SALAHUDDIN PANHWAR, J.---Through this consolidated judgment, I shall dispose of both the captioned appeals, arising from consolidated Judgment (s) and decree (s) of lower court (s) below. Through these separate appeals, the appellants have assailed review order dated 14.12.2013 and decree dated 11.9.2013 passed by learned Vth Additional District Judge, Hyderabad in Civil Appeals Nos.270 of 2012 and 271 of 2012 whereby dismissing the appeal of appellants and maintaining the consolidated judgment and decree, passed by learned trial Court Judge i.e, 2nd Senior Civil Judge, Hyderabad dated 31.8.2012 and 05.9.2012 respectively in FC Suit No,101 of 2007 'Re-Mst. Hajra and another v. Mst. Mumtaz Haroon and others and FC Suit No,135 of 2000 ReMst.
Mumtaz Haroon v. Mst. Hajran and others.
2. Telesly, but relevant facts, as pleaded in civil suit, are that the appellant Mst. Hajran filed FC Suit No,101 of 2007 wherein pleading that she is real mother of appellant No,2. The defendants/respondents Nos.1 to 5 are successors of another son of appellant namely Muhammad Haroon Memon who expired on 04.12.2006. The suit property viz, plot with double storey construction bearing No,17-B area 535 Sq. Yards Memon Co-operative housing society Hyderabad originally owned by appellant No,2 and such mutation was existing in his name vide entry No,359 dated 18.8.1991 as per form VII-B in the record of rights of respondent No,6. There was loan of the house Building Finance Corporation over the suit property which was repaid and such letter of closure of investment dated 01.3.1995 was issued by Assistant Manager, HBFC. It is further claimed that appellant No,2, being exclusive owner, due to love, affection and respect to his mother viz. Appellant No,1, about 3/4 years back gifted the same to appellant No,1 and subsequently reduced the oral gift deed in writing on stamp paper No,1313 dated 17.9.2007. Suit property continuously remained in possession of appellants, however, the appellant No,1 being mother/ grand mother allowed the respondents Nos.1 to 5 so also their successor Muhammad Haroon Memon to live in the first floor of suit property. The successor of the respondents Nos. 1 to 5 viz, Muhammad Haroon Memon, who died on 04.12.2006 during his life time never claimed any right against the appellants over the suit property. After death of Muhammad Haroon Memon surprisingly, the respondent No,1 within about 10 days of the death, moved application to General Secretary of Memon Co-operative Housing Society, Hyderabad claiming therein that suit property was owned by her late husband and it be transferred in favour of respondents Nos.1 to 5. On 20.9.2007, the appellants through their counsel issued notice to Secretary Memon Co-Operative Housing Society, Hyderabad for transfer of the suit property in the name of appellant No,1 on the basis of gift deed and the Secretary Memon Co-operative Housing Society called the appellants in his house office and handed over a photo copy of alleged registered sub-lease deed dated 17.5.1983 purporting to be executed by appellant No,2 in favour of successors in interest of respondents Nos.1 to 5 allegedly registered in the office of respondent No,7.
' It is further claimed that alleged sub-lease deed bearing No,859 dated 07.5.1983 allegedly executed by appellant No,2 is bogus, forged, fabricated, fraudulently and illegal document as neither it was executed by appellant No,2 nor any consideration was received by appellant No,2. As per impugned sub-lease deed the lease right was conferred upon Muhammad Haroon Memon for a period of 50 years commencing from 17.5.1983 i.e, for the period upto 17.5.2033 at the consideration of annual rent of Rs,60/- per year whereas the total consideration has been shown Rs,6000/-. Since the alleged sub-lease deed was without consideration therefore the fraud is evident from the document itself as there is hundred time difference in the rate and total consideration as mentioned in the documents. It is further alleged that the sub-lease deed dated 17.5.1983 was never executed by the appellant No,2 and neither Muhammad Haroon Memon nor his successor have any right over the suit property for the period shown in the bogus sub-lease deed which is liable be cancelled and given up.
