MEHMOOD MAQBOOL BAJWA, J.---Writ Petition No, 22661 of 2014 titled "Pervaiz Rasheed and others v. Ex-Officio Justice of Peace and others" and Writ Petition No, 22890 of 2014 titled "Khawaja Muhammad Asif v. Ex-Officio Justice of Peace and others" were dismissed by means of short order dated 26th of August, 2014 which is reproduced below for ready reference:-- ' For the reasons to be recorded later, Writ Petition No,22661 of 2014, titled "Pervaiz Rasheed and others v. Ex-Officio Justice of Peace and others" and Writ Petition No,22890 of 2014 titled "Khawja Muhammad Asif v. Ex-Officio Justice of Peace and others" having no force on legal as well as factual premises are dismissed.
2. For reasons to be recorded later, it is held as follow:--
3. Prayer for constitution of Larger Bench to determine the legality and binding force of Section 22- A (6) of The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, (V of 1898) in view of admission of Writ Petitions Nos.21812 and 12310 of 2014 for regular hearing, issuance of injunctive order regarding suspension of proceedings before Ex-officio Justice of Peace and order made by Ex-officio Justice of Peace, issuance of notices to the Federation of Pakistan and ' Government of Punjab through learned Attorney General for Pakistan and learned Advocate General, Punjab cannot be acceded to.
4. Leave granting order made on 11th of March, 2014 by the Apex Court and issuance of notices to learned Attorney General for Pakistan and Advocate Generals of the four provinces in terms of Order XXVII-A of The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, (Act V of 1908) in Civil Appeal No,1491 of 2013, whereby vires of Section 22-A of The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, (Hereinafter called Act V of 1898) was challenged by itself would not be sufficient to suspend the proceedings in both the writ petitions while issuing injunctive order suspending the operation of impugned order in view of settled proposition of law that "Leave granting order or leave refusing order" is not a judgment.
Reliance is placed upon "University of Health Sciences and others v. Mumtaz Ahmad and another"
5. Hearing of accused is not necessary by Ex-officio Justice of Peace prior to making any order while deciding the petition under Section 22-A(6) of The Act V of 1898. Reliance is placed upon "Saeed Ahmad and others v. Naseer Ahmad and others" (PLD 2000 Lahore 208), "Sanaullah v S.H.O., Police Station Civil Lines Gujrat and 3 others" (PLD 2003 Lahore 228), and "Khizer Hayat and others v.
Inspector-General of Police (Punjab), Lahore and others" (PLD 2005 Lahore 470).
6. Purpose and object of recording FIR is to set the criminal law in motion and to obtain first hand information of occurrence in order to exclude possibility of fabrication of story or consultation or deliberation and to safeguard the accused of such like happenings. Reference may be made to "Mushtaq Hussain and another v. The State" (2011 SCMR 45). Thus the registration of FIR against the petitioners shall not prove their guilt till decision by Court of competent jurisdiction. It cannot be used as a substantive piece of evidence against any accused unless proved in accordance with law.
7. Inquiry as to correctness or otherwise of allegations is not required to be made prior to registration of FIR though degree of care and caution is required while proceedings under Section 22-A(6) of The Act V of 1898. Reliance is placed upon "Muhammad Bashir v. Station House Officer, Okara Cantt. And others" (PLD 2007 SC 539), "Sanaullah v S.H.O. Police Station Civil Lines, Gujrat and 3 others" (PLD 2003 Lahore 228). It is the job of the investigation officer to collect evidence in order to reach conclusion regarding veracity or falsity of allegations referred to in the Crime-Report.
8. Arrest of a suspect or an accused is not necessary during the course of investigation and the general impression in this regard is mis-conceived because a person named in the FIR is not to be arrested straightaway upon registration of FIR or as a matter of course unless there is sufficient incriminating evidence regarding culpability of accused. The arrest of accused is to be deferred till the availability of incriminating evidence in order to satisfy the investigation officer regarding correctness of allegations leveled by the complainant against person named in the crime-Report.
(See: "Khizer Hayat and others v. Inspector- General of Police (Punjab), Lahore and others" (PLD 2005 Lahore 470).
2. The reasons for the above reproduced short order are as follows:--
3. The petitioners, who are Federal Ministers and Minister of State, through present writ petitions, have challenged the legality and validity of order dated 16th of August, 2014 passed by a learned Additional Sessions Judge, Lahore, exercising the authority of Ex-Officio Justice of Peace whereby the application made by respondent No, 3 for registration of case against the petitioners as well as others was allowed.
4. Facts in brief resulting in filing of present writ petitions and as disclosed are that on 17th of June, 2014, the District Administration of Lahore with the help of police made an attempt to remove the stated encroachments/illegal barriers on public roads around Minhaj-ul-Quran Academy and its Secretariat in Model Town, Lahore, resulting in clash between police and workers of Pakistan Awami Tehreek (hereinafter called "PAT"). According to the petitioners, due to clash, 10- civilians died while 103-persons including 28-policemen sustained injuries.
' Crime report bearing No, 510 of 2014 was registered at Police Station Faisal Town, Lahore, under Sections 302, 324, 353, 186, 148, 149, 290, 291, 427, 506-B, 109 of The Pakistan Penal Code, 1860 (Act No, XLV of 1860) (hereinafter called "Act No, XLV of 1860") read with Sections 13 and 13-B of The Arms Ordinance (Act XX of 1965) and Section 7 of The Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 (XXVII of 1997) on the statement of Rizwan Qadir Hashmi, Station House Officer, Police Station Faisal Town, Lahore.
5. According to the facts stated in the petitions, investigation was conducted by the Incharge (Investigation), Police Station Faisal Town, Lahore, with the assistance of five Inspectors of police under the supervision of S.P. (Investigation), Model Town, Lahore.
' On 19th of June, 2014, respondent No, 3 in both the writ petitions who is Director (Administration), Minhaj-ul-Quran International, made an application to the local police for registration of case putting his own version with reference to occurrence regarding which case FIR No, 510 of 2014 was already registered. In the said application, not only the petitioners but also the Prime Minister of Pakistan and Chief Minister of Punjab were nominated with the allegation of abetment.
' The Ex-Officio Justice of Peace after hearing the State allowed the application through order dated 16th of August, 2014, assailed by the petitioners, nominated accused in the application submitted by respondent No, 3.
6. Learned counsel for the petitioners in both the writ petitions, at the very outset, while questioning the legality and binding force of the impugned order submitted that Section 22-A of The Code under which application was made before the Ex-Officio Justice of Peace is no more a valid piece of legislation as Ordinance CXXXI of 2002 through which said provision was introduced has lapsed.
Submitted that in the circumstances, Ex-Officio Justice of Peace has no jurisdiction to issue direction to police for registration of case.
' Making prayer for constitution of larger Bench, it was submitted that Writ Petitions Nos. 21812 of 2014 and 12310 of 2014 assailing the legality of said provision of law have been admitted for regular hearing by this Court in which injunctive orders have been issued suspending the proceedings before Ex-Officio Justice of Peace and order made by the said authority respectively. Placing reliance upon the dictum laid down in "The Province of East Pakistan v. Dr. Azizul Islam" (PLD 1963 Supreme Court 296) and "Multiline Associates v. Ardeshir Cowasjee and 2 others" (PLD 1995 Supreme Court 423), it was argued that this Bench cannot form opinion contrary to that formulated.
