This petition under section 561, Cr. P. C. Is directed against the order passed by the, 5th Additional Sessions Judge, Karachi dated 10th May 1980, in Criminal Revision No. 79/80, filed by respondent No.
1. Against the order of A. C. M. Liaquatabad, dated 28th February, 1980, by which a Bus bearing No. 819-245, was handed over to the petitioner (herein) on Superdginama in the sum of Rs. 50,000.
2. The fats leading the filing of this petition briefly stated are as under :-
3. The petitioner had lodged F.I.R. With Liaquatabad Police, alleging that on 24th April 1978, his truck while standing in the garage of one Samad, was stolen by respondent No. 1. It was his case that the truck originally bearing No. K. A. P. 5570, had been purchased by him from one Mohammad Ali Vatto on 6th January 1978 for Rs. 35,000. The registra--tion of the vehicle was at that time in the name of one Ali Mohammad, who had sold the Vehicle to Haji Islam, who in turn had sold it to Mohammad Ali from whom the petitioner had purchased the same. It is apparent from the record that only after a period of ten months from the date of filing of the F. I. R. The truck which had by then been converted into a bus was secured from the possession of respondent No. 1. At that time the registration of the Vehicle was in the name of respondent No. 1. Incidentally as is revealed from the statement of facts in the order of the learned 5th Additional Sessions Judge. Karachi, while respondent No.1, was still in custody, on an application of the petitioner dated 28th February 1980 the bus was handed over to him without hearing respondent No. 1. By order of A. C. M., Liaquatabad.
It would further appear that Civil Suit No. 116779 was filed in the Court of Civil Judge No. XVII Karachi by respondent No. 1, against the petitioner for a declaration that the respondent No. 1. Was in lawful possession of the custody of vehicle bearing No. K. A. P. 5570 Chassis No. 543863, Engine No. 2619 of 90 H. P. And for a permanent prohibitory injunction restrain--ing the petitioner from interference in the possessory right of respondent No. 1, in respect of the aforesaid vehicle. The learned 5th Additional Sessions Judge, Karachi, before whom revision petition was filed by respondent No. 1, under section 439 A, Cr. P. C. Passed the impugned order considering that respondent No.1 was in possession of the vehicle, the registration was in his name and the order of delivery of the vehicle in favour of the petitioner was passed behind the back of respondent No. 1 and was therefore, not legal.
4. A preliminary objection has been raised by Mr. Anwar Tariq, the learned counsel for respondent No. 1, that since the power of revision of the High Court is concurrent under section 439 (4) (b) with the power of the Court of Sessions under section 439-A and since the revision petition has already been decided by the Court of Sessions, a second revision application with respect to the order made by the Sessions Court cannot be entertained. Reliance was placed on a decision of Criminal Revision Application, Rajo v. Muhammad Qassim and another (1978 P Cr. L J 706). In the precedent case revision application was tiled in the Court of Sessions, Larkana, against the order of S. D. M.
Shahdadpur, under section 145 (c), Cr. P. C. And the revision application was dismissed by the Additional Sessions Judge, on the ground that section 145, Cr. P. C. Proceedings were competent and the order of S. D. M. Regarding the produce had been passed to prevent any breach of the peace until the final decision by the civil Court. It was held that a revision application having already decided a second revision application was not maintainable in the High Court as High Court's power of revision was concurrent under section 439 (4) (6) the High Court could not entertain second revision application with respect to the order which had been dealt with by the Sessions Judge under section 439-A, Cr. P. C. In the aforesaid precedent case the petition was also stated to be under section 561-A for quashment of 'the order and therefore it had been argued that the power under that section could be exercised exclusively by the High Court. The contention was repelled as it was held that S. D. M. Had passed order under section 145 (6), Cr. P. C. And there was no more to be done by him, the proceedings having been concluded subject to orders of civil Court and therefore the question of quashment of the proceedings would not, therefore, arise.
5. 1n the instant case as already stated there is a civil suit pending for declaration and relief in connection with the -same vehicle. On the facts stated it cannot be averred that the orders passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge. Karachi, are perverse or without jurisdiction. The learned Additional Sessions Judge, relied upon the decision of this Court in Criminal Application No. 217; 71 in Syed Nizamuddin v. The State and another (1972 P Cr. L J 678) wherein custody of a car was handed over to the person who was last in possession. 1n any case under the impugned order the custody of the vehicle was handed over to respondent No. 1, on furnishing security at the matter with regard to ownership and rights of the parties is yet to be decided by the civil Court. It is well-settled legal position that ordinarily every case should be allowed to proceed according to law and resort to the provisions of section 561-A should not be lightly made as any such resort would circumvent the due process of law. It is only if the impugned order is per se, illegal or perverse and the High Court comes to-- the conclusion that process started in a subordinate Court is being abased that the power under the section to quash proceedings or to pass an order to set aside or step such proceedings is passed to prevent abuse of process of Court.
6. Under the circumstances the present petition for the reasons already given has no merit and is accordingly dismissed. revisions by the competent authorities. Therefore, it is advisable to consult the official sources or legal professionals for the most up-to-date and accurate information.