' Khilji Arif Hussain, J.--This appeal, with leave of the Court, is directed against the judgment passed by the Lahore High Court whereby ICA filed by the appellant was dismissed while maintaining the judgment passed by the learned Judge-in-Chamber.
2. The facts, necessary for appreciating the controversy, are that the appellant imported textile spinning machinery under Import Licenses dated 28.01.1990 and 16.05.1990 for installation in its factory situated at Faisalabad Road, Sheikhupura. The ex-bond bill of entry was filed on 18.11.1990 claiming benefit of SRO No, 530(1)/90, dated 7.6.1990 ('the SRO') as well as the concession on exemption of duty under Rural Industrial Development Scheme. The goods arrived in Pakistan and the date of manifest entered in the bill of entry was 18.11.1990 which was processed on the same day. The appellant was allowed benefit of the SRO No, 530(1)/90, dated 7.6.1990. However, the benefit of exemption under Rural Industrial Development Scheme claimed by the appellant under SRO No, 1284(1)/90, dated 13.12.1990 was not allowed on the basis that the relevant notification had, by the said date, not been issued. The appellant approached the Customs Collector with the prayer that the benefit of SRO may be allowed to it as it had claimed benefit of Rural Industrial Development Scheme in the ex-bond bill of entry dated 18.11.1990. The Central Board of Revenue vide memo dated 09.12.1992 replied that the benefit of SRO dated 13.12.1990 cannot be extended to the consignments imported by the appellant as the crucial date for application of SRO dated 13.12.1990 is the date of import of consignment and not the date of ex-bonding or payment of duty in terms of proviso to Section 30 of the Customs Act, 1969 and that the date of import has been defined in Board's letter dated 14.1.1991 issued in clarification of SRO dated 13.12.1990, the relevant portion of which reads as under: "(vi) The date of import of plant and machinery under the aforesaid notification would be the date of filing of bill of entry for home consumption and the ex-bond bill of entry in case of warehouse goods."
3. Aggrieved by the said order, the appellant filed Constitutional petition before the Lahore High Court which was dismissed vide judgment dated 30.5.1993. The appellant then filed ICA which was also dismissed, as mentioned above.
4. The learned counsel for the appellant, after taking us to the documents on record, vehemently argued that the appellant is entitled for the benefit of SRO dated 13.12.1990 which provided exemption in respect of the machinery imported within the specified period commencing on 1.12.1990. He contended that since the goods were ex-bonded and cleared after the issuance of the SRO, the appellant is entitled for the benefit of the same.
5. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the Respondent No, 3 contended that the import is a concept much larger than defined in Customs Act, 1969 and it should be appreciated in the context of the constitutional delimitation of territories of Pakistan as they are understood under International Law. He contended that once goods on a vessel cross twelve nautical miles, they come inside internal waters that are demarcated by the Baseline Notification and unloaded at harbor at Karachi, the import of goods in Pakistan stand completed and even if the Import General Manifest is not filed under the Act, still import has taken place. The learned counsel for the respondent further contended that in any case, the appellant filed Import General Manifest much before the date of notification .And merely because the imported goods were obtained from the warehouse after the date of SRO, the benefit under the SRO cannot be extended to the appellant.
6. We have heard the arguments of learned counsel for the parties and carefully gone through the record. From the perusal of record, it appears that the SRO No, 1284(1)/90 dated 13.12.1990 which provided exemption on the consignments to be imported on or after 1.12.1990. In the instant case, after the arrival of the machinery, the appellant filed ex-bond bill of entry on 18.11.1990 and date of manifest was 30.11.1990. The appellant thereafter got the consignment ex-bond on 5.12.1990. The crucial question which needs to be addressed is the effective date when the goods imported in Pakistan for the purposes of SRO to extend benefit to appellant are liable to pay duties. In the case of East and West Steamship Co. Vs. Collector of Customs (PLD 1976 SC 618), it was held as under: "The word 'import' carries the natural meaning of 'bringing in' and has no technical meaning. Mr. A.
K. Brohi construed the word 'import' as entailing the entire process of fling Bill of Entry, discharging from the vessel at a wharf, assessm ent of value of the goods and the duty payable on them. We, however, see no warrant for placing this artificial meaning on the word 'import'. In Black's Law Dictionary, 'importation' is defined as 'The act of bringing goods and merchandise into a country from a foreign country' and 'imported' in general, has the same meaning in the Tariff laws that its etymology shows, in porto, to carry in. To 'import' is to bear or carry into. An imported article is one brought or carried into a country from abroad. In Wharton's Law Lexicon 'import' is given the meaning 'goods or produce brought into a country from abroad".
7. In the case of Pakistan Textile Mills Owners Association vs. Administrator of Karachi (PLD 1963 SC 137), it has been held as under: "Under the definition given in the Rules framed by the Municipal Corporation the word "import" means the bringing in of goods into the terminal tax limits from outside those limits. In the present case the goods are, in fact, so brought in, unloaded and stored there along with other goods similarly brought in, then reloaded for transshipment to the factory. In every sense of the term, therefore, the goods are, in our view, imported into the Municipal limits of Karachi. We see no reasons, therefore, to give any artificial meaning to the word "import" as sought to be contended by the learned counsel. "Import" and "export" in their ordinary and natural sense mean to bring into or take out of or away from a particular place. The introduction of the notion that there must also necessarily be a mixing up in mass with other goods within those limits seems to us to impose an unjustifiable restriction upon the meaning of the word "import".
8. In the instant case admittedly the consignments were unloaded at Karachi Port much before the date of SRO and merely because at the request of the appellant, the goods were placed in ex- bond, benefit of any SRO cannot be extended in view of clear language of the SRO.
9. We have noted a significant change on levy of duty under Section 20 of the Customs Act, 1962 and of the Customs Act, 1969. Under Section 20 of the Act, 1962, duty was levied on goods imported into the Customs Station whereas under Act, 1969, it is levied the moment goods imported into Pakistan.
10. By SRO in question, Federal Government exempted plant and machinery as is not manufactured locally during specified period imported for specific area from whole of the customs duty, surcharge and sale tax leviable or chargeable thereon under the first schedule to the Customs Act, 1969 as is specified in Column 3 of the said table and whole of the sale tax chargeable thereon under the Sales Tax (Amendment) Act, 1990.
11. In the instant case, admittedly ex-bond bill of entry was filed on 18.11.1990, before the issuance of notification and also before 1.12.1990, the appellant cannot claim benefit under the said SRO. The clarification of Central Board of Revenue on 14.1.1991 made it clear that for the purpose of benefit of exemption, it will be from the date of filing of bill of entry for home consumption and the ex-bond bill of entry in case of ware housed goods and the date when goods are presented for clearance.
The appellant claimed exemption under the SRO being an exemption granting notification and as per assertion the same has to be construed strictly. From the scrutiny of the SRO, it appears that for claiming the benefit under SRO, the crucial date is the date when the bill of entry is submitted and not the date when the goods are to be crossed Customs barriers.
12. The impugned judgment being based on proper appreciation of facts and law, does not call for any interference by this Court while exercising powers under Article 185(3) of the Constitution. For the foregoing discussions, this appeal has no merit and the same is dismissed. No order as to costs. (R.A.) .