' Through this single order, we propose to dispose of two connected constitutional petitions bearing Writ Petition No,14739 of 2013 (Muhammad Abbas v. Special Judge, Anti-Terrorism Court and 6 others) and Writ Petition No,18344 of 2013 (The State v. Manzoor Hussain and 5 others), as both arise from order dated 30.5.2013 passed by the learned Judge, Anti- Terrorism Court No,III, Lahore, whereby an application under section 23 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 moved by the accused- respondents was allowed and trial of case FIR No,15, dated 20.1.2013, registered for offences under sections 302, 324, 148, 149, 337-F(i), 337-F(iii), 337 P.P.C. Read with section 7 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, at Police Station Hadyara, Lahore, lodged by Muhammad Abbas-complainant (petitioner in W.P. No, 14739/2013) was transferred to the court of ordinary/ regular jurisdiction.
2. Muhammad Abbas-complainant and the State through Deputy Prosecutor General Punjab, by filing the mentioned writ petitions, respectively, have assailed the said order.
3. Precisely, the relevant facts are that Muhammad Abbas (complainant) along with his five companions reached Chowk Chakianwala Hadyara at about 4.00 p.m. On 20.1.201.3, where they were ambushed by the respondent-accused and others, who were armed with deadly weapons, like Kalashinkovs, rifles .44 bore and 9-MM besides other firearms. Due to indiscriminate firing of the accused, Farhan Akbar, Salman Akbar, Muhammad Ashraf and Afyan fell badly wounded.
According to FIR, the firing made by the accused spread terror in the area; the injured were immediately shifted to Services Hospital, where three of them, Salman Akbar, Farhan Akbar and Muhammad Ashraf succumbed to the injuries. Afyan injured, however, was admitted in the hospital as indoor patient; the motive behind the occurrence, as spelt out from the FIR, was that children of the accused party had been insulted by the other side.
4. After investigation, report under section 173 Cr.P.C. Was submitted against the accused before the Anti-Terrorism Court-III, Lahore. During the course of the trial, the accused moved an application under section 23 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 seeking for transfer of the case to the court of ordinary jurisdiction. The learned Judge, Anti-Terrorism Court vide order dated 30.5.2013 found it a fit case for transfer to the court of regular jurisdiction. Hence, the instant writ petitions.
5. Learned counsel for the petitioner by heavily relying on the provisions of section 6 of the Act
(ibid) submitted that the occurrence took place at a busy Chowk, where 'the respondent-accused made incessant firing by means of lethal weapons and thereby murdered three persons and almost killed another one; the act of the accused created sense of fear and insecurity amongst the people at large. He has further submitted that the motive alleged even if believed was so trivial that it could easily be ignored or forgotten by the accused if they had no other intention but to commit an act of terrorism. The learned counsel has relied on an unreported order of this court having been made on 2.10.2013 in Writ Petition No,2878 of 2012. The learned counsel looked a bit hesitant and hiccupy when he submitted last that the learned trial court, in case the instant petition failed, may be directed to conclude the trial expeditiously.
6. The learned Deputy Prosecutor General Punjab appearing on behalf of the State has adopted in unison the line of arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioner.
7. Contrary to it, learned counsel for the respondent-accused have contended that previous rivalry between the parties over quarrel of the children was admitted in the FIR., hence, it was a case of private motive; the allegation of heavy firing with sophisticated weapons may not be deemed sufficient to bring the case within the scope of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997; the place of occurrence was not a populous area nor it was near any bazaar; mere heinousness of offence without other pre-requisites is no reason to consider it an act of terrorism and order made by the learned Judge, Anti-Terrorism Court for transfer of the case to a court of ordinary jurisdiction is unexceptionable.
The learned counsel has relied on Ahmad Jan v. Nasrullah and others (2012 SCMR 59).