3. In view of above back ground the plaintiffs/appellants prayed as under:-- a) This Honourable court may be pleased to declare that plaintiff No,1 is lawful owner of the suit property viz. B-17 Memon Co-operative Housing Society Hyderabad on the basis of gift deed made by plaintiff No,2 in favour of plaintiff No,1 which was further reduced in writing on stamp paper No,1313 dt: 17.9.2007. b) That it may also be declared that defendants Nos.1 to 5 have no right or interest over the suit property except to live in the property with consent and permission of plaintiff No,1 being mother in law and grand mother c) That sub-lease deed , allegedly registered by defendant No,7 viz. No,859 dated 17.5.1983 may please be declare, null, void, bogus, fraudulent, ineffective and may be cancelled and given up d) That permanent injunction may be issued against defendants Nos.1 to 5 restraining them from claiming any right over the suit property on the basis of impugned bogus sub-lease deed dated 17.5.1983. e) Cost be awarded to plaintiffs. j) Any other relief this honourable court deems fit and proper may also be granted.
4. The respondent/defendant No,1 filed her written statement alleging therein that said bungalow was constructed at the expenses/expenditure of ancestor of the respondents/defendants namely Muhammad Haroon, who was serving in Iraq from where he used to transmit foreign exchange to the appellant/plaintiff No,2. The appellant/plaintiff No,2 being no more owner of the property had got no right to gift the property in favour of appellant/plaintiff No,1. The alleged oral gift deed written on stamp paper dated 17.9.2007 is bogus, managed, fabricated document to harm the right of the answering defendants. It is further submitted that it never remained in possession of appellant/plaintiff No,2 but the appellant/plaintiff No,1, being real mother of deceased Muhammad Haroon and grand mother of respondents/defendants Nos.1 to 5 was residing with them but without any legal right of interest over the property. It was denied that ever the appellants/plaintiffs allowed Muhammad Haroon or the answering defendants/ respondents for residing in the suit property but they resided as owner of the property. The respondent/defendant No,2 had already sub-leased the property to the ancestor of the answering respondent/ defendant through sub- lease deed dated 17.5.1983 registered at Serial No,859 with the sub-registrar registration and the deceased Muhammad Haroon Memon got his name mutated in the record of the rights and after his expiry the respondents/defendants, being successors, beCame owners of the property. It was denied that sub-lease deed bearing No,859 dated 07.5.1983 executed by appellant/plaintiff No,2 is bogus, forged, fabricated, fraudulent and illegal document. It was also denied that it was not executed by plaintiff/appellant No,2. It was also denied that he did not receive the consideration from deceased Muhammad Haroon. It was denied that no consideration was paid to the appellant/plaintiff No,2 by deceased Muhammad Maroon. There was no fraud apparent on the documents. The appellant/plaintiff had twisted the words annual rent was fixed Rs,60/- and the value of Rs,6000 was shown for full occupancy value including annual rent and other benefits. The said amount was admitted and accepted by the appellant/plaintiff No,2 which is clearly evident from clause-2 of the sub-lease deed. It was denied that appellant/plaintiff No,2 had not executed sub-lease deed dated 17.5.1983 in favour of deceased Muhammad Haroon Memon. It was denied that respondents/defendants had no right over the suit property for which period shown in the legal and lawful sublease deed which is not bogus, as alleged.
5. The respondent/defendant No,2 also filed his written statement wherein submitting that late Muhammad Haroon was the employee as engineer at Iraq and he had purchased the suit property in favour of his brother namely Muhammad Arif as Benami transaction and thereafter constructed the double stoley house and then in month of May, 1983 suit house was transferred in favour of Muhammad Haroon Memon through registered sub-lease deed vide R.D.No,859 dated 17.5.1983 and since then he was lessee of suit plot along with the ownership of super structure and during his life time he had nominated his wife namely Mst. Mumtaz Haroon as nominee and after the death of Muhammad Haroon his widow Mst. Mumtaz Haroon is owner of the suit house. It was denied that appellant/plaintiff No,2 being exclusive owner, gifted property to plaintiff/appellant No,1 . And subsequently reduced oral gift deed in writing on stamp paper No,1313 dated 17.9.2007. It was alleged that appellant/plaintiff was not owner of suit property so the question of gift was not available and gift deed dated 17.9.2007 was claimed as fabricated and manipulated document. It was denied that suit property continuously remained in possession of appellants/plaintiffs. It was also denied that respondents Nos.1 to 5 were allowed to live in the suit property rather it was claimed that Muhammad Haroon, being owner in possession, kept his mother in house being a son.
