' MUHAMMAD TARIQ ABBASI, J.---By way of this application condonation of delay in filing of the Criminal Appeal has been sought.
2. The record shows that initially, the appeal against acquittal was preferred on 26.6.2014; the office raised certain objections and sought their removal within seven days and as such the petitioner took back the appeal; he again filed the appeal on 12.9.2014 i.e, after about two and a half months, hence became time barred.
3. The learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that due to summer vacation, the appeal was not entertained and when the court opened, he immediately filed it, hence the delay is liable to be condoned.
4. Arguments heard and record perused.
5. We are afraid, the reasons given by the learned counsel for the petitioner can be accepted because as per notification, during the year 2014, the High Court remained closed for summer vacation from 1.7.2014 to 6.9.2014 and as such the courts opened on 8.9.2014. If the above mentioned stance of learned counsel for the petitioner is taken as correct, even then, it was for the petitioner to file the appeal on the first day on opening of the courts i.e, 8.9.2014, but came on 12.9.2014.
6. Time required for removal of objection is to be adhered to and failure to refile the appeal as directed by the office would become time barred. It is, therefore, clear that if the appellant/petitioner fails to refile the memorandum of appeal, within the time specified by the office, the extra time taken for removal of the objection would not be excluded while computing the period of limitation. Reliance in this regard may be made to the case of "Lahore Development Authority v. Muhammad Rashid" (1997 SCM R 1224).
7. It has been the consistent view of the Superior Courts that in appeal filed against acquittal, delay cannot be condoned until and unless it is shown that the appellant/petitioner was precluded from filing appeal within time, due to some acts of the acquitted respondents or by some other circumstances of a compelling nature, beyond control of the petitioner/appellant. No such contention has been either alleged or found in the record. It was quite easier for the petitioner/appellant to act vigilantly and file appeal within time, but he preferred to behave indolently, which resulted in-lapse of prescribed time. It is well-recognized principle of law that equity aids vigilant and not indolent. Therefore, the petitioner/appellant could not get any benefit of his indolence. We are fortified in our view from the dictum laid down in the cases of Nazar v. The State (1968 SCM R 71), Jalal Khan v. Lakhmir (1968 SCM R 1345), Piran Ditta v. The State (1970 SCM R 282) and Nur Muhammad v. The State (1972 SCM R 331). Relevant portion of the case of Nur Muhammad (Supra) reads as under:- "It has been held by this court repeatedly that in petitions-against acquittal delay cannot be condoned unless it is shown that the petitioner was precluded from filing this petition in time due to some act of the acquitted respondent. See Muhammad Khan v. Sultan and others (1969 SCMR 82). No such act on the part of the acquitted respondent is alleged in the application for condonation of delay filed by the petitioner. The petition is, therefore, dismissed as barred by time."
8. Furthermore, as per law laid down by the august Supreme Court of Pakistan in the case of "Mian Abdul Rahim Sethi and others v. Federation of Pakistan through Minister of Defence and others"
(2000 SCM R 1197), in time barred cases, each and every day should have been satisfactorily explained, but in the instant case, the said requirement is missing.
9. For what has been discussed above, as there is no reason, cause or justification to condone the delay in filing appeal, hence the petition in hand being devoid of any force and merit is dismissed.