' Referring to the orders placed on record, it was submitted that notices have been issued to the learned Attorney General for Pakistan and the learned Advocate General, Punjab, under Order XXVII-A of The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Act V of 1908) (hereinafter called "The Act V of 1908").
7. Learned counsel for the petitioners in Writ Petition No 22661 of 2014 while making reference to the leave granting order made on 11th of March, 2014 by the Apex Court, issuance of notices to the learned Attorney General for Pakistan and the learned Advocate Generals of four provinces of Pakistan in terms of Order XXVII-A of The Act V of 1908 in Civil Appeal No, 1491 of 2013 maintained that vires of Section 22-A of The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (v. Of 1898) (hereinafter called "The Code") has been challenged in which notices have been issued and as such, proceedings in the petitions are required to be suspended.
' Continuing the arguments, learned counsel in both the writ petitions submitted that the Ex-Officio Justice of Peace while passing impugned order acted in a mechanical ,way which is against the mandate of Rule of law expounded by this Court in the case of "Khizer Hayat and others v.
Inspector-General of Police (Punjab), Lahore and others" (PLD 2005 Lahore 470). Referring to para- 16 of the judgment, it was argued that the Ex-Officio Justice of Peace though called report from the local police but .Did not examine the same and passed the order impugned blindfold issuing direction for registration of criminal case, Submitted that application made by respondent No, 3 was Motivated with extraneous consideration and malice-in fact in order to get premium having hostility against the petitioners and other political personalities named in the First Information Report. Further submitted that the Ex-Officio Justice of Peace should have specifically given its opinion regarding the reports submitted by local police and 'HT' prior to issuing direction for registration of case.
' Referring to the interim orders of the Ex-Officio Justice of Peace, it was submitted that local police as well as Joint Investigation Team (hereinafter called "JIT") submitted reports wherein it was clearly stated that time and again, respondent No, 3 was called upon to associate himself in the investigation as the application made by him was also transmitted to 'JIT' but respondent No, 3 despite verbal requests and orders in writing did not appear before 'JIT' which admittedly was an independent body comprising officers of I.S.I. And I.B. As well. Further submitted that order impugned is against the mandate' of Section 22-A(6) of The Code as the report of 'JIT' was not appreciated.
' Again making reference to para-16 of the judgment delivered in the case of "Khizer Hayat", it was submitted that since local police did not endorse the allegations levelled in the application submitted by respondent No, 3, therefore, the best course for respondent No, 3 was to file a private complaint which aspect was also not taken into consideration by the Ex- Officio Justice of Peace while allowing the application and as such, order assailed has been made against the mandate of Rule of law referred to.
8. Both the learned counsel for the petitioners while referring to the provisions of Section 22-A(6) of The Code submitted that the word- "may" has been used in the provision of law referred to and as such, it was not obligatory upon the Ex-Officio Justice of Peace to issue direction to the local police for registration of case. Reference was made to the dictum laid down in the case of "Khizer Hayat"
(PLD 2005 Lahore 470). Argued that in view of use of expression "May" , discretion vested in the Ex- Officio Justice of Peace was not properly exercised.
' Again focusing attention to the provisions of section 22-A of the Code, it was submitted that expression "appropriate" has been used in the said provision which has not been defined in the statute but added that an appropriate direction does not mean direction for registration of criminal case. Argued that in view of use of expression "appropriate", application should have been dismissed with the direction to respondent No, 3 being complainant to file a private complaint in which eventuality the said respondent was in a position to have control of proceedings.
9. Learned counsel for the petitioner in Writ Petition No, 22890 of 2014 also making reference to the provision of law under discussion submitted that the Ex-Officio Justice of Peace while passing impugned order exceeded from the jurisdiction vested in him while according to learned counsel for the petitioners in Writ Petition No, 22661. Of 2014, passage of order assailed is result of failure on the part of Ex-Officio Justice of Peace to exercise jurisdiction properly.
' Making comparison of the provisions of Section 22-A (6) of The Code and Article '199 of The Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 (hereinafter called "The Constitution"), learned counsel for the petitioner in Writ Petition No, 22890 of 2014 submitted that order assailed was made beyond the scope of authority and jurisdiction vested in the Ex-Officio Justice of Peace under Section 22-A(6) of The Code and it appears that the Ex-Officio Justice of Peace assumed jurisdiction under Article 199 of ' The Constitution and as such, the order got no legal sanctity and is liable to be set aside on this score alone.
' Continuing the arguments, learned counsel for the petitioners in both the writ petitions while making reference to the dictum laid down in "Muhammad Bashir v. 'Station House Officer, Okara Cantt and others" (PLD 2007 Supreme Court 539) maintained that though the Apex Court held that in case of information regarding commission of a conginzable offence, local police is bound to proceed under Section 154 of The Code but it is not an absolute rule. While relying upon the dictum laid down in "Rai Ashraf and others v. Muhammad Saleem Bhatti and others" (PLD 2010 Supreme Court 691), it was submitted that the Apex Court while taking into consideration the ground realities and tendency of false implication of innocent persons held that in each and every case; issuance of direction for registration of case is not the intention of law and party approaching the authority (Ex-Officio Justice of Peace) can be advised to file private complaint. Submitted that order assailed is against the mandate of law referred to.
10. Making reference to the status of petitioners, it was argued that all the petitioners are respectable citizens holding important posts being Federal Ministers and Minister for State and story was coined by respondent No, 3 in order to injure their reputation and the Ex-Officio Justice of Peace did not take this aspect into consideration which is against the mandate of Article 4 of The Constitution.
' Further submitted that the Ex-Officio Justice of Peace was neither competent nor authorized to make an order for registration of second FIR because neither there was any occasion nor justification for registration of second FIR. Submitted that when application made by respondent No, 3 was sent to 'JIT' in order to probe into the veracity of the allegations, respondent No, 3 did not cooperate with the said Investigation Team with obvious purpose and object.
' Making reference to the dictum laid down in "Ch. Muhammad Aslam v. C.P.O. Rawalpindi and others" (2011 PCr.LJ 1870), it was submitted that since respondent No, 3 wanted to set up a different version regarding manner in which incident took place but almost under the same provisions of law and as such, no distinct offence was disclosed for registration of second FIR. Further argued that in fact, it is elaboration and amplification of version recorded earlier through crime report No, 510 of 2014, therefore, the order impugned is legally not sustainable as it offends the Ratio expounded in the Report referred to.
11. Making comparison of the provisions of Sections 22-A(6) and 154 of The Code, learned counsel representing the petitioner in Writ Petition No, 22890 of 2014 submitted that though there is a compulsion for the Station House Officer to get a criminal case registered in case of information relating to commission of a cognizable offence but no such duty has been cast upon the Ex-Officio Justice of Peace to issue direction for registration of case keeping in view the provisions of Section 22-A(6) of The Code.
' Further submitted that order of Ex-Officio Justice of Peace is violative of not only Section 154 but also Section 22-A(6) of The Code and as such, in the opinion of learned counsel for the petitioners in both the writ petitions, matter requires fresh decision and with this background, prayer was made to remand the matter to the Ex-Officio Justice of Peace to pass fresh order keeping in view the mandate of law referred to and facts of the case.
