judged from the standards of reasonable, strong minded, firm and courageous men; and not those of weak and vacillating. This in our opinion is the correct approach in judging the effect of exhibition of a film or of reading a Book. It is the standard of ordinary reasonable man or as they say in English law, the man on the top of a Clampham omnibus."
9. Justice Bhagwati in Naraindas v. State of Madhya Pradesh [19741 3 SCR 624 while dealing with the power of the State to select text books for obligatory use by the students observed: ' It is our firm belief, nay, a conviction which constitutes one of the basic values of a free society to which we are wedded under our Constitution, that, there must be free not only for the thought that we cherish, but also for the thought that we hate. As pointed out by Mr. Justice Holmes in Abramson v. United States, 250 U.S. 616: "The ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas-- the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market." There must be freedom of thought and the mind must be ready to receive new ideas, to critically analyse and examine them and to accept those which are found to stand the test of scrutiny and to reject the rest.
10. In Kornai Krishna v. Emperor AIR 1935 Cal 636, the Calcutta High Court was dealing with a case of a speech advocating change of Government with that of Bolshvik form of Government. It was observed by Lord Williams as under: ' All that the speaker did was to encourage the young men, whom he was addressing, to join the Bengal Youth League and to carry on a propaganda for the purpose of inducing as large a number of people in India as possible, to become supporters of the idea of communism as represented by the present Bolshevik system in Russia.
' It is really absurd to say that speeches of this kind amount to sedition. If such were the case, then every argument against the present form of Government and in favour of some other form of Government might be allowed to lead to hatred of the Government, and it might be suggested that such ideas brought the Government into contempt. To suggest some other form of Government is not necessarily to bring the present Government into hatred or contempt.
' Along the same lines is the dicta laid down in Manohar v. Government of Bombay AIR 1950 Bombay 210. In the said case, a writer was convicted for inciting violence by suggesting to the people to rise against the Anglo American Imperialism and their agents. While quashing his conviction, the Court said that It is true that the article does state that the working class and the coiling masses can get hold of power through the path of revolution alone. But the expression 'revolution' is used here, as is clear from the context in contradistinction to reformism or gradual evolution. The revolution preached is not necessarily a violent revolution.
' As the writer has not stated in this article that the toiling masses should take up arms and fight for their rights and thus achieve a revolution we refuse to read this expression as inciting the masses to violent methods.
' In Niharendu Dutt Majumdar v. Emperor AIR 1942 FC 23, the Federal Court examined the effects of a vulgar and abusive outburst against the Government made by the accused for which he was convicted under Rule 34 of the Defence of India Rules. Chief Justice Gwyer, while acquitting the person, stated thus. There is an English saying that hard words break no bones; and the wisdom of the common law has long refused to regard an actionable any words which, though strictly and liberally defamatory, would be regarded by all reasonable men as no more than mere vulgar abuse.
' The speech now before us is full of them But we cannot regard the speech, taken as a whole as inciting those who heard it, even though they cried "shame shame" at intervals, to attempt by violence or by public disorder to subvert the Government for the time being established by law in Bengal or elsewhere in India. That the appellant expressed his opinion about that system of Government is true, but he was entitled to do so; and his reference to it were, we might almost say, both common place and in common form, and un-likely to cause any Government in India a moments uneasiness. His more violent outburst were directed against the then Ministry in Bengal and against the Governor in Bengal in his political capacity but we do not feel able to say that his speech whatever may be thought of the form in which it was expressed, exceeded the legal limits of comment or criticism.
11. In Odyssey Communications Pvt. Ltd v. Lokvidayan Sanghatana and others AIR 1988 SC 1642, the Indian Supreme Court, held that ' It can no longer be disputed that the right of a citizen to exhibit films on the Doordarshan subject to the terms and conditions to be imposed by the Doordarshan is a part of the fundamental right of freedom of expression guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India which can be curtailed only under circumstances which are set out in clause (2) of Article 19 of the Constitution of India. The right is similar to the right of a citizen to publish his views through any other media such as newspapers, magazines, advertisement hoardings etc. subject to the terms and conditions of the owners of the media.
12. It is often said that art pleases and illuminates our lives by stimulating emotions as well as it upsets, prods and pokes and that art in all its shades should be available to audiences. The principle underlying a free, democratic society is that every individual has a right to decide what art he or she wants or does not want. A similar freedom to create E art must also be made available to the artists. The choice, however, remains with the society for rejection of certain expressions of art forms that is controversial. her presentation by Special Rapporteur of the United Nations in the field of cultural rights titled "The right to freedom of artistic expression and creativity", she said ' Artistic expressions and creations do not always carry, and should not be reduced to carrying, a specific message or information. In addition, the resort to fiction and the imaginary must be understood and respected as a crucial element of the freedom indispensable for creative activities and artistic expressions: representations of the real must not be confused with the real, which means. for example, that what a character says in a novel cannot be equated with the author's personal views. Hence, artists should be able to explore the darker side of humanity, and to represent crimes or what some may consider as "immorality", without being accused of promoting these.
13. The Courts all over the world have consistently held that freedom of expression would also apply to artistic work presenting controversial and shocking ideas. Lord Justice Stephen Sedley in Redmond-Bate v Director of Public Prosecutions [2000] HRLR 249 quite relevantly remarked that ' Free speech includes not only the inoffensive but the irritating, the contentious, the eccentric, the heretical, the unwelcome and the provocative provided it does not tend to provoke violence.
Freedom only to speak inoffensively is not worth having.
14. The concurring note of Justice Louis Brandeis given in Whitney v. People of California [274 U.S. 357, 359] is lauded as perhaps the greatest defense of freedom of speech ever written by a judge and this Court could do no better than to reproduce it.
