' IRFAN SAADAT KHAN, J:- The instant Constitutional Petition has been filed with the following prayers:
1. To declare the petitioner as legal and bona fide owner of the residential plot No.D-131 of P&T Cooperative Housing Society Ltd., measuring 600 Sq. Yds., in sector 31-D, Korangi, Karachi, situated in sector 13-D, Korangi, Karachi.
2. To call for RNP of the residential Plot from the respondents Nos.1 and 6.
3. Set aside the impugned order dated 08-02-2013, passed by the learned Minister of Law Government of Sindh (respondent No.1) in revision application No.SO(T)6(58)/2012 with special compensatory cost.
4. To Direct the respondent No.7 not to issue the certificate under section 59(1)(a) of Cooperative Society Act 1925 till finalization of this petition.
5. Any other relief which may deemed fit and proper.
2. Briefly stated, the facts of the case are that the petitioner's mother Mst. Sharifa Begum was stated to be the original member and second allottee of the residential plot bearing No.D-131, P&T Cooperative Housing Society Ltd., measuring 600 square yards. On 30.11.1980 mother of the petitioner moved an application to the respondent No.2 for transfer /mutation of the said property and paid due amount thereon. Then after fulfillment of all the legal requirements the said property was transferred in her name. Thereafter the petitioner's mother received a notice from the respondent No.2 mentioning therein that since development charges were not paid by her hence her plot has been cancelled and she was declared defaulter, which was also published in a newspaper. The petitioner's mother then moved an application before the respondent No.6 by stating that she is in possession of the said plot and without giving any show cause notice the allotment of the plot has wrongly been cancelled hence the same may be restored. The petitioner's mother then filed ABN No.32 /2009 under Section 54 of the Cooperative Societies Act, 1925, which was subsequently dismissed and thereafter she preferred an appeal bearing No.27 /2009 before the respondent No.6 which was decided in her favour. It was stated that when the matter was pending before the respondent No.6 the petitioner came to know that the said plot has been allotted in the name of respondent No.5 in the year 1997 and subsequently it was re-allotted in the name of respondent No.4 on 16.09.1997. It is also stated that when the matter was decided in favour of the petitioner, the respondent No.3 moved an application under Section 12(2), C.P.C. Before the respondent No.6, which application was dismissed vide order dated 23.04.2010. The petitioner then applied for execution certificate, which was also granted and the respondent No.6 issued an execution certificate in favour of the petitioner on 27.04.2010. Being aggrieved with the execution application the respondent No.3 moved an application before the Vth Senior Civil Judge, Karachi East, which application was then decided in favour of the said respondent vide order dated 22.10.2010 and the operation of the execution certificate was suspended by the respondent No.6 vide order dated 30.12.2010. The Vth Senior Civil Judge vide his order dated 22.10.2010 remanded the matter back to the respondent No.6 for deciding the matter between the petitioner and the respondents afresh. The matter thereafter proceeded before the respondent No.7 and this time also vide order dated 17.06.2011 the matter was decided in favour of the petitioner. In the meantime, the mother of the petitioner expired and the petitioner applied for mutation of the plot, which was allowed and the plot in question was mutated in his name vide entry dated 26.11.2011 and a fresh allotment order dated 09.12.2011 was issued. Meanwhile, the respondent No.6, before whom the matter between the petitioner and the respondent No.3 was pending, decided the matter in favour of the petitioner and against the said order the respondent No.3 filed a revision application before the respondent No.
1. The matter proceeded before the respondent No.1 who, vide order dated 08.02.2013, decided the matter in favour of the respondents and it is against this order that the present petition has been filed.
3. Ms. Najma Zehra Advocate has appeared on behalf of the petitioner and stated that the order passed by the respondent No.1 is not in accordance with law, since the order is defective on two grounds; firstly, the order was passed without providing opportunity of hearing to the petitioner and, secondly, the order has been passed in a perfunctory manner without discussing the matter and through a vague and sketchy order the matter has been decided. The learned counsel, while elaborating her viewpoint, submitted that a perusal of the order would reveal that the respondent No.,1 has simply recorded the facts of the case and thereafter jumped to the conclusion that the order passed by the respondents Nos.6 and 7 are not in accordance with law and hence allowed the application of the respondent without dilating upon the issues in a legal manner. She, therefore, submits that since the order is vague and non-specific the same may be set aside.
4. Mr. Ch. Khalid Rahim Arain Advocate has appeared on behalf of the respondent No.2 and has supported the contentions of the learned counsel for the petitioner and has stated that the order passed by the respondent No.1 dated 08.02.2013 is against the law.
5. Nobody is in attendance on behalf of the respondents Nos.3, 4 and _5 and this Court vide order dated 17.03.2015 has already held the service upon them good. Today also these persons were called but they had remained absent.
