' SHAMS MEHMOOD MIRZA, J.--This intra Court appeal filed under section 3 of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972 calls into question order dated 31.05.2016 passed by learned Single Judge in Chambers whereby the writ petition filed by the appellant was dismissed.
' We had dismissed this appeal through short order. The detailed reasons for dismissal of the appeal shall be provided hereunder:
2. The critical question requiring determination in this appeal is whether the appellant was discriminated against by Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA) in disqualifying it from the prequalification process for construction of Dasu Hydropower Project. The facts of the case are not in dispute and have been narrated with sufficient accuracy by the learned Single Judge in Chambers in the impugned order. Suffice it to state that the Federation of Pakistan .Undertook the construction of Dasu Hydropower Project, which is partly funded by International Development Association (IDA), which organization forms part of World Bank Group. The Government of Pakistan on 25.08.2014 executed a finance agreement (financing agreement) With IDA for the purposes of obtaining the loan. WAPDA invited application for pre-qualification of the contractors by issuing Specific Procurement Notice for participation in the project. Clause 4 of the said notices made the- entire pre-qualification process subject to the World Bank's Guidelines (Guidelines). Pre- qualification documents in respect of two portions of the project were issued by WAPDA, which projects for facility of reference are individually described as "MW-01" and "MW-02" and collectively as "projects". The appellant is a company incorporated in Peoples Republic of China with a place of business/branch office in Pakistan in terms of section 451 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984. The appellant submitted its applications for the projects on 28.05.2015. WAPDA in its report submitted to the World Bank regarding evaluation of the bidders conditionally pre- qualified the petitioner along with several other bidders. However, the World Bank rejected the appellant's name as a participant for pre-qualification whereupon WAPDA on 12.02.2016 issued the notices to the appellant disqualifying it from the pre-qualification process. The appellant invoked the constitutional jurisdiction of this Court by filing Writ Petition No,6625 of 2016 which was disposed of on 01.03.2016 with a direction to respondent No,2 to decide the petitioner's application filed on 14.02.2016 requiring furnishing of reasons for disqualification of the appellant. Respondent No,2 passed order dated 30.03.2016 stating that the appellant was disqualified on account of the direction of the World Bank. Being not satisfied with the order, further letters were addressed to WAPDA for furnishing of reasons but to no avail. The appellant, therefore, once again filed the writ petition challenging order dated 30.03.2016 and Disqualification notices dated 12.02.2016, which was dismissed and the decision whereof is under challenge in this appeal.
3. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the bidding documents were furnished after seeking necessary clarifications from WAPDA with regard to the utilization by the petitioner of its Group Members, Companies (subsidiaries). While referring to Clause 6.3.1(c) of the Evaluation Report on Pre-qualification of the Applicants (Evaluation Report), it was submitted that the term 'applicant' included its partners and its affiliate that were directly or indirectly in control of the firm.
By the terms of the Evaluation Report, it was stated the appellant duly mentioned the names of its subsidiaries that had undertaken the implementation of the completed contracts submitted with the pre-qualification documents. WAPDA in the Evaluation Report submitted that these subsidiary companies were 100% owned by the appellant and, therefore, there was no requirement for the JV agreement. It was stated that the appellant was pre-qualified on the condition that the subsidiary companies identified in the clarification must be assigned the works and the key staff from these subsidiaries be identified, which was done and as such there was no justification to reject the appellant from the list of pre- qualified bidders. It was contended that WAPDA ought not to have exercised its power under the dictation of IDA which was whimsical and arbitrary and violated the due process for which the appellants was entitled under Article 10-A of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 (the Constitution).
4. Learned counsel for the WAPDA by refuting the stance of the appellant submitted that the appellant had materially changed its position 'from the one taken before the learned Single Judge in Chambers. It was further submitted that the appellant had not challenged the financing agreement or the World Bank Guidelines under which the pre-qualification process took place. It was also stated that the order passed by learned Single Judge in Chambers was by its nature a consent order against which no appeal could lie. Learned Deputy Attorney General appearing on behalf of Federation of Pakistan supported the stance taken by WAPDA.
5. Before proceeding to discuss the merits of the case set up by the appellant, it would be useful to glance at the various provisions of the financing agreement and the Guidelines for a better understanding of the issues involved in this case. Not only were the projects funded by the World Bank but it also issued Partial Credit Guarantee for the benefit of WAPDA to secure further funding.
The entire purpose of seeking funding from the multilateral institutions like World Bank, IMF and their affiliates is to bring legitimacy and transparency to the project. It is an undisputed fact that lending by such institutions enhances the prospects of further funding and adds to the benefit of the executing agency, which in this case is WAPDA. It was for this very purpose that the Government of Pakistan executed the financing agreement with IDA. The purpose of IDA funding is mentioned in clause 2 of the Specific Procurement Notice, which reads as under: ' The Government of Islamic Republic of Pakistan (The Borrower) have received and IDA Credit from the World Bank for the Project. Much of the funds from the IDA Credit would be used for the preparatory work, environmental management plans and project monitoring and supervision.