The respondents Nos.1 to 5 are legal heirs of late Muhammad Haroon who was owner of the suit property therefore, respondent/defendant No,1 had submitted application to office of the society for transfer of the same in her favour and an article was published in daily Jur'at Karachi dated 27.12.2006 and society had transferred suit property in favour of respondent/defendant No,1. It was also claimed that since Muhammad Haroon became absolute and exclusive owner since 1983 as such appellant/plaintiff No,2 had no power to gift the property to anybody. The gift deed was alleged as fabricated and false document while registered sub-lease deed, being registered, was genuine. It was also denied that sub-lease deed was without consideration.
6. The respondent No,1 Mst. Mumtaz Haroon also filed FC Suit No,135 of 2009 wherein pleading the same facts, which were pleaded in her written statement and had sought following relief (s):- a) To declare that the plaintiff is lawful owner of the said property i.e, house No,B-17 Memon Cooperative Housing Society, Hyderabad; b) To direct the defendant or whosoever be in the possession of the ground floor of suit property house No,B-17 Memon Co-operative Housing Society Hyderabad to hand over the peaceful Possession of the plaintiff; c) To direct the defendants to pay the plaintiff mesne profits for the suit property at the rate of Rs,30,000/- from the date of institution of this suit till final disposal; d) That permanent injunction may be granted against defendants Nos.1 to 5 restraining them from selling, transferring and changing the ownership rights, title of property House No,B-17, Memon Co- operative Housing Society Hyderabad to any vendee and in all relevant records of ownership, transfer on mutation etc of said property in the relevant records of concerned department, so also restrain the defendants from destructing or demolishing the suit property without due course of law; e) To direct the defendants to pay past utility bills share amounting to Rs,75,628/- and one half of the future monthly utility bills from the date of institutions of this suit till final disposal; f) That any other relief which this Honourable court may deem fit and proper; g) The cost of the suit may also be awarded; h) To declare null and void gift deed dated 17.9.2007 executed on stamp paper No,1313 purportedly executed by the defendant No,5 in favour of defendant No,1 to direct the defendants to deliver the original of gift deed before this Honourable court and further prayed that this honourable court may be pleased to cancel the same; ' In such suit, the appellants filed their joint written statement wherein sticking with the claim, as was pleaded in their suit.
7. Both the suits were consolidated and from the pleadings of the parties the following consolidated issues were framed by the learned trial court Judge:-
1. Whether deceased Muhammad Haroon Memon was the exclusive owner of property No,B-17 Co- Operative Society Hyderabad vide sub-lease deed dated 20.3.1979?
2. Whether sub-lease deed No, 859 dated 17.5.1983 is bogus, forged, fabricated, fraudulent and illegal?
3. Whether oral gift written on stamp-paper dated 17.9.2007 is bogus, managed etc?
4. Whether in the life time deceased Muhammad Haroon provided living accommodation to the defendants Mst. Hajran and others?
5. Whether in the life time deceased Muhammad Haroon provided living accommodation to the defendants Mst. Hajran and others?
6. Whether said Arif gifted the suit property to his mother Mst. Hajran through gift deed dated 17.9.2007?
7. Whether suit is not maintainable under the law?
8. Whether plaintiff is entitled for any relief as prayed?
' What should the decree be?
9. To substantiate the pleadings, appellant No,1 examined her attorney namely Muhammad Arif Memon, the appellant No,2 and then side was closed through statement.
8. In rebuttal thereof, the respondents/defendants examined their attorney at Ex.57 who produced special power of attorney at Ex.57/A, registered sub-lease registered No,1399 dated 17.5.1983 as Ex.57/B, application dated 12.2.2006 as Ex.57/C, Transfer letter dated 27.12.2006 as Ex.57/D, form-VUII entry No,360 dated 01.8.1991 as Ex.57/E, permission to mortgage dated 23.9.1991 as Ex.57/H, heirship certificate of late Muhammad Haroon Memon as Ex.57/I, paid utility bills as Ex.57/A and then side was closed through statement.
9. The learned trial court, having heard the arguments, passed the consolidated judgment and decree dated ' 31.8.2012 and 05.9.2012 whereby dismissing the suit of appellant (FC Suit No,101/2007) while decreeing the suit of respondents/defendants (FC Suit No,135/2009).
