MUHAMMAD AFZAL ZULLAH, J.- This Letters Patent Appeal was filed to call in question order dated 4th April, 1967, whereby the application filed by the appellant' for restoration of his Second Appeal (S. A. O. No. 278/1962) which was earlier dismissed in default on 12th January, 1966, was dismissed.
2. The facts narrated by the learned counsel for the appellant are that on an application for eviction of the appellant moved by the respondent, an order under subsection (6) of section 13 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 was passed for deposit of rent. The appellant made a default in that behalf and his defence was struck of under the said provision His first appeal was dismissed, therefore, he filed the aforementioned Second Appeal. Late Mr. Saeed Akhtar, Advocate was the counsel for the appellant. Neither he nor the appellant appeared on 12th January, 1966. It is noted in the , order that the case was called out-several times. As none appeared till 12 noon, it was dismissed in default on that day. Application for restoration was moved after considerable delay in February, 1967. It was dismissed on 4th April, 1967 with the following order "Heard. No valid grounds have been shown for the restoration of the appeal. Needless to add that the case was shown in the list and as such alternative arrangement should have been made.
Dismissed in limine.
3. In the meanwhile, during the pendency of appeal, it is stated, the transfer of the property in favour of the respondent under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958 having been brought under challenge, the case of transfer was remanded for fresh decision in 1963. According to the learned counsel, it was still pending with the Settlement Authortises when the Second Appeal in the High Court was dismissed in default. The respondent's learned counsel further stated, had on the dismissal of the appeal in default, hurried to obtain the posses--sion of the property in dispute and the appellant was physically ejected long ago. Learned counsel for the respondent gave the further facts : that the respondent also lost the case before the Settlement Authorities and that the property went to an--other person, who obtained ejectment order against the respondent which was affirmed in appeal and that the respondent had challenged the said ejectment order in the High Court in S. A. O. 461/76.
4. We have checked the record of the said appeal. It was filed by Gulab Khan (respondent herein) on 29th June, 1976 and was dismissed for default on 5th October, 1976 Since then there is nothing on record to show that Gulab Khan respondent took any interest in the said matter, that is why his learned counsel, appearing in this appeal, stated that it had become infructuous.
5. Learned counsel for the appellant has contended that the ground urged for restoration of appeal before the learned Single Judge has not been properly appreciated According to him the well- known fact that late Mr. Saeed Akhtar was busy in the preparation of RunnKutch case during the days that the appeal was dismissed in default, should have been considered as sufficient cause for restoration.
6. Even when accepting the importance of the case in which the learned counsel was engaged during those days. It cannot be denied that the said reason itself did not furnish any justification either that the learned counsel should not have made alternative arrangement for appearance in this case or that the appellant himself should not have made such alternative arrangement. The only circumstance that the appellant was. Not aware of the fixation of the case would not. Reduce the importance of the observation mentioned in the impugned order that alternative arrangement should have been made. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court were pleased to observe in Zulfigr Ali v. Lal Din and anothers (1974 SCMR 162) as follows :-----"
"Learned counsel appearing in support of this petition has contended that the dismissal of the appeal for default was due to the negligence of the learned counsel and not due to any negligence on his part, and, therefore, the restoration should have been allowed. The contention is without any force. The mere fact that a litigant has engaged a counsel to appear on his behalf does not absolve him of all responsibility, it was as much his duty as that of the learned counsel engaged by him to see that the appeal was properly and diligently prosecuted. If he engaged a counsel who was lacking in his sense of responsibility to the Court, it is he who should suffer and not the other side."
7. In so far as the principle is concerned the above quoted observations would apply in this case also. There is nothing to show that the appellant prosecuted the appeal properly and diligently. It cannot be said that the order passed by the learned Single Judge suffers from any infirmity, legal or otherwise. This appeal has no force and accordingly is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.