1. The appellant has challenged in this appeal the concurrent findings of the two courts below holding him a defaulter in payment of rent for the months of July and August, 1970 and ordering his ejectment from the premises.
2. Mr. Khalid Anwar, the learned counsel for the appellant very candidly, at the hearing of this appeal, stated before me that in view of the concurrent findings of fact by the two Courts below that the appellant has defaulted in payment of rent for the months of July and August, 1970, he would not challenge this finding of fact and will confine his arguments only with regard to the legal aspect of the case which relates, to the admissi--bility of the rent deed dated 27-5-1970, Exh. 6, produced in evidence before the Controller. It is contended by the learned counsel that the lease agreement which is the basis for, filing of the ejectment case against the appellant is a document evidencing lease in excess of one year and therefore it required compulsory registration both under section 107 of the Transfer f~ of Property Act as well as under section 17 of the Registration Act. It is urged by the learned counsel that although the document is described as a lease for a period of 11 months but in reality it was a lease for an indefinite period as would appear from paragraphs 4 and 5 of the document. It is alternatively contended by the learned counsel that even if the document is held to be a lease for a period of 11 months only, it still required registration under section 107 of the Transfer of Properties Act and therefore, in the absence of registration, the respondent could not assert a right under this document to enforce the term with regard to payment of rent on a specified date contained in the document. To support his contention that even a lease for a period of l I months required registration under section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act, the learned counsel has referred to the case of Abdullah Bhai v. Ahmed Din (PLD1964S C106). In reply to the above contentions of Mr. Khalid Anwar, the learned counsel for respondent urged that even if the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is accepted the lace; of registration will not render the document inadmissible in evidence and it can be looked into by the Court for collateral purposes of finding out the rate of rent, mode of payment etc. To support his contention, the learned counsel for the respondent relied upon the case of Muhammad Ishaque v.
2. Messrs Erose Theatre (PLD 1977 SC 109) and Muhammad Ashraf v. Muhammad Sharif (PLD 1971 Lah, 610). In the case of Muhammad Ishaque, the learned counsel for respondent relied upon the following passage at page 125 of the report "It may be added that the argument based on the requirement of compulsory registration of the partnership deed has really lost its rele--vance in view of the replacement of the original section 49 of the Registration Act by a new section by the Registration (Amendment) Ordinance, 1962. The former provision that an unregistered document creating declaring or transferring a right in immovable property could not be received in evidence is no longer the law of the land, and the only penalty for non-registration is that the document in question shall not be operative in respect of rights in immovable property."
3. "The objection as regards the admissibility in evidence of the rent deed is misconceived, for the reason that on the appellant's own showing the tenancy was for a period of eleven months ending with the 31st of August, 1968. The law does not require such an agreement of lease to be registered.
4. Further, the document was being used, if at all, for the collateral purpose of ascertain the mode of payment, and not as the basis of the tenancy which has been found to be statutory tenancy in terms of clause (i) of section 2 of the Ordinance. Finally, the two essential terms of the previous tenancy namely, the rate of rent and mode of payment stand admitted by the present appellant, and, therefore, the exclusion of the agreement from evidence would make no difference to the decision of this case."