RAJA MUHAMMAD KHURSHID KHAN, ACTG. C. J.-This appeal by leave seeks to assail the judgment and decree of the High Court; dated 18-5-1978, whereby the appeal filed by the appellant.
(vendee) was dismissed and the judgment and decree passed by the first appellate Court was maintained.
2. The only point involved in the present appeal 'relates to the amount on payment of which the pre-emptor (respondent herein) can exercise his right of prior purchase. The trial Court decreed the suit of the pre-emptor holding that he was entitled to exercise his right on payment of Rs. 3,000, the amount that actually changed hands before the Registering Officer. The first appellate Court reversed this finding and granted the decree on payment of the entire amount of Rs. 10,000 ; mentioned in the sale-deed. This finding of the first appellate Court was also maintained by the High Court, on second appeal, We order dated 18-5-1978. Hence, this appeal to assail the said judgment of the High Court.
3. It is submitted on behalf of the appellant that the High Court as well as the first appellate Court while assessing the amount, on payment of which the pre-emptor could exercise his right of prior purchase, has erred and failed to adhere to the well-recognized principles necessary for the safe administration of justice. His contention, in the first instance, is that the statements of the witnesses ; examined an proof of the receipt by which Rs. 7,000 are stated to have changed hands prior to the Registration of the sale-deed, 'suffer - from grave infirmities and it was not safe for the lower Courts to hold that the receipt stands proved. He has, secondly ; contended that the receipt seems to. Be forged one as the signatures of the vendor on the receipt and the sale-deed have least resemblance in their, even broader, characteristics.
4. After giving our considered thought to the arguments advanced and examining the relevant record ; we consider that this appeal merits no consideration. Our reasons are;
(a) The challenge to the validity of the order of the High Court, it would appears, turns entirely, on propriety and correctness of the reasoning advanced by the High Court in refusing to interfere with the judgment of the first appellate Court. It clearly amounts to appreciation of evidence which hardly' furnishes a ground for interference in this Court. The Supreme Court cab interfere only when' the decision is patently erroneous or based on no evidence at all or upon any manifest misreading of the evidence or such that it could not honestly have been arrived at after giving due consideration to the facts and circumstances of the case. We do not find any such error in the finding of the lower Courts to call for any interference. The sweep of the powers of the Supreme Court of Azad Kashmir is indeed not so were as to enable- us to appreciate the evidence if there is (as the case is before us) no error or mistake apparent on the face of the record. The Supreme Court will always decline to assess the weight of the evidence as it amounts to re-appraisal and rehearing of the case which only a full constituted Court of civil appeal can do.
(b) So far the submission regarding the non-resemblance of the signatures of the vendor on the two documents, mentioned above, is concerned we observe that the above ground was neither taken before the trial Court nor it was agitated before the first or the second appellate Court. We say s e because we neither find its mention in the judgments of the first appellant Court and that of the High Court which are otherwise very detailed and elaborate judgments and record all the points raised before them therefore, see no reason to allow this point to be raised for the first time.
We, before this Court ; especially when there is no evidence on it.
(c) A party is bound in law to confine itself to the pleadings and cannot be permitted a 'volte face' and build up an inconsistent case for the first time before the Supreme Court.
5. Our above stated conclusions are supported by a considerable body of cases from Pakistan as well as Indian jurisdiction which lay down that the appreciation of the evidence in a way not suited to the party cannot be made a valid ground of appeal in the Supreme Court and that a party cannot also generally be allowed to press a ground of attack or defence for the first time before the Supreme Court.
The upshot of the whole discussion is that this appeal fails with costs.