12. Learned counsel for the petitioner in Writ Petition No,22890 of 2014 while making reference to the date of application made by respondent No,3 for registration of case submitted that occurrence took place on the midnight of 16th and 17th of June, 2614 but respondent No, 3 made an application to the local police on 19th of June, 2014. Delay in approaching the local police while making application was heavily canvassed and it was argued that delay by itself is sufficient to demonstrate malice on the part of respondent No, 3 which also suggests deliberation and consultation which aspect should have been kept in view by the Ex-Officio Justice of Peace.
13. Referring to the version contained in FIR No, 510 of 2014 which was registered on the complaint of Rizwan Qadir Hashmi, Inspector/S.H.O. Police Station Faisal Town, Lahore, it was submitted that order made by the Ex-Officio Justice of Peace for registration of second FIR is legally not sustainable because the information supplied through the application by respondent No, 3 cannot be said to be first information as on the strength of complaint submitted by the Station House Officer, Police Station Faisal Town, Lahore, law was already set in motion after registration of case at the instance of said Inspector.
' Further stated that subsequent application by no stretch of imagination suggests distinct offence and as such, the ' order regarding registration of FIR which would be second could not have been made.
14. Referring to the order, impugned, it was further submitted on behalf of petitioners that though the Ex- Officio Justice of Peace made reference to certain case law with reference to registration of second FIR but did not discuss the Rule of law enunciated in the Reports referred to except case of "Wajid All Khan Durani and others v. Government of Sindh and others" (2001 SCMR 1556).
15. Learned counsel for the petitioner in Writ Petition No, 22890 of 2014 while making reference to the provisions of Section 22-A(6) of The Code which were introduced by Ordinance CXXXI of 2002 submitted that Rule of law enunciated in the case of "Wajid Ali Durani" (supra) could not have been acted upon in view of insertion of the said provision authorizing the Ex- Officio Justice of Peace to make an appropriate direction in case of non-registration of criminal case.
' Again adverting to clause (i) of subsection '6' of Section 22-A of The Code, it was submitted that said provision clearly envisages that the Ex-Officio Justice of Peace can exercise his authority if case has not been registered ealier.
' Referring to the registration of case FIR No, 510 of 2014, attempt was made to argue that since case was already registered regarding same occurrence, therefore, it cannot be said by any stretch of imagination that local police was responsible for non-registration of criminal case in order to cover the case under clause (i).
16. Pleading rule of consistency and parity, learned counsel for the petitioners further submitted that it is a matter of common knowledge that aggrieved persons used to approach the Ex-Officio Justice of Peace as well as this Court and orders are made in routine including suspension and rescission of orders and as such, case of the petitioners should be treated as a case of an ordinary litigant.
' Seeking help from the dictum laid down in "Ishaq Lashari, Inspector v. The State" (PLD 2009 Karachi 14), it was submitted that the Ex-Officio Justice of Peace was not authorized to issue direction to the police for registration of case and at the most, direction could have been issued to proceed in accordance with law.
' Further submitted that in case order impugned is not set aside, it will cause irreparable loss to the petitioners being respectable citizens enjoying status of Federal Ministers and Minister for the State and they have to face agony of associating themselves in the investigation who also apprehend their arrest and then to face trial for an indefinite period.
' Highlighting the cumulative effect, it was submitted that in the circumstances, order impugned is perverse, arbitrary and against the mandate of law also offending the well-settled proposition of law expounded in the "precedents" referred to and relied upon and as such is liable to be set aside.
17. Exercising the right of rebuttal, learned counsel for respondent No, 3 submitted that case FIR No, 510 of 2014 was registered in order to prejudice case of the complainant. Submitted that 14-persons were done to death and 109-persons sustained injuries which was a brutal act on the part of police officers/officials acting under the command of petitioners and otheRs, Further submitted that registration of FIR No, 510 of 2014 by itself was not sufficient to decline the relief because in the said crime report,, facts were distorted and as such, respondent No, 3 who made an application to the local police after refusal on the part of respondent No, 2 to register the case approached the 'Ex- Officio Justice of Peace highlighting the facts finding support from the material appended with the application. Submitted that there is no embargo upon registration of second FIR. Further submitted that another FIR No, 511 of 2014 was also registered against one Gullu Butt in order to cause prejudice to the case of complainant regarding same occurrence. Submitted that if second FIR (No, 511 of 2014) can be lodged at the instance of police regarding same occurrence, why third crime report cannot be registered on the application of complainant highlighting the facts finding support from the documentary evidence.
' Referring to the Rule of law expounded in "Wajid Ali Khan Durani and others v. Government of Sindh and others" (2001 SCMR 1556), "Sabin Bibi v. Station House Officer and others" (PLD 2007 Lahore 370), "Muhammad Azam v. Inspector-General of Police, Islamabad and 2 others" (PLD 2008 Lahore 103), "Afzal Khan v. A.S.J., Sheikhupura and 7 others" (2011 YLR 963), "Zulfigar Ali v. The Justice of Peace/Sessions Judge and 7 others" (2012 PCr.LJ 138) and "For Arrest of Accused of Murder of Her Daughter Waheeda" (2014 SCMR 83), it was submitted that since different version was put by the complainant regarding the occurrence which is not amplification of allegations contained in the crime report bearing No, 510 of 2014, therefore, learned Ex-Officio Justice of Peace rightly issued direction for registration of case.
18. Learned counsel for respondent No, 3 further submitted that veracity or falsity of allegations are not required to be dealt with while proceeding under Section 154 of The Code. It was further submitted that petitioners after registration of case can join the investigation and during the course, if they are proved innocent, it will be well within the right of Investigating Officer to make request to the Area Magistrate for discharge of petitioneRs, Submitted that keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case, involvement of petitioners being abettor cannot be ruled out.
19. Replying the argument canvassed by learned counsel for the petitioners, it was submitted that respondent No, 3 being complainant was not obliged to furnish evidence against the petitioners in detail because said process shall start after registration of FIR. Submitted that if the complainant fails to produce 'evidence regarding culpability of the petitioners, premium can be given to them by getting them discharged during the course of investigation.
20. Responding to the argument with reference to non-association of the complainant in the investigation of case FIR No, 510 of 2014, it was contended that there was genuine apprehension of the complainant not to get justice from the Investigating Officer/Agency under the influence of petitioners, It was further submitted that question of association of the complainant in investigation does not arise at all prior to registration of FIR keeping in view the allegations contained in the application made by respondent No, 3.
' Further contended that learned Ex-Officio Justice of Peace while taking into consideration the facts of the case rightly reached to the conclusion to which no exception can be taken.
21. Replying the argument submitted by learned counsel for the petitioners on legal premises with reference to constitution of larger Bench, it was submitted that though certain writ petitions were admitted for regular hearing as argued by learned counsel for the petitioners but still it is a matter of common knowledge that orders are being made by the Ex-Officio Justices of Peace under provision of law assailed and the orders are also challenged and implemented through this Court while invoking jurisdiction by the aggrieved party under Article 199 of The Constitution. Submitted that suspension of proceedings will cause great loss to the complainant and it will amount to discrimination, disparity and legal chaos.