10. Such judgment and decree were challenged by the appellants through two separate appeals i.e, Civil Appeal No,270 of 2012 "Re-Mst, Hajra and another v. Mst. Mumtaz Haroon and others" and Civil Appeal No,271/2012 "Re-Mst. Hajra and another v. Mst. Mumtaz Haroon and others" which both were made over to the court of learned Vth Additional District Judge, Hyderabad.
11. The learned appellate Judge, having heard the arguments, passed a consolidated judgment and decree dated 10.9.2013 and 11.9.2013 respectively whereby both the appeals were allowed and in consequence thereof the consolidated judgment and decree of learned trial court judge were reversed.
12. The record further spells out that on 05.10.2013 the advocate for respondent No,2 filed application under Order XLVII, Rules 1, 2 and 4 R/w Section 114, C.P.C. Before appellate court wherein praying for reviewing judgment and decree of appellate court. Objections thereon were filed by appellants.
However,' vide order dated 14.12.2013 the learned appellate Court, having heard the arguments, allowed the review application and in consequence thereof both the Civil appeals i.e, C.As.
Nos.270/2012 and 271 of 2012 were dismissed and consolidated judgment and decree of the learned trial court was maintained.
13. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that scope of review was very limited; review application was filed after 21 days when Article 161 of Limitation Act provides 15 days; appellate Judge has travelled beyond his jurisdiction; findings of both Courts below are against the settled principles of law. In support of his contentions, he has relied upon the cases reported as PLD 2014 Sindh 468, 2003 CLC Lahore 1773, 1996 CLC Karachi 1003 and 1991 MLD Karachi 1070.
14. On other hand, the learned counsel for the respondents argued that appeal is not maintainable and that findings of both the learned lower court (s), being legal and proper, needs no interference.
He further added that order of the review is competently passed. In support of such contentions, he has relied upon the cases reported as PLD 1971 Lahore 59, 2012 CLC 1418, 1999 MLD 2096, 2006 CLC 1430, 2006 SCMR 1304 and 2007 CLC 27.
15. I have heard the respective arguments, so advanced by respective parties' counsel and have also examined the available material.
16. The learned counsel for the appellants has taken a strong stance to the effect that review, filed by respondents, was barred by law of Limitation. It is always the demand of law to address a legal question first, therefore, I would like to examine this issue. Let's have a reference to Articles of Limitations dealing with 'review' which are:-- Article- 161For a review of judgment by a Court ofFifteen days Small Causes or by a Court invested with the jurisdiction of a court of Small causes when exercising that jurisdiction Article- 162For a review ofTwenty judgment by a Highdays Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction Article- 173For a review ofNinety judgment except in thedays cases provided for by Article 161 and Article 162 ' The Article-161 specifically speaks about review of judgment of Small Causes court or a court exercising jurisdiction of Small Causes court while Article 162 is confined to judgment of High Court, if passed exercising original jurisdiction. However, the Article 173 has been made applicable to judgment (s) of other courts. It is a matter of record that review, under question, was in respect of the judgment passed by appellate Court (Additional District Judge). The judgment of appellate Court (Additional District Judge), in no way, fits within meaning of the Articles 161 and 162 of the Limitation Act, therefore, would fall within meaning of Article 173. The Article 173 of the Limitation Act provides a period of Ninety days for review. In the instant matter the review was filed within a period of 24 days, therefore; such review cannot be said to be hit by Article 173 of Limitation Act.
17. Now, reverting to merits of the case, it would be significant to first examine the legality of the order, passed by learned appellate Court Under Order XLVII, Rules 1, 2 and 4 R/w section 114, C.P.C.
' The Order XX Rule-3 of the Code, being relevant to the issue is reproduced hereunder:--
3. Judgment to be signed. The judgment shall be dated and signed by the judge in open Court at the time of pronouncing it and, when once signed, shall not afterwards be altered or added to, save as provided by Section 152 or on review.
