MUHAMMAD ILYAS, J.-The Regular First Appeal in hand was, admittedly time barred when it was submitted before this Court. The appellants, Manzoor Hussain and others, therefore, made a petition (C.M. No. 5916/C/81 for condonation of delay. The appeal was initially presented before the District Judge, Mianwali, but it was returned by him on the ground that its ,jurisdictional value exceeded the pecuniary limits of his jurisdiction. The appellants have invoked the provisions of sections 5 and 14 .Of the Limitation Act, 1908, to get over the difficulty of limitation.
2. The respondents, Muhammad Ali and another, have opposed the said petition of which notice was given to them.
3. It was contended by learned counsel for the appellants that the appellants had filed the appeal before the learned District Judge, in good faith, with the assistance of a senior counsel and therefore, they were entitled to the benefit of section 14 of the Limitation Act. It was explained by him that in the pre-emption suit, out of which this appeal has arisen, the ostensible sale price was Rs. 1 lac but as the appellants, who were plaintiffs in the suit, had no objection to the payment of Rs.
50,000 as sale price, they had gone in appeal to assail the difference of Rs. 50,000. Accord--ing to the learned counsel since the amount of difference, namely, Rs. 50,000 did not exceed the pecuniary limits of the jurisdiction of the learned District Judge. They were advised by their counsel to take the appeal to him (District Judge). He cited Punjab Province v: Nisar Ahmad (1), Abdul Rashid and another v. Muhammad Hafeez and another (2), Kilachand Devechand & Co. (Private)
Ltd. v. Messrs Sh. Mian Muhammad Allahbux (3) to urge that that if a remedy is pursued by a party before a wrong forum due to the mistaken advice of his counsel, he can be accommodated under section 14 of the Limitation Act.
4. In reply, it was urged by learned counsel for the respondents that the difference between the ostensible sale price and the sale price conceded by the appellants was not of Rs. 50,000 but of Rs.
52,000 inasmuch as according to the appellants the sale price actually paid by the respondents (vendees) was Rs. 48,000. He also made reference to the memorandum of appeal filed before the learned District Judge in which the jurisdictional value of the appeal is given as Rs. 1 lac. The submission made by learned counsel for the respondents was that the appellants had not acted with due diligence in filing the appeal before the learned District Judge nor the same had been prosecuted by them in good faith. He also invited our attention to Abdul Ghani v. Ghulam Sarwar (4), Mrs. Ismat Tariq v. Sh. Shaukat Ali (5), Ch. Muhammad Sharif v. Muhammad Ali Khan and others (6), Mst. Ghulam Fatima v. The Federation of Pakistan through General Manager, P. W. R., Lahore (7), Wali Muhammad and 2 others v. Inam-ul-Hassan Khan and S others (8) and Mst. Mah Bibi v. Mst. Hameeda Begum (9) to urge that the wrong advice of a counsel did not constitute a validground for condonation of delay,
(l) PLD 1960 Lab. 801(2) PLD 1963 Lab. 414
(3) PLD 1962 Kar-. 510(4) PLD 1977 SC 102
(5) 1974 SCMR 158(6) 1975 SCMR 259
(7) PLD 1970 Lab. 493(8) PLD 1971 Lab. 332
(9) PLD 1976 Kar. 811
5. There appears to be little merit in the argument of learned counsel for the appellants that the appellants had taken the appeal to the District Judge because the difference in the sale price fixed by the trial Court, namely, Rs. 1 lac and the sale price which, according to the appellants, bad been actually paid was of Rs. 50,000 because in the plaint it was averred by the appellants (plaintiffs) that the disputed land was actually sold for Rs. 48,000. Even before the District Judge it was pleaded by their learned counsel that "according to the appellants-plaintiff's the decree should have been passed against the amount of Rs. 48,000", Thus, the difference was of Rs. 52,000 and not Rs. 50,000. We are, therefore, unable to agree with learned counsel for the appellants that the appeal was preferred before the learned District Judge because the dispute required to be determined in the appeal related to a sum of Rs. 50,000.
6. -Even if it is believed that the object behind the filing of the appeal was to avoid the payment of Rs. 50,000, there is no explanation whatsoever as to why in the memorandum of appeal submitted before the learned District Judge the jurisdictional value of the appeal was given as Rs. 1 lac.
Nothing is, said to be done in good faith unless it is done with due care and caution I. Keeping this principle in view, there was no good faith on the part of the) appellants and their counsel in taking the appeal to the learned District Judge by mentioning its jurisdictional value as Rs. 1 Jac.
According to the provisions of section 18 of the Civil Courts Ordinance, 1962, the learned District Judge had no jurisdiction to hear appeals arising out of the suits of the value exceed--ing Rs.
50,000. The appellants not only filed this appeal before the learned District Judge without due diligence but also prosecuted it for a long time. This means that even till the appeal was returned to them the appellants did not care to ensure that it was being pursued before a proper forum. No indulgence can, therefore, be shown to them under sections 5 and 14 of the Limitation Act.
7. As for the cases of Punjab Province, Abdul Rashid and another and Kilachand Devechand & Co.
(Private) Ltd., relied upon by learned counsel for the appellants, their facts are different from those of the case in hand. Also, the view expressed therein is no longer holding the field. The latest view on the point has been reflected in the cases of Abdul Ghani, Mrs. Ismat Tariq, Ch. Muhammad Sharif, Mrs. Ghulam Fatima, Wali Muhammad and 2 others and Mst. Mah . Bibi, cited by learned counsel for the respondents. The cases of Abdul Ghani, Ch. Muhammad Sharif relate to section 14 of the Limitation Act while the case of Mrs. Ismat Tariq, Mst. Ghulam Fatima, Wali Muhammad and 2 others and Mst. Mah Bibi are in respect of section 5 of the said Act. The trend of authorities now, therefore, is that if a party has taken' a matter before a wrong forum due to the mistaken advice of his counsel he[~ cannot take benefit of the said provisions of the Limitation Act. There is also no affidavit by the learned counsel, who assisted the appellants before the learned District Judge, to the effect that he had, in good faith, advised the appellants to file appeal before the learned District Judge. We are, therefore, not inclined to condone delay in the filing of the appeal before this Court. The appeal in band is, therefore, dismissed, in limine, on the ground of Limitation.
C. M. No. 5916/C/81 is also disposed of accordingly.