World Bank has also approved an IDA Partial Credit Guarantee (PCG) that would be used to enhance WAPDA;s credit to finance these works for which the pre-qualification applications are being invited. The Dasu Hydropower Project is structure to be financed sequentially with a series of IDA credits and IDA PCGs in addition to financing from WAPDA and Government of Pakistan.
' Similarly, Clause 4 of the Specific Procurement Notice reproduced hereunder clearly brings out the fact that the process of pre-qualification procedure was subject to the World Bank Guidelines.
' Pre-qualification will be conducted through Pre-qualification procedure specified in the World Bank's Guidelines "Procurement of Goods, Works, and Non-Consulting Services" under "IBRD Loans and IDA Credits and grants by WORLD BANK Borrowers-January 2011" and is open to all applicants from eligible source countries, as defined in the guidelines.
' The Guidelines for Procurement of Goods, Works and Non-Consulting Services under IBRD Loans and IDA Credits and by World Bank Borrowers were issued in January 2011. The purpose of these Guidelines was stated to be as under: 1.1 The purpose of these Guidelines is to inform those carrying out a project that is financed in whole or in part by a loan from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), a credit or grant from the International Development Association (IDA), a project preparation advance (PPA), a grant from the Bank or a trust fund administered by the Bank and executed by the recipient, of the policies that govern the procurement of goods, works, and non-consulting services required for the project. The Loan Agreement governs the legal relationship between the Borrower and the Bank, and the Guidelines are made applicable to procurement of goods, works, and non-consulting services for the project, as provided in the agreement. The rights and obligations of the Borrower and the providers of goods, works and non-consulting services for the project, as provided in the agreement. The right and obligations of the Borrower and the providers of goods, works, and non-consulting services for the project are governed by the bidding documents, and by the contract signed by the Borrower with the providers of goods, works, and non-consulting services, and not by these Guidelines or the Loan Agreements. No party other than the parties to the Loan Agreement shall derive any rights therefrom or have any claim to loan proceeds.
' While laying down the procedure for review by the World Bank, it is stated in the Guidelines as under: Bank Review 1.13 The Bank reviews the Borrower's procurement procedures, documents, bid, evaluations, award, recommendations, and contracts to ensure that the procurement process is carried out in accordance with the agreed procedures. These review procedures are described in Appendix 1. The Procurement Plan approved by the Bank shall specify the extent to which these review procedures shall apply in respect of the different categories of goods, works, and non-consulting services to be financed, in whole or in part from the Bank loan.
Misprocurement: 1.14 The Bank does not finance expenditures under a contract for goods, works, and non-consulting services if the Bank concludes that such contract: (a) _has not been awarded in accordance with the agreed provisions of the Loan Agreement and as further elaborated in the Procurement Plan to which the Bank provided no objection; (b) could not be awarded to the bidder otherwise determined successful due to willful dilatory conduct or other actions of the Borrower resulting in unjustifiable delays, the successful bid being no longer available, or the ,wrongful rejecting of any bid; or (c) involves the engagement of a representative of the Borrower, or a recipient of any part of the Loan proceeds, in fraud and corruption as per paragraph 1.16(c). In such cases, whether under prior or post .Review, the Bank will declare misprocurement, and it is the Bank's policy to cancel that portion of the loan allocated to the goods, works, and non- consulting services that have been misprocured. The Bank may, in addition, exercise other remedies provided for under the Loan Agreement. Even once the contract is awarded after obtaining a no objection from the Bank, the Bank may still declare misprocthement and apply in full its policies and remedies regardless of whether of the loan has closed or not, if it concludes that no objection was issued on the basis Of incomplete, inaccurate, or misleading information furnished by the Borrower or the terms and conditions of the conduct had been substantially modified without the Bank's no objection.
' The appendixes attached with the Guidelines provide guidance to the potential bidders desiring to participate in the World Bank's financed projects and the procurement processes. In Appendix 3, the World Bank's role has been described to review and evaluate the procurement procedures, documents, bid evaluations, award recommendations and the contract to ensure that the process is carried out in accordance with agreed procedures, as required in the Loan Agreement. In case of major contracts, the documents are reviewed by the World Bank prior to their issue, as mentioned in Appendix 1. If, at any time in the procurement process and even after the award of contract, the World Bank concludes that agreed procedures were not followed in any material respect, it may 'declare misprocurement, as described in Clause No,1.14 above.