The reading of the above provision itself shows that the Court (s) can alter or add in pronounced judgment while exercising jurisdiction Under Section 152 or on review, therefore, competence of a Court to alter or add in already pronounced judgment is protected by the law itself. Such jurisdiction, however, is not an 'alternative to an appeal' but is meant to: i) correct some mistake or error apparent on the fact of record; ii) on discovery of new or important matter or evidence, which despite due diligence, was not within knowledge of applicant, when order was passed; iii) for any other sufficient reason; ' The grounds (i) and (ii) provides 'limitations' for exercising such jurisdiction, however, the ground
(iii) for exercise of such a jurisdiction has to be given due meaning and weight. The term 'sufficient reason', however, would not authorize the reviewing court to act as appellate Court but could be taken as a discretion to a court to make a 'judgment' 'the judgment' within meaning and object of Order XX Rule 4(2) of the Code which reads as under:-- ' Judgments of other Courts. (2).---Judgments of other Courts shall contain a concise statement of the case, the points for determination, the decision thereon, and the reasons for such decision.
The term 'reasons for such decision' leaves nothing ambiguous that 'decision' should be based on the reasons. If a decision does not find conformity with reasons for such decision it cannot be said to be a 'legal judgment' because it is the reasoning which results into 'conclusion'. An appeal lies against a decree but grounds of objections against a decree are always originated from the details of the judgment/ order. In the Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, the word 'decree' has been defined as follow:-- Decree. The Judgment of a Court of equity or chancery answering for the most purposes to the judgment of a court of law. A decree in equity is a sentence or order of the court, pronounced on hearing and understanding all the points in issue, and determining the rights of all the parties to the suit; according to equity and good conscience. It is a declaration of the court announcing the legal consequences of the facts founds. With the procedural merger of law and equity in the federal and most State Courts under the Rules of Civil Procedure, the term 'judgment' has generally replaced 'decree'.
18. On above touch stone, I would like to examine the review order, so passed by the learned appellate Court. The perusal of the judgment of the appellate Court shows that it framed following points for determinations:--
1. Whether impugned judgment dated 31 .
8.2012 and decree dated 05.9.2012 requires any interference of this Court?
2. What should the decree be?
' The perusal of the judgment of appellate court shows that reasons towards point of determination were, no doubt, favouring to the respondents so it appears from following operative part of the judgment:- "It appears that entire dispute between the parties is roaming around the execution of lease deed dated 17.5.1983, allegedly executed by the respondent No,2 in favour of appellant. It is admitted position that said lease deed is registered documents under the registration rules, hence in my humble view authenticity of registration document is attached with it unless is proved contrary.
The burden was having upon the respondent No,2 to prove that the lease deed was not executed by him. The evidence adduced by the appellant No,2 reveals that respondent No,2 has not deposed a single word that he has not specifically executed the sale agreement or that it was not bearing his signature or LT.Is or that he had not appeared before the Sub-Registrar concerned for execution of lease deed.....
'So far the gift of suit property by the respondent No,2 in favour of the appellant No,1 it is admitted position that said gift deed executed by respondent No,2 in the year when the suit property was already leased out to appellant in the year 1983 and khata stood in the name of appellant hence in my humble view that the suit property was not available for gifting the same to respondent in the year 2007... '
19. The above reasoning, prima facie, should have been resulted in maintaining the judgment and decree of the learned trial court judge but learned appellate Court held otherwise in original judgment and decree. Thus, it is clear that reviewing judgment and decree to bring the conclusion in line without changing the reasons cannot be said to be illegal when such review only brought the conclusion in line with reasons thereof. However, I must mention here that a Judge is always supposed to have read the Order /Judgment before signing it because one cannot legally take an exception to a written document after signing the same unless shown to have not been aware of the contents of such a document, which a Judge, cannot claim. An error or mistake can happen but it should, prima facie, appear to be an error or a mistake. A reproduction of the concluding para of appellate Judgment will show how carelessly it was taken while signing.
' 'In view of my findings on above issue impugned judgment and decree passed by learned trial court in F.C.Suit No,101 of 2007 and FC Suit No,I35 of 2009 are set-aside (reviewed as maintained).
In the result F.C.Suit No,101 of 2007 is decree (reviewed as dismissed) while F. C. Suit No,135 of 2009 stands dismissed (reviewed as decreed).
' In the above circumstances Civil Appeal No,270 of 2012 and Civil Appeal No,2 71 of 2012 are allowed (reviewed as dismissed) with no order as to costs.