8. We have heard all concerned and perused the relevant record minutely.
Does element of personal vendetta or satisfaction of personal vengeance give rise to terrorism or a terrorist-act, is a question, the answer whereto lies in the definition of section 6(2)(a to n) of the Act (ibid). The 'purpose', the motivation, the `actus reus' and the `mens-rea' constitute the components of terrorism or an act of terrorism. An action designed to coerce and intimidate or over-awe the government or the public or section of public or community or sect or, if such an action is designed to create a sense of fear or insecurity in society in the backdrop of religious, sectarian or ethnic cause, shall constitute an act of terrorism or a terrorist act. A private crime resulting into fear or insecurity as a by-product, a fall-out or an unintended consequence of fright etc. Cannot be termed as an act of terrorism. Mere gravity, heinousness, gruesomeness or shocking nature of any offence, committed in pursuance of personal enmity or in settlement of personal vendetta is not by itself sufficient to brand such crime as a terrorist act or an act of terrorism. The reliance in this regard may be made on "Mehram Ali and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others (PLD 1998 SC 1445), "Muhabbat Ali and another v. The State and another" (2007 SCMR 142) and Ahmad Jan v.
Nasrullah and others (2012 SCMR 59).
9. In our opinion, the case of the respondent-accused and that of their co- B accused was far lesser in severity and grievousness than that of the terrorists or sectarian criminals, who killed the innocent persons for none of their fault, only to threaten and defeat the writ of the State or to cause damage to the other sect. It is not a hidden truth that the miscreants, the saboteurs or the terrorists do not have any personal grudge or motive against those, whom they target either by exploding some device or by immolating themselves or by any other means so as to shatter the prevailing peace and tranquility in the society or to render the masses insecure. Their mind-set is only to do maximum damage to the society or to a section of the society, so as to weaken the state or overawe the government. The offence alleged against the respondent-accused is necessarily a fall-out of the motive alleged in the FIR, according to which previous squabbling as to the insult of the children, led to the said human loss. It certainly looks a case of private motive and settlement of personal vengeance, having been committed without any intent to creating sense of fear or insecurity in the society or a section of society or to public-at-large nor it was designed to coerce or intimidate or overawe the government or the public or section of a particular community or sect or fanning out religious, sectarian or ethnic or hatred. Nexus has to be shown between the act done and the objective or design by which the said offence was committed, so as to formulate a finding that the said offence constitutes an act of terrorism. Mehram Ali's case (supra) provides necessary guidelines in this regard. In the absence of such linkage, it cannot be said that an offence committed in the background of personal enmity, though having transmitted a wave of terror or fright was is necessarily an act of terrorism. The Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in dealing with an identical matter in Ahmad Jan's case (2012 SCMR 59), referred to PLD 2009 SC 11, PLD 2004 Lahore 199, PLD 2001 SC 521 and PLD 2002 SC 841 and observed as under:-- ' "The motive for the occurrence is enmity inter se the parties on account of some previous murders. In this view of the matter, we are of the opinion that since motive was enmity inter se the parties, the application of section 7 of the Act, which primarily requires the spread of sense of insecurity and fear in the common mind is lacking in the present case. The occurrence neither reflects any act of B terrorism nor it was a sectarian matter instead the murders in question. Were committed owing to previous enmity between the two groups."
' We find that the learned Judge, Anti-Terrorism Court has rightly observed in the impugned order that the occurrence alleged against the accused did not reflect any act of terrorism, as it was committed in the backdrop of previous animosity between the parties. The complainant himself has introduced the factum of previous heart-burning and rivalry between the parties in the FIR, which led to the unfortunate incident, hence, it cannot be declared a terrorist act for the discussion supra.
10. Resultantly, we are not inclined to interfere with the impugned order passed by the learned Judge, Anti-Terrorism Court. These petitions are accordingly dismissed.
11. During arguments, learned counsel for the petitioner made an alternate submission as well that the learned trial court may be directed to conclude the trial expeditiously, as above-said occurrence took place almost a year ago. This particular submission of the learned counsel is appreciable, hence, it is directed that the learned trial court (Ch. Muhammad Tariq Javed, Additional Sessions Judge, Lahore) on communication of this order would record this fact in the order-sheet and accelerate the proceedings of the trial, so as to conclude it within four months from the said date, may it be a day-to-day or twice-a-week affair. A copy of the judgment passed by the learned trial court would be submitted to the Registrar of this court for our perusal in chambers. The judicial record of this case be returned forthwith.