6. Mr. Miran Muhammad Shah, learned AAG representing the respondents Nos.1, 6 and 7 has refuted the arguments of the petitioner and stated that the respondent No.1, vide impugned order, has decided the issue against the petitioner, after finding force in the contention of the applicants, who are respondents in the present petition. He, therefore, supports the impugned order and states that this petition may be dismissed.
7. We have heard all the learned counsel at considerable length and have also perused the record.
8. It is seen from the impugned order that the respondent No.1 firstly recorded the facts of the case and thereafter quoted the observations made by the respondent No.7 and thereafter jumped to the conclusion that he finds force in the contention of the applicants. Learned AAG was specifically asked a question that could, by any stretch of imagination, this order be considered to be a legally sound order, to which he replied that in his view the order has been passed after finding force in the contention of the applicants. We totally disagree with the contention of the learned AAG.
Perusal of the order clearly reveals that in the said order the respondent No.1 has firstly discussed the facts of the case, and then after reproducing some portions of the order passed by the respondent No.7, he reached to the ultimate conclusion that he has found force in the contention of the applicants. The said order is totally silent as to what were the contentions of the applicants and how the respondent No.1 has reached to the conclusion that he has found force in the contention of the applicants.
9. The respondent No.1, in our view, has totally failed to discuss the reasons in his order as to how he has found force in the contention of the applicants, which in our view, has rendered this order to be not maintainable. It is a settled principle of law that an authority deciding the matter has to discuss the issue and thereafter to give its own view and A findings on that issue and thereafter either to allow or to dismiss the matter before it by giving cogent reasons. We are afraid that the order passed by the respondent No.1 does not appear to be a sound order as far as this aspect is concerned. Article 4 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973 and Section 24-A of the General Clauses Act (the Act) clearly stipulate deciding a matter in a legal manner. In our view the authority deciding the matter should give reasons with respect to the lis pending before it, which aspect is totally missing in the present case. The authority, while dealing with either judicial or quasi-judicial matters is required to give reasons in support of its decision. It is a trite A principle of law that any order in violation of Clause 24-A of the Act could not be considered to be an order in accordance with law. In this regard, we would like to quote the famous judgment given in the case of Mollah Ejahar Ali v. Government of East Pakistan (PLD 1970 Supreme Court 173) wherein a five members Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan has observed as under: "A judicial order must be a speaking order manifesting by itself that the Court has applied its mind to the resolution of the issues involved by their proper adjudication."
' In another judgment given by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in the case of Government of Sindh v. Muhammad Juman and another (2009 SCM R 1407) the Hon'ble Apex Court, while relying upon the judgment of Gouranga Mohan Sikdar v. The Controller of Import and Export (PLD 1970 SC 158) and Mollah Ejahar Ali v. Government of East Pakistan supra, has held that: "This Court in the cases reported as Gouranga Mohan Sikdar v. The Controller of Import and Export (PLD 1970 SC 158) and Mollah Ejahar Ali v. Government of East Pakistan PLD 1970 SC 173 held that the Court must pass a speaking judicial order manifesting by itself that the Court applied its mind to the issues involved in the case. Even section 24-A of the General Clauses Act requires an executive authority to pass the order reasonably, fairly, justly and by rendering reasons.
' It has also been held by a Division Bench of Lahore High Court in the case of M/s. Poly Pack Ltd. v.
Customs and Central Excise Appellate Tribunal and others (2005 PTD 2566) that: "It is settled law that "judicial order" must be speaking order manifesting by itself that the Court has applied its judicial mind to the issues and points of controversy involved in the causes. In any case the impugned judgment, which is not a speaking order and devoid of reasons is pot sustainable in law being in contravention of law declared by the Supreme Court of Pakistan in various cases, like Adamjee Jute Mills Ltd. v. The Province of East Pakistan and others (PLD 1959 SC
(Pak) 272), Gouranga Mohan Sikdar v. The Controller Import and Export and 2 others (PLD 1970 SC 158), Mollah Ejahar Ali v. Government of East Pakistan and others (PLD 1970 SC 173) and Muhammad Ibrahim Khan v. Secretary, Ministry of Labour and others (1984 SCMR 1014)."
10. We, therefore, in view of the above facts, have come to the irresistible conclusion that the order passed by the respondent No.1 could not, by any stretch of imagination, be considered to be an order fulfilling the requirements of Clause 24-A of the Act. Hence, the said order is set aside and the matter is remanded back to the respondent No .1 for deciding the same afresh in accordance with law, after granting opportunity of hearing to all the concerned parties, through a well-reasoned and speaking order thereby giving valid reasons for accepting or rejecting the contentions raised before him. Petition stands allowed in the above terms.
' Above are the reasons of our short order of even date.