' The people, being not equipped with legal knowledge, stick with the conclusion which is usually described with sole word 'dismissal' or 'decree', therefore, the Court (s) should take much care in letting such a situation. Apart from above, the concluding para of the review order would show that in two pages the learned appellate (in original judgment) committed as many as 26 mistakes. The operative portion of review is reproduced hereunder:- "It further order that in point No,1 on page No,7 in line 6 the word "He" be corrected as respondent's counsel. In line No,07 the word respondent No,02 be corrected as appellant and word in line No,08 appellant be corrected as respondents Nos.01 to 05 and line No,9 respondent No,2 be corrected as appellant in line No,11 and word "He" be corrected as appellant's counsel. In line No,29 respondent be corrected as appellant and in the same line appellant be corrected as respondent and on page No,08 line Nos.3, 5, 11, 16, 26 and 27 the word respondent No,02 be corrected and read as appellaw No,02 and the same pag No,8 the word respondent No,01 in the line Nos.20; 23, 24, 25, 29 and 31 be corrected and read as appellant. In the line No,34 on the same page the word 'Not" be deleted and read as "that the learned trial court has passed the impugned judgment and decree legally'. In the line No,33 of the same page No,8 word 'No' be added prior to word interference. In the line No,34 on page No,8 and line No,1 of page No,09 i.e, the law cited by learned counsel for the respondent is not applicable as facts of reported case are quite different from the facts of this case be deleted. All the corrections be made with red ink in the said judgment and decree. There will be no order as to costs. "
' Such number of mistakes only in two pages of judgment, prima facie, show that how the appellate court judge, was conscious while turning the simple words into 'decree of a court'. Such careless attitude from a judge is not expected because the 'judgment' is not a mere 'junk of words but 'a declaration by a court capable of being executed/enforced' . However, since it is the 'justice' which matters but not the attitude of a 'judge' even, therefore, I am compelled to endorse the review order to be proper, as it is the demand of law.
20. After above discussion which resulted into affirming reviewing the conclusion of appellate judgment to bring it in line with reasoning, the legal position becomes as that now there are concurrent findings of two court (s) below. To make interference into concurrent findings of two court (s) below, it is necessary that it must be established that there had been patent jurisdictional defects, patent illegality / irregularity effecting merits of the case or excess of jurisdiction. The findings of two court (s) below do not appear to have been against the available material.
21. The perusal of the record shows that the appellants examined no witness or document to prove the alleged fraud. Uttering the word 'fraud' itself never establishes the fraud but it is the circumstances, facts or documentary evidence through which 'fraud' could only be established.
The examination-in-chief of the appellant Muhammad Arif would make its position further clear which is reproduced: 'I am attorney of the plaintiff No,01. I produce original power of attorney at Ex.53/A. I had purchased the suit property bearing plot No,17-B in year 1979 and same was registered in the year 1981. I had obtained loan from H.B.F.C. Over the suit property in 1981. In the year 1992 I have cleared the loan of H.B.F.C. Over the suit property. The documents were mortgaged with the H.B.F.C. Since 1982. My deceased brother Muhammad Haroon Memon changed the khata fraudulently in his name in the year 1983. My brother Muhammad Haroon died in the 2006 thereafter, I came to know about this fraud. I have Approached the settlement committee of the society but they have refused to settle the dispute. Thereafter, 1 have filed present suit'
' From above it is clear that he did not attempt to say a single word that how a document (title in name of deceased Muhammad Haroon) was fraudulent except that khata was changed fraudulently. He did not produce the document of mortgage of property with HBFC so as to establish that such transfer (lease deed) was fraudulent one being made during period of mortgage. The word 'fraud', alone, can never be held sufficient to declare a document 'fraudulent'.
On the other hand respondents are claiming their title through a registered lease deed. As regard the gift, it would suffice to say both the courts rightly held that since the appellant Muhammad Arif was no more owner of property at time of making alleged oral or written gift i.e, 3-4 years prior to year 2007 when writing of oral gift was made. Even otherwise, the appellants did not attempt to establish requisite ingredients of gift which are express offer by competent person; acceptance thereof and delivery of possession hence he (appellant Muhammad Arif) was not competent to make any gift.
22. In view of above discussion, I am of the clear view that the judgments and decree(s) of both the courts below do not require any interference hence are maintained as such. In consequence whereof both the appeal (s) along with listed applications are hereby dismissed with no order as to costs.
23. Let the copy of this judgment shall be sent to the learned Judge, who has authored impugned judgment, through M.I.T., as well Registrar of this Court shall circulate the same to the learned District Judge (s) and Additional District Judge(s) of Sindh.
Second .