' Those who won our independence believed that the final end of the state was to make men free to develop their faculties, and that in its government the deliberative forces should prevail over the arbitrary. They valued liberty both as an end and as a means. They believed liberty to the secret of happiness and courage to be the secret of liberty. They believed that freedom to think as you will and to speak as you think are means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth; that without free speech and assembly discussion would be futile; that with them, discussion affords ordinarily adequate protection against the dissemination of noxious doctrine; that the greatest menace to freedom is an inert people; that public discussion is a political duty; and that this should be a fundamental principle of the American government. They recognized the risks to which all human institutions are subject. But they knew that order cannot be secured merely through fear of punishment for its infraction; that it is hazardous to discourage thought, hope and imagination; that fear breeds repression; that repression breeds hate; that hate menaces stable government; that the path of safety lies in the opportunity to discuss freely supposed grievances and proposed remedies; and that the fitting remedy for evil counsels is good ones. Believing in the power of reason as applied through public discussion, they eschewed silence coerced by law- the argument of force in its worst form. Recognizing the occasional tyrannies of governing majorities, they amended the Constitution so that free speech and assembly should be guaranteed.
15. Lest anybody decries that films are not the sort of medium requiring protection under the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution, the words of Justice Clark in Joseph Burstyn, Inc v. Wilson, Commissioner of Education of New York 343 U.S. 495 (1952) are quite apposite. The facts of the case were that in 1950, the New York State Board of Regents in pursuance of a New York statute cancelled Joseph Burstyn's license to distribute his film "The Miracle" because according to them it was "sacrilegious." Burstyn brought an action claiming that the statute in question was unconstitutional as it violated his First Amendment right of free speech. It was held that; ' It is urged that motion pictures do not fall within the First Amendment's aegis because their production, distribution, and exhibition is a large-scale business conducted for private profit. We cannot agree. That books, newspapers, and magazines are published and sold for profit does not prevent them from being a form of expression whose liberty is safeguarded by the First Amendment. We fail to see why operation for profit should have any different effect in the case of motion pictures.
' Mr. Justice Frankfurter cited in his opinion the judgment in Cantwell v. Connecticut 310 U.S. 296, where Mr. Justice Roberts, speaking for the whole Court, said: "In the realm of religious faith, and in that of political belief sharp differences arise. In both fields the tenets of one man may seem the rankest error to his neighbor." Later in the opinion, Mr. Justice Frankfurter made the extremely relevant observations regarding the vague standards contained in the New York Statute under consideration ' It is this impossibility of knowing how far the form of words by which the New York Court of Appeals explained "sacrilegious" carries the proscription of religious subjects that makes the term unconstitutionally vague. To stop short of proscribing all subjects that might conceivably be interpreted to be religious, inevitably creates a situation whereby the censor bans only that against which there is a substantial outcry from .a religious group. And that is the fair inference to be drawn, as a matter of experience, from what has been happening under the New York censorship.
Consequently the film industry, normally not guided by creative artists, and cautious in putting large capital to the hazards of courage, would be governed by its notions of the feelings likely to be aroused by diverse religious sects, certainly the powerful ones. The effect of such demands upon art and upon those whose function is to enhance the culture of a society need not be labored.
16. The respondents retorted that violence would have erupted had the film "Maalik" continued to be screened. This plea has no merit. As per the petitioner's counsel, the film in question continued its screening in the cinemas in Khyber Pakhtunkhawa without any reaction from the audiences. Be that as it may, the perceived potential of threat of violence by the Government is not a ground for decertifying the movie. The Ordinance does not allow decertification of a movie on the value judgment of the Government rather the case must fall within the G limitations provided in the proviso to Seotion 9(2) thereof. The case of the Government rests on grounds that are alien to the Ordinance. It is now accepted position that ideas are strengthened when they are H challenged and are debated and not by acquiescence and enforced silence. The theory of marketplace of ideas (said to have originated from John Milton's Areopagitica) postulates a laissez faire approach to the regulation of speech and expression and states that the success or failure of ideas, theories and propositions will depend on their own merits and demerit. The underlying notion behind the theory is that rational individuals have the capacity to discern through the process of deliberation and exchange of competing ideas to realize the best possible result. e theme was also expanded on and reflected in Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.'s dissent in Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919), the case that finally established the marketplace of ideas as a. legal concept in the American legal jurisprudence.
17. In the context of the present case, it may be stated that an infringement of a right is not unconstitutional if it could be justified under the criteria set out in the proviso to section 9(2) of the Ordinance. The objective of the impugned decision and its underlying reasons, however, must not only satisfy the criteria set out in the proviso to section 9(2) of the Ordinance but they must be of sufficient importance to override the constitutionally protected right of freedom of expression. In addition thereto, the means adopted by the decision making authority must pass the proportionality test. In other words, the means employed must be rationally connected to the objective and should not be arbitrary, unfair or based on irrational considerations and that they be such that their effects on the limitation of rights and freedoms are proportional to the objective (see R v. Oakes [1986] 1 SCR 103).
18. The Notification and the reasons furnished in the parawise comments for decertifying the film "Maalik" have no nexus with the permissible limitations provided for in proviso to section 9 (2) of the Ordinance on the freedom of expression. Our Constitution and the Ordinance do not allow absolute freedom of expression and free speech. The standards provided therein are, however, general in nature and, therefore, the Government's action in decertifying the movie or placing a ban on it has to be strictly construed. Keeping in view the grounds offered by the Government, the movie in question does not appear to fall in category that section 9(2) of the Ordinance permits the Government to exclude from public view. In the present case, there is absolutely no justification for making an exception to the basic principles of freedom of expression as enunciated by various judgments mentioned above.
19. In the result, this writ petition is allowed and Notification dated 27.04.2016 is declared to be without lawful authority and of no legal effect.