22. Learned Advocate General, Punjab, endorsed the contentions of learned counsel for the petitioners on legal premises submitting that since two writ petitions have been admitted at Principal Seat while one has been admitted at Rawalpindi Bench of this Court in which vires of Section 22-A (6) of The Code have been assailed, therefore, it would be in fitness of the things that in both the Writ Petitions (W.Ps. Nos. 22661 of 2014 and 22890 of 2014), petitioners should be extended same treatment by suspending the operation of impugned order and making request for constitution of larger Bench.
' On facts, it was submitted that the Ex-Officio Justice of Peace did not advert to the allegations contained in application submitted by respondent No, 3 which were result of deliberation, consultation and afterthought and application was made with delay in order to circumvent the process of investigation being conducted by 'JIT'. Further argued that keeping in view the provisions of Section 22-A (6) of The Code and in view of the law expounded in "Rai Ashraf and others v.
Muhammad Saleem Bhatti and others" (PLD 2010 Supreme Court 691), direction for registration of FIR could not have been made in view of availability of alternate and efficacious remedy by filing a private complaint.
' Endorsing the viewpoint of learned counsel for the petitioners, it was argued that since respondent No,3 has got no trust upon the local police as well as investigating team conducting investigation in case FIR No, 510 of 2014, therefore, while setting aside the order assailed, direction may be given to the respondent No, 3 to file private complaint keeping in view the dictum laid down in "Khizer Hayat and others v. Inspector- General of Police (Punjab), Lahore and others" (PLD 2005 Lahore 470). It was .Further submitted that application was made by the complainant with ulterior motive and extraneous consideration and that too by making a bald statement.
' Also argued that it was not within the domain of the Ex-Officio Justice of Peace to issue direction for registration of case and respondent No, 3 should have been advised to associate in the investigation being conducted by 'JIT' as the application of the respondent No,3 for registration of case was also sent to said investigation team. Referring to the reports submitted by local police and 'JIT' , it was contended that intentional omission of respondent No, 3 to associate in the investigation does not suggest anything except falsity of accusations which were levelled with political motivation and other extraneous consideration.
' Prayer for remittance of the matter to the Ex- Officio Justice of Peace made by learned counsel for the petitioners for re-decision was also adopted.
23. Anxious consideration has been given to the arguments advanced keeping in view the Rule of law expounded in the Reports cited at bar by learned counsel for the adversaries, learned Advocate General, Punjab and material available on record.
24. Submitting arguments on legal premises and making reference to the orders made by the learned Single Judges of this Court in Writ Petitions Nos. 21812 of 2014 and 12310 of 2014, it was submitted that since vires of Ordinance CXXXI of 2002 incorporating Section 22-A of The Code has been assailed in which notices have been issued to the learned Attorney General for Pakistan and learned Advocate General, Punjab, and injunctive orders have also been issued, therefore, after suspending the proceedings in both the writ petitions, matter should be referred to the larger Bench. Argued that in view of legal intricacy, it is desirable to settle the legal proposition prior to decision on merits. Further submitted that this Bench is supposed to follow the orders referred to.
25. Factual position highlighted by learned counsel for the petitioners though cannot be questioned but the prayer made for suspension of proceedings in the writ petitions and referring the matter to larger Bench keeping in view legal aspects cannot be allowed.
' Learned counsel for the petitioners in order to substantiate his contention sought help from the dictum laid down in "The Province of East Pakistan v. Dr. Azizul Islam" (PLD 1963 Supreme Court 296) and "Multiline Associates v. Ardeshir Cowasjee and 2 others" (PLD 1995 Supreme Court 423).
' I have gone through the Rule of law enunciated in the Reports cited at bar by learned counsel for the petitioners in Writ Petition No, 22661 of 2014 but I cannot find myself in agreement with the contention raised.
' Perusal of the facts of Report and Rule of law enunciated in the case of "The Province of East Pakistan" (PLD 1963 Supreme Court 296) suggests the binding force of "precedents" and it was held at page-308 as follows:- "In our opinion, the High Court was, in coming to this view, mainly influenced by the fact that a rubber-stamp authentication did not bring into being a valid order of requisition. This view is not supported even by previous decisions of the same High Court. Another Division Bench thereof has held that simply because a requisition notice" was issued under a rubber-stamp signature, it cannot be said that the Additional District Magistrate passed the order without applying his mind."
(Vide A'JIT' Kumar Das v. The Province of East Pakistan) (I). The only reason given for not accepting this view is that the question that was argued in that case was thatThe rubber-stamp signature indicated that the, officer concerned had not applied his mind to the requisition. With respect, we must point out that the decision was a direct authority also on this question, as in spite of the rubber-stamp signature the validity of the order of requisition was upheld and if the learned Judges of the High Court deciding the present case were inclined to take a different view, they should have, in accordance with the rules of their own Court, referred the matter to a larger Bench.
Alternatively, they could have expressed their doubti regarding the view taken in the precedent case, in a Court of coequal jurisdiction, while yet following that view, and left the matter to be raised in appeal before this Court. "
26. Describing the binding force of judgments of equal Bench in the High Court, the Apex Court while making reference to the Rule of law enunciated in the case of "The Province of East Pakistan"
(supra) held in the case of "Multiline Associates v. Ardeshir Cowasjee and 2 others" (PLD 1995 Supreme Court 423) that earlier judgment of equal Bench in the High Court on the same point is binding upon the second Bench. Further held that if a contrary view has to be taken, then request for constituting a larger Bench should be made.
It is significant to state that word "judgment" has been used in both the Reports. Admittedly, order referred to issuing notices to the learned Attorney General for Pakistan and learned Advocate General, Punjab, in order to hey viewpoint of Government and other adversary on the point agitated in the said writ petitions and as argued by learned counsel for the petitioners would not be sufficient to suggest those.Orders as "judgment" bt.Cause there is no final adjudication in this regard. Perusal of said orders clearly reveals that no question of law has yet been decided.
Position would have been different one if in the writ petitions referred to, there was an "adjudication" by the learned Single Judges of this Court with reference to the moot point before this Court in which eventuality there would have been no option but to adopt the course suggested by learned counsel for the petitioners,
27. Learned counsel for the petitioners in Writ Petition No, 22661 of 2014 also submitted, which argument was also adopted by learned counsel representing the petitioner in Writ Petition No, 22890 of 2014 and learned Advocate General, Punjab that since leave has been granted by the Apex Court on 11th of March, 2014 in Civil Appeal No, 1491 of 2013 whereby the vires of Section 22-A of The Code have been assailed and as such, proceedings in both the writ petitions are to be deferred.
' No doubt, the Apex Court has granted leave in order to determine the binding force of Section 22- A(6) of The Code which was inserted through Ordinance CXXXI of 2002 on 21st of November, 2002, but with great respect, argument advanced would not substantiate the plea of the petitioners as well as learned Advocate General, Punjab for the simple reason that order granting leave or refusing the same is not a "judgment" and as such is not binding. Reference may be made to "Khairullah v. Sultan Muhammad and another" (1997 SCMR 906) wherein it was held at page- 908 as under:-- "Even otherwise, an order simply granting leave to appeal, does not lay down a rule of law to be followed, like a judgment of this Court deciding finally a matter. "
' Reference may also be made to the Rule of law expounded in "Rustam Ali and 2 others v. Haider Bakhsh and another" (1988 Civil Law Cases 779), "Noor Muhammad v. Province of Sindh and others"
(1995 Civil Law Cases 952), "Muhammad Amin v. Muhammad Yasin and another" (2002 Civil Law Cases 231), "Syed Ghazanfar Hussain through Legal Heirs and others v. Noor-ud-Din and others"
(2011 Civil Law Cases 1303), "University of Health Sciences and others v. Mumtaz Ahmad and another" (2010 SCMR 767) and "Muhammad Tariq Badr and another v. National Bank of Pakistan and others" (2013 SCMR 314 (325)).
