' ROOH-UL-AMIN KHAN, J:- Through the instant Review Petition, the petitioner has requested for setting aside the order/judgment dated 24.4.2015 passed by this court in Writ Petition No.831-P/2014 whereby the judgment and decree of both the courts below were modified to the extent of enhancement in the maintenance allowance of petitioners and the rest of the judgment of the District Judge was maintained.
2. Brief but relevant facts of the case are that the petitioners No.1 and 2 filed a suit for recovery of maintenance allowance, 5 tola gold ornaments and share in the house as dower and 4 tola ornaments given to her by her parents at the time of rukhsati and recovery of dowry articles or its market value. Respondent contested the suit by filing written statement and also prayed for restitution of conjugal rights. The learned trial court decreed the suit to the extent of recovery of her maintenance at rate of Rs.1000/- per month while the minor was held entitled for the same relief at the rate of Rs.3000/- with 20 % annual increase till his age of majority. The dowry articles according to the list produced by the respondent was also decreed in her favour. So far the recovery of gold ornaments and share in the house as dower are concerned, the suit was dismissed, however the plea of the respondent for restitution of conjugal rights was decreed in his favour subject to provision of separate residence to the defendant wife. The appeal filed by petitioner before the District Judge was partially allowed, i.e. Only to the extent of increase in the maintenance allowance of the minor from Rs.3000/- to Rs.4000/- while the rest of the decree and judgment of the learned trial court was maintained. Aggrieved with the aforesaid order, petitioner had filed Writ Petition No.831-P/2015 which was decided in the following terms:- "At the very outset, learned counsel for respondent No.1 made an offer, regarding enhancement of maintenance allowance of both the petitioners i.e. Petitioner No.1 /wife from Rs.1000/- per month to Rs. 3000/- while with regard to petitioner No.2, from Rs.4000/- per month to Rs.5000/- per month.
The learned counsel for petitioners showed her willingness and accepted the above offer, consequently did not press the remaining claims.
' Hence, in view of above, the impugned judgments of both the Courts below are modified to the extent that the maintenance allowance of petitioner No.1/wife is enhanced to Rs.3000/- per month from Rs.1000/- per month, from the date of institution of suit till subsistence of Nikah, subject to her Abadi with her husband/respondent No.1, while maintenance allowance of petitioner No.2/minor son is enhanced from Rs.4000/- per month to Rs.5000/- per month with 20% increase per annum till his attaining age of majority."
3. The contention of learned counsel for petitioners is that neither petitioner nor her counsel has given any willingness about forgoing her other claims and this court while deciding the writ petition has wrongly referred to that the counsel for respondent does not press the remaining claim.
Admittedly,. Mr. Iftikhar Ilahi, learned counsel, representing the petitioner in the instant review petition was not counsel in writ petition, rather Miss. Farhana Marwat, Advocate had filed it and at the time of arguments, in presence of the petitioner had accepted offer of respondent No.1 regarding enhancement of maintenance allowance of both the petitioners i.e. His wife and child and had stated at the bar that in consequence of the increase of maintenance allowance she will not press the remaining claim. The Review Petition has been filed by Mr. Iftikhar Elahi, Advocate who has raised serious allegation to the effect that neither petitioner nor her counsel had given any willingness at the time of hearing of the writ petition. Therefore, Ms. Farhana Marwat, Advocate who was busy before another bench of this court was summoned and confronted with situation, who categorically stated that at the time of hearing of writ petition the petitioner was present in court and in consequence of offer made by counsel for respondent regarding enhancement of maintenance allowance of both the petitioners, she consulted the petitioner and in pursuance of her willingness she made a statement before the court for not pressing the rest of the claim. She disclosed that both the courts below have rejected the claim of petitioner regarding dower on the score of tampering and forgery in Nikah Nama. At this juncture the learned counsel for respondent stated that the claim of petitioner regarding dower and maintenance allowance was based on Nikah Nama, allegedly registered in the office of Union Council Akbarpura, Nowshera. In this respect the PW-1 produced the extract from the relevant pages of the register, wherein at S.No.20 the birth entry of Khadija Syed was listed on 16.4.2012, but between S.No.19 and 20 another No.20 was re- entered showing the registration of Nikah Nama dated 12.1.2012. In the record of Secretary, Union Council, two entries were made against one serial number. The entry of Nikah Nama in the register of the Union Council was a forged addition by the petitioner, these had been discarded by both the courts below as forged and fictitious. He further stated that at the time of arguments the forged entries were brought into the notice of the court, therefore, the learned counsel for petitioner waived off her claim based on forged Nikah Nama. Miss Farhana Marwat affirmed the above assertion. The sole ground raised by the learned counsel for petitioner has strongly refuted by the previous counsel of petitioner in writ petition.
