ASHTAR ABBAS, MEMBER-Ill -- Through this judgment, an appeal under Section 19 of the PEEDA Act, 2006 read with Section 4 of the PST Act, 1974 is being decided whereby the appellant was removed from service due to his involvement in criminal case F.I.R. No. 31511998 under Section 302/34, P.P.C. registered at P.S. Moutra.
2. Learned counsel for the appellant contends that impugned orders dated 28.06.2007 and 31.05.2014 are against law and facts; impugned orders have been passed in violation of judgments of the Hontle apex Courts; provisions of PEEDA Act, 2006 were not kept in view, hence impugned orders cannot sustain. Learned counsel for the appellant prayed. that appeal be accepted, impugned orders be set aside and appellant be reinstated in service.
3. Conversely, learned District Attorney vehemently opposed the arguments rose by the appellant and placed his reliance on the parawise comments submitted by the department. Learned D.A. prayed that as the appeal is merit less, it be dismissed.
4. Arguments Heard. Record perused.
5. The contentions raised by the appellant in the instant service appeal are that he was appointed as PTC Teacher in Govt. Elementary School, Kotli Amir Ali and was falsely implicated in criminal case F.I.R. No. 315/98 under Section 302/34, P.P.C. of PS Moutra dated 26.09.1998; appellant was convicted and sentenced to death vide order dated 24.03.2003 and the same remained upheld even upto the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan. Thereafter, appellant entered into compromise with the legal heirs of the deceased and was ultimately acquitted from the charge vide order dated 29.04.2013 and released from jail on 30.04.2013.
6. it is admitted fact that the appellant was removed from service by the order of the Dy. District Education Officer (M) Tehsil Sialkot due to his conviction in the above-referred criminal case F.I.R.
No. 315/98 in view of the provisions of Section 4(IV) of the PEEDA Act, 2006. The available record reflects that the appellant had committed the murder of Muhammad Mansha son of Muhammad Amin, Amara Ullah son of Allah Ditta, Saqib Rafique son of Muhammad Rafique and Muhammad Saleem son of Piran Ditta and the learned Trial Court convicted the present appellant and others on four counts. The present appellant challenged the order passed by learned Trial Court even upto the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan by filing Criminal Petition No. 753-L of 2009 and leave to appeal was refused on 31.08.2009 by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan.
7. After the rejection of the criminal petition No. 753-L of 2009 from the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan, the appellant moved an application. under Section 338-E read with Section 345, Cr.P.C. as the appellant had arranged compromise with the legal heirs of the deceased mentioned above.
The, Hon'ble Additional Sessions ,Judge, Daska vide his order dated 29.04.2013, granted permission to the appellant and others to effect compromise with legal heirs of the four deceased persons in order to keep tranquility and peace in the society and ultimately acquitted the appellant and others from the charge.
8. The above-mentioned facts would show in an unequivocal term that the present appellant was involved in criminal case FIR. No. 315/98 under Section 302/34, P.P.t. registered at P.S. Moutra for the murder of four persons and he along with others was convicted by the competent authority and law and sentence to death on four counts. His criminal appeal was dismissed by the Hon'ble Lahore High Court, Lahore and thereafter, his Criminal Petition No. 753-1. of 2009 was also rejected/refused by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan vide judgment dated 31.08.2009.
Section 8 of the PEEDA Act, 2006 says that:-- "Where an employee is convicted by a Court of law or has entered into plea bargain or has been acquitted by a Court of law as a result of compounding of an offence involved moral turpitude or affecting human body under any law for the time being in force, the competent authority, after examining facts of the case, shall dismiss the employee."
9. In the present case undoubtedly the appellant lynched four persons and was sentenced to death on four counts, killing of innocent human being is a major sin and crime against all mankind which has much more than a crime of corruption or corrupt practice. Comparative study of the provision of Section 8 of the Act ibid would lead this Tribunal to observe that the authority in the instant case lawfully imposed the major penalty and removed the appellant from service.
10. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that case of the appellant falls under clause "c" of Section 8 of the PEEDA Act, 2006 is not tenable for the reason that in the instant case, the appellant had already been removed from service. In my humble view, had the appellant not been removed from service, clause "c" of Section 8 of the Act ibid would have been applicable. In the instant case, as mentioned above, the Dy. District Education Officer (M), Tehsil Sialkot keeping in view the conviction of the appellant in the above-said criminal case by invoking the provisions of Section 4(IV) of PEEDA Act, 2006 has removed the appellant from service.
11. The case-law referred by the learned counsel for the appellant reported in PLD 2010 S.C. 695 titled Chairman Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan etc. v. Mumtaz Khan, in my humble view has no applicability in the present case on all fours, specially in view of luminous provisions of Section 8 of the Punjab Employees Efficiency, Discipline & Accountability Act, 2006.
12. I have minutely gone through the order dated 28.06.2007 passed by Dy. District Education Officer (M), Tehsil Sialkot as well as order dated 31.05.2014 passed by the appellate authority i.e. District Education Officer (M) Elementary Education, Sialkot and found no material illegality in them. For what has been discussed above, I see no merit in the instant appeal. Resultantly, it is dismissed.