This order would dispose of the present Revision Petition as also Criminal Revision No. 90E of 1980, as in these petitions two orders passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Faisalabad, on 28th September, 1980, allowing bail to Razaullah and Abdul Hamid, respondents in the present petition and Altaf Hussain, respondent in the other petition, who are all accused in case F. I. R. No. 58, dated 16th August, 1978 registered under sections 302/307/34, P. P. C. At Police Station Chuttiana, District Faisalabad, have been challenged on the .Ground that the respondents were not entitled to be released on bail under the third proviso to subsection (1) of section 497, Cr. P. C.
2. The petitioner has assailed the aforementioned orders contend--ing that the respondents' trial could have been concluded within two years from the date of their arrest as the case was fixed for bearing on 25th August, 1980 when copies of the statements of the prosecution witnesses, recorded under section 161, Cr. P. C. Were delivered to the respondents, but the trial had to be postponed on a request made by the respondents that they had also engaged Syed Ihsan Qadir Shah, Advocate, Sargodha, as their counsel and that he was proceeding for Hajj and would not be available till the end of October, 1980. The respondents were arrested by the Police on 26th September, 1978 and in case they had not made a request for adjournment, their trial would have certainly concluded before 26th September, 1980 and thus the statutory period of two years mentioned in the third proviso to subsection (1) of section 497, Cr. P. C. Would not have expired.
According to the petitioner, the respondents had sought the adjournment of the case with rnala fide intention because they were duly represented by their counsel and they had not placed on record any power-of-attorney to show that they had engaged Syed Ihsan Qadir Shah, Advocate, Sargodha, justifying adjournment of the case on account of his non-availability. The respondents' sole object of getting their case adjourned was to take advantage of the provisions of the third proviso to subsection (1) of section 497, Cr. P. C. For being released on bail.
3. I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the respondents. On 25th August, 1980 copies of the statement of the P. Ws. Recorded under section 161, Cr. P. C. Were delivered to the respondents by the learned Additional Sessions Judge in whose Court the case was pending. After the delivery of the copies, a date was to be fixed for the commencement of the trial and it was at this stage that Razaullah, respondent, made a request to the Court that the case should be fixed for hearing in the first week of November, 1980, as Syed Ihsan Qadir Shah, Advocate, Sargodha, whom he had engaged to defend him in the case, was proceeding to perform Hajj and would be available only in the month of November, 1980. The learned Additional Sessions Judge allowed the request of Razaullah respondent and adjourned the case to 30th of October, 1980. The petitioner's contention that the request for adjournment was made by Razaullah, respondent, with some ulterior object, does not merit consideration because the learned Additional Sessions Judge had exercised his discretion and fixed 30th October, 1980 as the date for the commencement of the trial. The fact that Razaullah, respondent, was already represen--ted by a counsel or that he had not placed on the file a power-of-attorney executed by him in favour of Syed Ihsan Qadir Shah, Advocate, Sargodha, is not relevant for the disposal of the present revision petitions because, as noticed above, the learned trial Judge had allowed the request of Razaullah to postpone the trial on account of non-availability of Syed Ihsan Qadir Shah, Advocate, Sargodha. The prosecution or the petitioner could have opposed the request of Razaullah, respondent, on the ground now stated by them in this Court. The propriety of the order of the learned trial Judge to postpone the trial therefore, cannot be questioned by the petitioner.
4. The sole point for consideration in these two petitions is whether the delay in the trial of the respondents had been occasioned by an act or omission of the respondents or any other person acting on their behalf because only then their request for bail could be turned down by the Court.
The respondents were arrested by the Police on 26th September, 1978 and it was on 25th August, 1980 that the first step for the commencement of their trial was taken inasmuch as copies of the statements of the prosecution witnesses under section 161, Cr. P. C., as required by section 265-C (1) were delivered to them. Their trial could not commence before the expiry of seven days after the delivery of the copies in view of the provisions of section 265-C (1), Cr. P. C. The learned trial Judge instead of adjourning the case for seven days, which it was necessary for him to do, in view of the aforementioned legal provisions allowed- the request of Razaullah respondent and fixed 30th October, 1980 as the date of hearing in the case. It is evident that the above adjournment alone had not caused the delay in the trial and the statutory period of two years had not expired merely on account of that adjournment. It is also doubtful if the trial of the respondents would have concluded before 26th September, 1980 because that conclusion is based on the assumption that the prosecution would have been able to produce all the witnesses on the date fixed for the trial and no eventuality of whatsoever nature would have arisen necessitating the adjournment of the case beyond 26th September, 1980. Thus, under the circumstances of the case, it cannot be said that the respondents are responsible for the delay in the trial of the case and that the statutory period of two years has expired due to some act or omission of the respondents or any other person acting on their behalf. The impugned orders do not suffer from any legal lacuna justifying interference be this Court in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction. The revision petitions are, accordingly, dismissed.