4. Admittedly, the scope of review is very limited and an order can only be reviewed when there is discovery of some new or important evidence which despite of exercise of due diligence was not in the knowledge of the party and so could not be produced by him when the order was being passed or on account of some mistake or error on the face of record. The power cannot be invoked or exercised merely on the assertion of a person that he/she has not authorized the counsel to make a statement before the court. The main aim of review is correction of the error and not reopening of finally decided matter. In the instant review petition the petitioners have attempted to reopen the main case and reappraise the material which has already been conceded by petitioners. Such practice is not permissible under the law.
5. In view of the above, learned counsel for petitioners failed to point out any of the aforesaid ingredients in the order of this court essential for invoking of review jurisdiction. Accordingly this petition stands dismissed.
6. Before parting with the order we deem it appropriate to mention that the learned counsel for petitioner has made an assertion in the review petition on his personal affidavit despite the fact that at the time of hearing of writ petition, neither he was counsel in the case nor was present in the court. The fact and contents of the Review Petition are not supported by an affidavit of counsel, who had filed and argued the writ petition before this court. Admittedly impugned order has been passed by the Divisional Bench of this court, even then the learned counsel made an averment on his personal affidavit that the petitioner or his counsel has not shown willingness. In similar circumstances the august Supreme Court of Pakistan while dismissing Civil Petition titled "Abdul Khalid and others vs. Province of Sind" (2010 SCM R 583), was pleased to rule as under:- "The petitioners impugn the order dated 11.11.2009 passed by learned Division Bench of the High Court. It is stated in the said order that the same has been passed by consent of the parties. It this is indeed so, then an appeal would not be competent. Learned counsel for the petitioners, however, stated that the petitioners or their learned counsel in the High Court had not consented to the said order. He also referred to an affidavit of the said counsel, We are afraid, this contention cannot be accepted considering that two honourable Judges of the High Court have noted that consent was given by or on behalf of the petitioners."
' It is evident from the impugned order that the counsel for petitioner consented and waived off her certain claims after consulting the petitioner, which were recorded accordingly. The denial as well affidavit of learned counsel is contrary to the record of the court has no value as court proceedings has always precedence over the affidavit of the counsel. Any material placed on record, in negation of the court proceedings has no value and it cannot be considered at all. Reference in this regard can be made to the case of "Fayyaz Hussain Versus Akbar Hussain & others" (2004 SCM R 964).
We also deem it obligatory to lay emphasis that the primary duty of lawyer is not just to defend his client to the best of his ability but to uphold, above all, the letter and spirit of the constitution to the best of his understanding to do right and justice according to law without fear or favour to all. A lawyer is first an officer of the court and should thus assists the court as guardian of the constitution and law in imparting justice. We are firm in our view, that the only function of legal profession is to promote administration of justice. The practice of law is not a trade and brief no merchandise and so the leaven of commercial competition or procurement should not vulgarize it.
It obligates the lawyer to observe carefully and with extreme delicacy those norms which make him worth of confidence of the community.