' It is further to be noted that vires of Section 22-A of The Code was assailed before the Apex Court on the ground that said provision confers Executive powers upon Judicial Officers which as such is ultra vires of the Constitution but in the writ petitions, its legality was questioned on the ground that Ordinance CXXXI of 2002 has lapsed.
28. It was also argued on behalf of petitioners bvt half heartedly that prior to passing impugned order, the Ex-Officio Justice of Peace did not grant an opportunity to the petitioners being the persons against whom there is accusation. Submitted that omission by the Ex-Officio Justice of Peace to provide right of hearing has prejudiced the case of petitioners.
' However, the said argument would not advance the plea of the petitioners in view of settled proposition of law. If any authority is needed on the point, reference may be made to "Saeed Ahmad and others v. Naseer Ahmad and others" (PLD 2000 Lahore 208), "Sanaullah v. S.H.O., Police Station Civil Lines, Gujrat and .3 others" (PLD 2003 Lahore 228), and "Khizer Hayat and others v.
Inspector-General of Police (Punjab), Lahore and others" (PLD 2005 Lahore 470).
29. Though the legality of provisions of Section 22-A of The Code was assailed by the learned counsel for the petitioners as well as learned Advocate General, Punjab, but arguments were not advanced on this proposition and reliance was just placed upon the orders passed by learned Single Judges of this Court in the writ petitions as referred and "leave granting order" by the Apex Court. However, it is desirable to deal with this objection though in brief.
' The provisions of Section 22-A of The Code were made part of the statute book through The Code of Criminal Procedure (3rd Amendment) Ordinance CXXXI of 2002 dated 21.11.2002.
' The vires of said amendment was challenged before the learned Karachi High Court in the case of "Lal Bakhsh v. The State" (PLD 2004 Karachi 532) and while examining the arguments and taking into consideration Article 89(2)(a) and Section 6-A bf The General Clauses Act (X of 1897), it was held at page-536 as follows:-- "The question of revival under the original provisions after repeal of amending Act, came under examination before the Lahore High Court in case of Muhammad Afzal Khan v. Excise and Tax.
Ation Officer and 2 others PLD 1984 Pesh. 215, Azam Ali and others v. The Custodian of Evacuee Property West Pakistan, Lahore and Mst. Khem Bai alias Ghulam Fatima PLD 1968 Lah. 148 and PLD 1994 Kar. 173.
'The view taken in all the cases is that an amendment once effected in a statute continues to be effective. After the amendment has been made the purpose of the amending Act is served and retaining it on the statue book amounts to carrying of dead weight. Repeal of such Act is an exercise synonymous with the spring clearing of dead leaves. Such exercise is taken by the legislature periodically. All the learned counsel concede that at the time of enactment, the President enjoyed the powers to promulgate Ordinance CXXXI of 2002. Albeit all Acts of the President have been validated and it is nobody's case that the powers to enact the aforesaid Ordinance were not available to the President.
' The question of the effect of the Article 89 of the Constitution will not be necessary to be considered in this case. The above point may be considered at a more appropriate juncture.
' In view of the above discussion the Code of Criminal Procedure (3rd Amendment) Ordinance 2002 served its purpose after promulgation and publication. The amendment has been effected in the Criminal Procedure Code. Having affected such amendment repeal or expiry of the Ordinance would not undo the amendment already made which continues to remain operative and which has now become a part of the Criminal Procedure Code and continues to remain operative,."
(underlining is mine)
' Keeping in view different provisions and case law referred to, I respectfully follow the dictum laid down in the Report.
' As referred earlier, the detailed discussion is neither required nor can be made as the arguments were not advanced on this proposition independently and further matter is sub-judice before the Apex Court as well as before this Court though on different grounds. Since no contrary view is available in the form of "judgment" till this time, therefore, the argument canvassed on behalf of petitioners as well as learned Advocate General, Punjab, would not advance the plea agitated in view of Rule of law referred to.
30. After dealing with the arguments on legal premises, it is the time to deal with the arguments of learned counsel for the parties as well as learned Advocate General, Punjab, with reference to merits of the case keeping in view the scope of interference in constitutional jurisdiction.
31. Learned counsel for the petitioners while making reference to the provisions of Section 22-A (6) of The Code and highlighting the expressions "may" and "appropriate" contended with vehemence that it was not obligatory upon the Ex-Officio Justice of Peace to issue direction in each and every case for registration of case because the word "may" is not mandatory in nature and it gives discretion to the Ex-Officio Justice of Peace to make an order for registration of case or otherwise.
' In order to substantiate the contention, learned counsel for the petitioners and learned Advocate General, Punjab again made reference to para-16 of the Report titled "Khizer Hayat and others v.
Inspector- General of Police (Punjab), Lahore and others" (PLD 2005 Lahore 470) in which it has been held at pages-534 and 535 as follows:-- "Whenever information disclosing commission of a cognizable offence is provided to him but the provisions of section 22-A(6), Cr.P.C. Do not make it obligatory for an ex-officio Justice of the Peace to necessarily or blindfold issue a direction regarding registration of a criminal case whenever a complaint is filed before him in that regard. The use of the word "may" in section 22- A(6), Cr.P.C. Clearly shows that the jurisdiction of an ex-officio Justice of the Peace in that regard is discretionary in nature, and understandably so. It is unfortunate that concepts and notions of truth and justice are becoming more and more subjective in our society and the machinery of criminal law with its coercive process is increasingly being utilized by motivated persons or parties for achieving objectives which are self- serving. Thus, there is a pressing need on the part of the ex-officio Justices of the Peace to exercise caution and restraint before issuing a direction regarding registration of a criminal case. "
In view of use of expression "may", there can be no two opinions that discretion has been given to the Ex- Officio Justice of Peace to decide the matter keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case and as held, it is not compulsion in each and every case to issue direction for registration of case.
' The word "appropriate" used in the said provision of law clearly suggests that Ex-Officio Justice of Peace has to pass a suitable and proper order while taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of the case and yardstick to exercise jurisdiction. It is also an admitted proposition of law that each and every case has to be decided keeping in view its own facts and circumstances and no hard and fast rule can be formulated which type of order has to be made by the Ex-Officio Justice of Peace. Nevertheless, the Ex-Officio Justice of Peace must be conscious that order has not to be made in a mechanical way.
'The learned Full Bench of this Court while dealing with the proposition and interpreting the expression "may" held that discretion has been given to the Ex-Officio Justice of Peace to pass an appropriate order.
