DECISION ' This appeal is directed against the decision of the learned Vth Labour Court given on 25th October, 1981 dismissing the grievance petition of the appellant, retiring him on his allegedly attaining the age of sixty years, though his date of birth according to his school leaving certificate from the Head Master of the Junior Basic School, Meerut, U. P. In India, is 20th December, 1928. The main ground on which the learned Labour Court has dismissed the appellant's grievance petition is that as the employment of the appellant is regulated by the Pakistan Essential Services (Maintenance) Act, 1952, it has no jurisdiction in the matter. The subsidiary consideration which weighed with the learned Labour Court in dismissing the appellant's grievance petition was that the appellant had approached the Chairman, N. R. C., who had rejected his claim.
2. The issue whether an employee whose services were governed by the Pakistan 'Essential Services (Maintenance) Act, 1953, could have resort to any forum or was entitled to relief other than that provided under the said Act, was examined by the Supreme Court In the very recent case of Karachi Electric Supply Corporation Limited v. National Industrial Relations Commission and another decided on 1st December, 1981 wherein while disagreeing with the view of the Peshawar High Court in the case of M/s. Indus River Contractors, Tarbella v. Aziz Ahmed, Member, and another (1) it observed as follows :- "the High Court held that by implication the specified authority (1) P D 1980 Pesh. 216 has the subsidiary power of doing all the necessary acts to enforce what is laid down in the Rules and regulations. But this conclusion fails to take into consideration that where a statute provides a forum for dealing with the violation no other authority can be a substitute for it the more so when the Act is an emergency legislation and has taken care to exclude the application of other laws which provide a forum for resolving the dispute between the employer and the employee, arising from the violation of the terms and conditions of service."
3. The Supreme Court has further clarified its view in this behalf in a subsequent paragraph in the same judgment which reads as follows :- "Section 5 deals with the cessation of employment either at the behest of the employer or the employee. It would thus include termination of service according to the terms and conditions, discharge, dismissal, absence or abandonment and retrenchment. The direction issued in terms of rule 3 (2) (d) concerning the termination of employment will also be covered in view of the wide and all-embracing language of this section. Any discontinuation of employment has necessarily to be judged from the test laid down in the section namely, that it was "Without reasonable excuse".
Therefore, if the respondents felt aggrieved either by their termination of service or dismissal they should have taken steps to institute the proceedings as provided by section 7 and in that event it would have been open to the Court to determine as to whether the termination, according to the terms and conditions of service, or by way of dismissal or discharge, was without lawful excuse or not as the expression "without reasonable excuse" signifies an excuse which is not lawful".
4. It would, thus, appear that the view taken by the Supreme Court is that a person whose employment is regulated by the provisions of the Pakistan Essential Service (Maintenance) Act,.
1952, if he I aggrieved by the termination of his services, for whatever cause and in whatever manner, can have resort only to the forum and according to the procedure provided in the said Act and to no other authority and in no other manner. I may submit that a somewhat similar view was expressed by me in the High Court in the case of Pakistan Burmah-Shell, Karachi v. Sind Labour Court No. IV (1), where I bad observed as follows :-- "Mr. Nasir. Zahid conceded that in view of the aforesaid provisions in the Act, the complaint of - respondent No. 2 in respect of the actual termination of his employment was not maintainable by the trial Court. He, however, submitted a two-fold argument in support of his contention that the proceedings before the Labour Court upon the complaint of respondent No. 2 were nevertheless maintainable. His first argument was that though the Act provides punishment for termination of employment, it makes no provision for the ft-instatement of a workman whose services have been wrongly terminated and the payment to him of back benefits, which provisions are only contained 'in the 'L R.
0. He accordingly maintained that for the purpose of these benefits, which have been specifically claimed by respondent No. 2 in his {{FOOT NOTE}}
(I) PLD.1978 Kar. 109 {{FOOT NOTE}} ' complaint, there was no conflict or repugnancy between the Act and the I. R.
0., and hence the provisions of section 7-A of the Act would not be a bar to the maintainability of the complaint so far as these benefits are concerned. I am unable to agree with this submission of the learned counsel. Since the Act has made certain provisions in regard to the termination of services of a workman, the workman to whom the provisions of the Act have been made applicable can have resort only to the said provisions and not to the provisions of other laws dealing with the same matters or consequential matters."
5. For the reasons discussed by me above I am of the view that the grievance petition of the appellant was not maintainable before the learned Labour Court. I would, accordingly, dismiss the same.