M. S. H. QURESHI, J.-The petitioner seeks leave to appeal from the judgment dated 23-2-1980 of the Lahore High Court, whereby his writ petition challenging the order of the Settlement Commissioner, Multan, was dismissed.
2. The dispute relates to a shop in the Multan Cantonment which was transferred, on 25-7-1959, in favour of Maqbool Shah, predecessor-in-interest of the petitioner, and a P. T. O. Issued in his favour.
He surrendered all his rights in the shop by a deed of association executed on 13-8-1960 in favour of Syed Zia-ud-Din (predecessor-in-interest of the respondents), which was acted upon by the Settlement Authorities on 15-8-1960 and in consequence a P. T. O. Was issued in favour of the associate and after his death the P. T. O. Was amended on 1-5-1964 in favour of his successors-in- interest, that is, the respondents. Maqbool Shah later died in 1965. Six years thereafter, i. e., on 25-5- 1971, the petitioner challenged the agreement of association by filing an appeal but the same was dismissed by the Additional Settlement Commissioner on 1-11-1972 on the grounds of limitation and of the petitioner having no locus standi. A revision brought by the petitioner before the Settlement Commissioner (Mr. Wali Muhammad Khan Nagher). However, succeeded on 15-6-1973 and the matter was remanded "for fresh decision after hearing the parties and taking necessary evidence in this case." Before the matter could be taken up in remand, a change was brought about in the law by Act LV of 1973, in the result of which the matter came up again before the Settlement Commissioner (Mr. Muhammad Nawaz Hashmi) under the amended section 20 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, but the same was dismissed on 16-11-1973.
The learned Settlement Commissioner found that the deed of association had been duly acted upon, that even though Maqbool Shah, the original transferee, had survived Syed Zia-ud-Din, the associate, for two years, yet he had not agitated the matter even though changes had been made in the P. T. O. Issued in favour of the associate in order to substitute his successors-in-interest, i. e., the present respondents. He, therefore, held that the matter having attained finality as far back as 1960, the same could not be allowed to be agitated by the successor of the original transferee at such belated stage.
3. The case of the petitioner before the High Court was that the agreement of association had neither been executed by the original transferee nor had it been competently approved. The contention, however, did not prevail and the learned Judge of the High Court came to the view that no ingredient of fraud having been specifically pleaded and the matter not having been agitated either by the original transferee in his life time or by the petitioner for the next six years, the Settlement Authority had rightly concluded against him.
4. It is submitted that Mr. Muhammad Nawaz Hashmi acting in remand could not dispose of the matter without first holding an enquiry for which it had been remanded and that the petitioner's case could not be thrown out on the ground of delay because the entire order of the appellate Court having been set aside by Mr. Wali Muhammad Khan Nagher, the finding of the appellate Court on that point, too, stood set aside, and, as such, the delay must be deemed condoned. These submissions, we are afraid, are only technical. The matter before Mr. Muhammad Nawaz Hashmi was in fact the appeal which had been remanded by the order of his predecessor "for fresh decision" and that being a pending appeal, Mr. Hashmi was fully competent to decide the same as revision under the amended provision of section 20 (2). As regards the delay, there was no specific condonation in the remand order. His order dated 16-11-1963 shows substantial compliance of the remand order. As far as the merit of the case is concerned, the same pertains to a question of fact duly concluded by the Departmental Authorities on the basis of material before them and as such the High Court was justified in not interfering with the same. We are satisfied that no case is made out for grant of leave and accordingly dismiss the petition.