' Discretion has to be exercised justly, fairly, reasonably and arbitrary exercise of discretion shall be held to be inconsistent with the mandate of The Constitution. Reference may be made to "Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India and others" [(1279) 3 Supreme Court Cases 489], "Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay and others v. Mahidra and Mahindra Ltd. And others" (AIR 1984 SC 1182), "Amanullah Khan and others v. The Federal Government of Pakistan through Secretary,Ministry of Finance, Islamabad and others" (PLD 1990 SC 1092), "Chairman, Regional Transport Authority, Rawalpindi v. Pakistan Mutual Insurance Company Limited, Rawalpindi" (PLD 1991 SC 14), "Walayat Ali Mir v. Pakistan International Airlines Corporation through its Chairman and another" (1995 SCMR 650), "Abid Hussain and others v. P.I.A.C. And others" (2005 SCMR 25), "State of NCT of Delhi and another v. Sanjeen alias Bittoo" [(2005) 5 Supreme Court Cases 181] and "Secretary, Government of Punjab and others v. Khalid Hussain Hamdani and 2 others" (2013 SCMR 817).
' In all the cases referred to, it was unanimously held that discretion has to be exercised keeping in view the principle of justice, fairness and while exercising discretion, aim and object of law and rules under which it was authorized to act should be kept in view.
32. Prior to dealing with the touchstone of Section 22-A (6) of The Code and keeping in view the expressions under discussion, while examining the facts, it is also desirable to deal with the argument canvassed by learned counsel for the petitioners in Writ Petition No, 22890 of 2014.
'While referring to clause (i) of Section 22-A(6) of The Code, it was submitted that the Ex-Officio Justice of Peace was not authorized to make order for registration of case because FIR No, 510 of 2014 regarding same occurrence had been registered.
' Interpreting the expression "non-registration of criminal case", it was submitted that question of non- registration of criminal case does not arise at all in view of registration of crime report bearing No, 510 of 2014 at the instance of Rizwan Qadir Hashmi , Inspector/S.H.O. Police Station Faisal Town, Lahore.
' Argument canvassed though with vehemence but cannot advance and substantiate the plea when the provision is examined in its true perspective. The expression under discussion has not to be given narrow meaning and the examination of the provision clearly suggests that if a person approaches the Court for registration of case, the omission on the part of local police while taking into consideration the reasons for such misfeasance shall give domain to the Ex-Officio Justice of Peace to make an appropriate order. The expression 'under reference does not suggest that said provision of law is confined only to the registration of first case. It is further to be noted that provision of Section 22-A of The Code is part of procedural law, just providing a forum to redress the grievance of aggrieved party subject to the conditions mentioned therein and does not highlight a yardstick for making appropriate order.
'Pursuant to above, argument advanced is mis-conceived and ill-founded.
33. Now it g the high time to deal with the facts and circumstances of the case.
' It is an admitted fact that case FIR No, 510 of 2014 was registered against certain persons including the members of complainant party under different provisions of The Pakistan Penal Code, 1860 (Act No, XLV of 1860), The Arms Ordinance (Act XX of 1965) and The Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 (XXVII of 1997). However, grievance of respondent No, 3 being complainant is that when he approached the local police for registration of case, there was a clear cut refusal on the part of police for extraneous consideration. Application made by the respondent No, 3 was though received but was not acted upon.
' In order to examine this aspect, provisions of Section 154 of The Code are to be examined which suggest yardstick for registration of case, according to which if there is an information relating to commission of a cognizable offence, the Officer Incharge of a police station shall reduce the same into writing according to the mandate of said provision.
' This Court is also conscious of the argument advanced by learned counsel for the petitioner in Writ Petition No, 22890 of 2014 contending with vehemence that in view of addition of Section 22- A(6) of The Code, the yardstick contained in Section 154 of The Code is irrelevant and immaterial because the principle laid down in Section 154 of The Code can only be taken into consideration by the Officer Incharge of a Police Station and not by the Ex-Officio Justice of Peace.
' I regret to share and endorse the opinion formulated by learned counsel for the petitioner.
By no stretch of imagination, it can be argued that when the Ex-Officio Justice of Peace has to exercise discretion in order to make an appropriate order, he is not required to keep in view the yardstick contained in Section 154 of The Code.
' As discussed earlier, discretion has to be exercised for making an appropriate order. If there is no yardstick before the Ex-Officio Justice of Peace, how he would be able to make an appropriate order in the cases brought before him under the provisions of Section 22-A(6) of The Code.
' It is to be noted that provision of Section 22-A(6) of The Code has provided alternate and additional forum for redressal of grievance of public-at-large keeping in view the complaints regarding noncooperation of the police but when the forum of the Ex-Officio Justice of Peace has to proceed under Section 22-A(6) of The Code, it has to keep in mind certain principles for making an "appropriate order". If there is no yardstick and principle provided by the statute for exercising the authority by Ex-Officio Justice of Peace, then it would not only be impossible for the said forum to make appropriate order while exercising discretion but will also be difficult for the superior forum/court to determine whether discretion was exercised judicially, fairly or suggest extraneous consideration. In fact, the provision of Section 154 of The Code controls the discretion of Ex-Officio Justice of Peace which has been vested upon him in view of the use of word "may" and expression "appropriate order " .
34. Adverting to the moot point on facts, it is to be noted that expression "every information relating to commission of a cognizable offence" has been used in Section 154 of The Code. The word "relating" is important and significant not only in order to settle the controversy in the present case but in all other cases which are brought before the police or before the Ex-Officio Justice of Peace.
' Phrase under discussion clearly demonstrates that information put either before the Officer Incharge of a Police Station or the Ex-Officio Justice of Peace should provide information pertaining to the commission of a cognizable offence. The word "relating" rules out the interpretation regarding actual commission of a cognizable offence. It also demonstrates that information should be about the alleged commission of offence and while making an appropriate order, it is not essential that the Ex-Officio Justice of Peace should be confident that information supplied clearly proves the commission of a cognizable offence. Had there been the intention of legislature that there must be an information about commission of a cognizable offence, the word "relating" must not have been used in the provision.
' In view of the above state of law, there can be no two opinions that the grievance of the aggrieved party, if any, has to be examined and scanned keeping in view the touchstone of the expression under discussion. It is not the requirement of Section 154 of The Code that there must be information regarding actual commission of a cognizable offence.
' Keeping in view the scheme of Section 154 of The Code, allegations contained in application made by the respondent No, 3 are to be examined but not in depth and detail as it may prejudice the case of any of the parties during the course of investigation or trial.
35. Perusal of the application made by respondent No,3 suggests the background of incident which took place on the intervening night of 16th and 17th of June, 2014. According to the contents of said complaint, the 4ispute arose when local police as well as contingent of Tehsil Municipal Administration visited the Central Secretariat of Minhaj-ul-Quran International in order to remove the stated illegal encroachments. It further suggests that resistance was made but in an amicable way and ultimately clash started and the persons mentioned in the said application succumbed to the injuries besides sustaining injuries. The application also names 'certain persons against whom allegation of firing has been levelled. Names of the petitioners also find mentioned in the latter part of the application with the allegation of abutment.
36. Though I am in agreement with the contention of learned counsel for the petitioners that except the allegations levelled in the application, complainant i,e, respondent No, 3 did not give detail of abetment but the fact by itself would not be sufficient to dislodge the stance of respondent No, 3 (complainant) at this stage keeping in view the expression "information relating to commission of a cognizable offence".
In order to satisfy the yardstick contained in Section 154 of The Code, only the allegations and accusations contained in the crime report are to be examined and the accusations contained in the application made by respondent No, 3 satisfy the yardstick of Section 154 of The Code. This Court while examining the allegations cannot make comments upon the correctness of stance of respondent No, 3 which exercise in fact is the assignment of I.O.
