1. DORAB PATEL, J.-The petitioners are the legal heirs of one Nathu, whose claim for agricultural land was verified for 276 P. I: Units, and therefore, as Nathu had meanwhile died, the land to the extent of the said units was con--firmed in favour of the petitioners, on 30-4-1957. This order of 30-0-1957 was challenged after more than ten years by the first respondent acting through his attorney. But, according to learned counsel, the attorney was an imposter and, therefore, the appeal filed by him was a frivolous and vexatious appeal and this apart from the fact that it was grossly time-barred.
2. Unfortunately, for the petitioners, the Deputy Settlement Commissioner heard the appeal, allowed it and cancelled the allotment of the petitioners to the extent of 125 P. I. Units as excess land. This was by an order, dated 17-5-1968 therefore, the petitioners challenged this order in a revision which came up for hearing before the Settlement Commissioner, Bahawalpur, on 30-4-1969. The Settlement Commissioner appears to have accepted the con--tention of the petitioners that the attorney, who had claimed to have filed an appeal on behalf of the first respondent against the order of 30-4-1957 was an imposter, but despite this finding he dismissed the revision of the petitioners with the observation that the area cancelled "should only be allotted to any other eligible Mohajir, including the present petitioners, provided they have any unsettled claims pending-" Aggrieved by these orders, the petitioners challenged them in a writ petition in the Lahore High Court which was dismissed on 18-11-1974. Instead of challenging the judgment against them in a petition for leave, they filed a review application for the review of the judgment on 30th December, 1974. But, as this review application was dismissed on the 24th January, 1975, they have filed this petition for leave against the judgment dismissing their writ petition as well as the order dis--missing their review application.
3. The petition is time-barred by eighty days, but according to learned counsel, if the time spent by the petitioners in prosecuting their review application was excluded, the petition was in time. This submission implies that the petitioners were justified in filing a review application, but we do not think they had any grounds for seeking a review of the Judgment of 18-11-1974. In any event, they had filed their review application after the expiry of the statutory period of limitation for filing a review, therefore, the review had to be dismissed on this ground, and, therefore, the petitioners cannot possible claim the benefit of time spent in prosecuting their review application.
4. Learned counsel's only other plea was that the petitioners were villagers who had been misguided by their advocate. This would be no ground for, condoning delay, therefore, the petition is dismissed on the ground that it is time-barred.