' It is further to be noted that FIR is not an encyclopedia and it is not the requirement to give detail of each and every incident and fact which exercise has to be made during the course of investigation by the Investigating Officer.
' Purpose and object of recording FIR is to set criminal law in motion and to obtain first hand information of the occurrence in order to exclude possibility of fabrication of story, consultation or deliberation and to safeguard the accused of such like happening. Reliance is placed upon the dictum laid down in "Mushtaq Hussain and another v. The State" (2011 SCMR 45).
' As referred earlier, veracity or falsity of allegations are not required to be examined while examining the material put by the complainant on the touchstone of Section 154 of The Code. The well-settled proposition of law cannot be disputed that correctness or otherwise of the allegations is to be scanned during the course of investigation when admittedly the persons against whom there is an accusation shall be associated providing an opportunity to them by the I.O. To submit their stance and viewpoint.
37. Pursuant to above, opinion formulated by the Ex-Officio Justice of Peace in the order impugned cannot be said to be result of extraneous consideration.
38. It is further to be noted that in order to stamp any person as an accused, credible information and evidence has to be produces by the complainant during the investigation and it would not be duty of the person against whom there is an allegation to prove his innocence unless there is credible evidence regarding his culpability.
39. Pursuant to above, when the allegations contained in the application are taken into consideration, it can be said that prima facie there was an information relating to commission of a cognizable offence as opined by the Ex-Officio Justice of Peace.
40. This Court is well conscious of the argument advanced by learned counsel for the petitioners with vehemence that possibility of false implication may not be ruled out and the petitioners being Federal Ministers and members of ruling party against whom the respondent No, 3 got hostility may suffer loss to their reputation but nevertheless, no definite and positive findings can be given by this Court at this stage as the matter relating to factual controversy cannot be adjudicated upon, particularly keeping in view the duty of respondent No, 3 to substantiate his allegations with reference to role assigned. To the petitioners,
41. Delay in submission of application to the local police was also heavily canvassed by learned counsel for the petitioner in Writ Petition No, 22890 of 2014.
' Exercising right of rebuttal, it was submitted that respondent No, 3 approached the local police on the same day but the application was not entertained due to malice. However, this aspect is not required to be dealt with by this Court keeping in view the moot point because effect of delay in lodging FIR are required to be examined during the course of trial.
42. It was also argued by learned counsel for the petitioners that petitioners are Federal Ministers and Minister for the State and their nomination in the crime report, which according to learned counsel for the petitioners is outcome of malice, will cause serious prejudice to their reputation which has to be protected according to Article 4 of The Constitution.
I am in agreement with the contention of learned counsel for the petitioners that each and every citizen of Pakistan is to be dealt with according to the mandate of the Constitution irrespective of his status and no action detrimental to the life, liberty, reputation or property of any person shall be taken except in accordance with law.
'The expression "except in accordance with law" qualifies the command of Article 4 of The Constitution. It has to be kept in mind that each citizen of Islamic Republic of Pakistan has to be dealt with according to the mandate of law and as such, the argument that in case registration of case, reputation of petitioners shall be prejudiced would advance the plea of petitioners because action under the command of law is forbidden.
43. Great stress was laid down by learned counsel for the petitioners that petitioners should be treated like ordinary citizen and no discrimination should be made against the petitioners to which proposition no exception can be taken as it is the command of The Constitution but nevertheless, keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case and discussion, there can be no two opinions that prima facie there is an information relating to commission of a cognizable offence.
44. It was also contended with vehemence by learned counsel for the petitioners that the Ex-Officio Justice of Peace passed the order impugned as he was swayed by emotional arguments of adversary which were submitted before the Ex-Officio Justice of Peace.
Law has to take its own course keeping in view facts and circumstances of each case and any of the parties either in civil or criminal administration of justice should not be penalized and prejudiced on extraneous consideration. However, in view of discussion made, the argument advanced would not be helpful to the petitioners at this stage.
45. Another argument which was canvassed with vehemence on behalf of petitioners is that in case the order is maintained and upheld, it will cause irreparable loss to the petitioners as after registration of FIR, petitioners have to join the investigation and they can also face agony of arrest.
Suffice it to say that accusation against a person which has been made in the crime report by itself would not give authority to the Officer Incharge of a Police Station or I.O. To make his arrest straightaway upon registration of Fl R. It is settled proposition of law that mere registration of case would not stamp any of the persons as an accused and cannot be arrested as a matter of course unless there is sufficient incriminating evidence regarding culpability of accused. Arrest of the accused is subject to the satisfaction of I.O. Regarding correctness and veracity of allegations levelled by the complainant against the persons named in the crime report. Reference may be made to "Khizer Hayat and others v. Inspector-General of Police (Punjab), Lahore and others" (PLD 2005 Lahore 470).
46. While making another attempt to assail the legality of the order, it was submitted that the Ex- Officio Justice of Peace though keeping in view the command of provisions of Section 22-A (6) of The Code called report from the local police and 'JIT' but no definite finding was given regarding the genuineness of the report submitted. Again placing reliance upon the dictum laid down in the case of "Khizer Hayat" (PLD 2005 Lahore 470), it was submitted that prior to passing any order for registration of criminal case, there must have been specific findings by the Ex-Officio Justice of Peace to brush aside the report submitted.
' It was further argued that the 'JIT' time and again called the respondent No, 3 to appear and associate himself in the investigation who, with malice-in-fact, did not join the proceedings before the 'JIT' headed by an officer of rank of Additional Inspector General of Police.
Learned counsel for the respondent No, 3 though did not dispute the factual position but while meeting out the objection maintained that respondent No, 3 got no faith and trust upon any investigation team keeping in view the ground realities.
47. In order to decide the actual root point as already dealt with, contention raised by the adversaries regarding non-association of respondent No, 3 in the investigation of case FIR No, 510 of 2014 is not required to be examined for the simple reason that the case, according to the version of respondent No, 3, was not registered. Even otherwise, this fact by itself would not be sufficient to annul the order assailed before this Court.
48. Perusal of the order impugned though does not categorically brush aside the reports submitted by local police but nevertheless, order impugned issuing direction to respondent No, 2 for registration of case clearly suggests that the Ex-Officio Justice of Peace was not satisfied with the reasoning and compulsions highlighted in the said report for non-registration of case on behalf of respondent No, 3.
49. Seeking help from the dictum laid down in "Ishaq Lashari, Inspector v. The State" (PLD 2009 Karachi 14), it was submitted by learned counsel for the petitioners as well as learned Advocate General, Punjab that the Ex-Officio Justice of Peace neither competent nor authorized to issue direction for registration of criminal case and he can only direct the police to proceed in accordance with law.
50. I have gone through the Rule of law' expounded in the Report relied upon. Perusal of the Report does not substantiate the contention of the petitioners as well as learned Advocate General, Punjab because while relying upon the dictum laid down in "Muhammad Javaid Khan v. Additional Sessions Judge, Multan and 2 others" (2007 PCr.LJ 124), it was held that the Ex-Officio Justice of Peace is not authorized to make any order to the police for registration of case under a particular provision of law or to add or delete any provision if case was registered under the particular provision to which proposition no exception can be taken and same Rule of law was held by the learned Full Bench of this Court in the case of "Khizer Hayat" (PLD 2005 Lahore 470). Perusal of last paragraph of the impugned order reveals that while accepting the application, direction was issued to respondent No, 2 to register FIR keeping in view the allegations contained in the application of respondent No, 3.
51. Assailing the legality of the order, it was further submitted with 'vehemence that second FIR could not be registered keeping in view the allegations contained in the application made by respondent No, 3.
52. Seeking help from the dictum laid down in "Ch. Muhammad Aslam v. C.P.O. Rawalpindi and others" (2011 PCr.LJ 1870), it was contended that learned Full Bench of this Court declined to make order for registration of second FIR in similar circumstances.
' I have gone through the Rule of law expounded in the Report but the same would not advance the plea of petitioners for the reason to be recorded at appropriate stage.
53. It is an admitted fact that case FIR No, 510 of 2014 was registered with reference to occurrence on the complaint of S.H.O. Police Station Faisal Town, Lahore.
54. Before dealing with the respective contentions, it is desirable to know the circumstances under which second FIR can be registered.
55. However, prior to dealing with the legal aspect. It is desirable to make reference to the arguments advanced by learned counsel for the respondent No, 3 reference of which was made by the Ex-Officio Justice of Peace in the impugned order regarding registration of second FIR bearing No, 511 of 2014 which was registered under different provisions of The Act No, XLV of 1860 including the offences under Sections 506, 427 of the said Act against one Gullu Butt and otheRs, ' Argument of learned counsel for the respondent No, 3 that since FIR No,511 of 2014, which is second in series, was registered regarding same occurrence, therefore, there is no bar regarding registration of third FIR, which argument is mis-conceived and ill-founded.
' After perusal of the contents of said FIR, I find myself in agreement with the contention of learned counsel for the petitioners contending that allegations contained in the crime report does not pertain to the occurrence keeping in view the allegations contained in FIR No, 510 of 2014.
56. Next question for consideration before this Court is whether in the circumstances of the case, the Ex-Officio Justice of Peace was justified in issuing direction for registration of second FIR.
57. It is well settled proposition of law that second FIR can be registered if a distinct and separate cognizable offence is disclosed or if any aggrieved person got reservation about the first FIR grousing that contents of the FIR already registered does not disclose the true picture of the occurrence. However, second FIR cannot be registered if it is just an amplification or elaboration of earlier. Reference may be made to "MRs, Ghanwa Bhutto and another v. Government of Sindh and another" (PLD 1997 Karachi 119), "Wajid Ali Khan Durani and others v. Government of Sindh and others" (2001 SCMR 1556), "Muhammad Azam v. Inspector-general of Police, Islamabad and 2 others" (PLD 2008 Lahore 103), "Mst. Allah Rakhi v. D.P.O. Gujranwala and 5 others" (2009 MLD 99), "Mushtaq Hussain and another v. The State" (2011 SCMR 45) and "Zahid Ali v. Station House Officer, Police Station Patni, Taluka Rohri, District Sukkur and another" (2012 PCr.LJ 180).
58. I have gone through the Rule of law, enunciated in "Ch. Muhammad Aslam v. C.P.O. Rawalpindi and others" (2011 pCr.LJ 1870) banked upon by learned counsel for the petitioneRs, Perusal of the facts of the Report suggests that petitioner who was Protocol Officer of Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto Shaheed approached the Court for registration of case but for different reasons, the application was declined.
' It is to be noted that settled proposition of law has not been disputed in the Report under reference categorically holding that registration of second FIR regarding same occurrence is not barred under law if a distinct and separate cognizable offence is disclosed or the aggrieved person differs from the contents of earlier FIR on the ground that the first FIR registered does not reflect the real story.
59. In the case of "Ch. Muhammad Aslam (supra), one of the grounds to dismiss the writ petition was that petitioner is not an aggrieved party as none of the close relatives including husband and son of the deceased who, at that time, was sitting President of Islamic Republic of Pakistan and Chairman of a political party respectively ever approached the Court. It was further opined that even other family members of the deceased did not approach the Court for registration of FIR and it was held that the omission on their part to approach the Court is sufficient to reflect the satisfaction about the result of investigation. It was further noted that trial had commended and after framing of charge, statements of certain prosecution witnesses were recorded.
60. It is desirable to add that the petitioner in said writ petitions directly approached this Court and as such, while interpreting the expression "aggrieved party" used in Article 199 of The Constitution and discussing the facts of the case and status of the petitioner, it was held that petitioner cannot be said to be an "aggrieved partyr within the meaning of Article referred to.
61. In the present case, respondent No, 3 approached the local police and remained unsuccessful but his attempt brought fruit when he approached the Ex-Officio. Justice of Peace and constitutional jurisdiction has been invoked not by respondent No, 3 but by the petitioneRs, It is further to be noted that locus standi of the complainant as an aggrieved pet son was not questioned by the petitioners which argument even otherwise would not be available to the petitioners cause for registration of case, it is not necessary that an aggrieved person should approach the police communicating information relating to commission of a cognizable offence because the purpose and object for registration of FIR is to set the law in motion.
62. Perusal of the allegations contained in FIR No, 510 of 2014 when put in juxtaposition with the accusations contained in the application made by respondent No, 3 clearly demonstrates that the accusations contained in the said application are not amplification and elaboration of the FIR No, 510 of 2014. Rather the respondent No, 3 being complainant has introduced his own version while controverting the allegations contained in the FIR registered earlier, also intends to implicate the police officers as well as officials and other persons including the petitioners, Set of the accused, mode and manner in which occurrence statedly happened is different in the FIR No, 510 of 2014 and complaint of respondent No, 3.
' In view of the matter, it cannot be said that the allegations contained in the application of respondent No, 3 are just elaboration and amplification of the accusations disclosed in case FIR N o. 510 of 2014.
63. Seeking help from the dictum laid down in "Khizer Hayat and others v. Inspector-General of Police (Punjab), Lahore and others" (PLD 2005 Lahore 470) and "Rai Ashraf and others v.
Muhammad Saleem Bhatti and others" (PLD 2010 Supreme Court 691), learned counsel for the petitioners contended that alternate and efficacious remedy is available to respondent No, 3 to voice his grievance by filing a private complaint and as such, it was improper on the part of the Ex- Officio Justice of Peace to issue direction for registration of criminal case.
' Referring to para- 16 of the judgment in the case of "Khizer Hayat" (PLD 2005 Lahore 470), it was submitted that when it is the case of respondent No, 3 himself that local police is under the influence of petitioners and others, then only appropriate remedy available to the respondent No, 3 is to file a private complaint in which eventuality he would be in a position to control the proceedings. It was further submitted that it has been categorically held in the Report under reference that impression entertained by a large section of legal community that in case of filing of private complaint, accused persons cannot be arrested is an erroneous impression.
' Argument canvassed on the base of case-law referred to cannot be questioned but each case has to be decided keeping in view its own facts. I may advantageously make reference to the dictum laid down in "Wajid Ali Khan Durani and others v. Government of Sindh and others" (2001 SCMR 1556) in which it has been held that alternate remedy though was available to an aggrieved person under the law by way of lodging complaint but mere fact that an alternate remedy had been provided could not debar the Court from giving direction to the police to record another FIR in an appropriate case.
64. In view of discussion prayer for remittance of matter Ex-Officio Justice of Peace also force.
65. Epitome of above discussion is that both the writ petitions having no merits are dismissed.