6. This brings us directly to paragraph 2(a) contained in Appendix 1, which is the source of controversy in the present case. It reads as under: Prior Review ' In case where pre-qualification is used, the Borrower shall, before pre-qualification submissions are invited, furnish the Bank with the draft documents to be used, including the text of the invitation to prequalify, the pre-qualification questionnaire, and the evaluation methodology, together with a description of the advertising procedures to be followed, and shall introduce such modifications in said procedure and documents as the Bank shall reasonably request. The report evaluating the applications received by the Borrower, the list of proposed prequalified bidders, together with a statement of their qualifications and of the reasons for the exclusion of any applicant for pre- qualification, shall be furnished by the Borrower to the Bank for its comments before the applicants are notified of the Borrower's decision, and the Borrower shall make such additions to, deletions from or modifications in the said list as the Bank shall reasonably request. (Emphasis supplied)
' This clause clearly gives a carte blanche to the World Bank in regard to the choice of proposed bidders who are pre-qualified and stipulates that the pre-qualification process undertaken by WAPDA is subject to the prior approval of the World Bank. It may be of some importance to note that this clause speaks of the Evaluation Report containing the list of proposed pre-qualified bidders, which further shows that no right came to vest in the appellant by reason of submitting his bid as its status remained that of a proposed bidder (see Abdullah Mangi and another v. Pakistan International Airlines etc. 2005 SCM R 445). The question that arises is what right the appellant possesses to 'challenge the decision of the World Bank in rejecting its name from the list of the proposed bidders. It is all the more important to ask the right question as the controversy arises out of a clause in the Guidelines rather than any law or action of WAPDA.
7. We take the appellant as identifying two issues. First, the appellant under Article 10-A of the Constitution has a right to due process, which right has' been violated in denying the appellant the chance to participate in the bidding. Second, the World Bank was under a duty to have made a "reasonable request" to WAPDA for rejecting the name of the appellant. The standard of reasonableness, it was argued, was not met with in the facts and circumstances of the case.
8. The financing agreement of which the Guidelines are an integral part and the procurement process initiated by WAPDA was not subject to any municipal law of this country. The procurement law contained in Public Procurement Rules, 2004 makes this fact clear by virtue of its Rule 5. Which reads as under: ' Whenever these rules are in conflict with an obligation or commitment of the Federal Government arising out of an international treaty or an agreement with a State or States, or any international financial institution the provisions of such international treaty or agreement shall prevail to the extent of such conflict.
' Another important facet of the case to be kept in mind is that the financing agreement was entered into by the executive authority of the Federal Government and the World Bank. It is not a piece of legislation. The Federal Government of its own free will and consent agreed to make the financing agreement subject to the Guidelines and in the process gave away a variety of rights to World Bank including the right to select the pre-qualified bidders. The grievance of the appellant thus stems out of a process in which the Federal Government or WAPDA had no say. It is accepted by all sides that the Guidelines governed the procurement process undertaken by WAPDA under which the sole arbiter for selecting the bidders was World Bank. It is also clear that the decision to reject the appellant's status as a proposed pre-qualified bidder by World Bank was sourced in. The Guidelines itself rather than an enactment. While deliberating over the issue, the learned Single Judge in Chambers felt that the subject matter of the writ petition was not covered by Article 199 of the Constitution and disposed of the petition by holding so. The appropriate question that arises is that if the Court lacked the necessary jurisdiction to review a particular matter before it, then the appeal should also fail to that extent. Accordingly, it will be necessary to consider, as a threshold question, the ambit of the Court's jurisdiction to entertain the application for judicial review in the present case and to evaluate the reasons furnished by the learned Single Judge in Chambers to support that finding.
9. The perusal of the judgment by the learned Single Judge in Chambers shows that he arrived at the opinion that WAPDA was not independent in the decision making process but was bound by the dictation of the World Bank as per the Guidelines. The learned judge with reference to Article 199 of the Constitution also came to the conclusion that World Bank was beyond the remit of the jurisdiction of the Court having extra territorial presence. It was accordingly held by the learned Single Judge in Chambers, and rightly so in our opinion, that 'World Bank was not a "person" performing functions in connection with the affairs of the Federation, a Province or local authority and, therefore, no directions could be issued to it in the exercise of powers under Article. 199 of the Constitution. The fact that World Bank could not be sued in the writ petition as it has no office in Pakistan is also admitted and no arguments to the contrary were addressed 'before us by the appellant's counsel. The power to judicially review the administrative action is not concerned with the merits of the decision in respect of which judicial review is sought but the decision-making process itself. The judicial review remedy is concerned with setting aside of the order/action and is remittal in nature unlike appeal where the Court can vary the decision and can also substitute its decision for that of the decision maker. In the present case, the process of decision making vested with the World Bank over which the learned Single Judge in Chambers rightly observed he could not exercise any power of judicial review.
10. The appellant's counsel, however, asserted that any deletion from or modification in the list of proposed pre- qualified bidders by the WAPDA was subject to "reasonable request" by the World Bank, the underlying assumption being that reasonableness of the request was not binding on WAPDA and, therefore, susceptible to judicial review. This submission has no merit in it. The World Bank is no more amenable to the writ jurisdiction of the Court than the decision it makes with regard to the rejection of the status of the appellant as the proposed pre-qualified bidder. But the reasonable of the decision taken by World Bank is not in issue here rather the question is whether it had the authority and power to pass the decision. The World Bank retained an absolute veto power over the selection of the proposed pre- qualified bidders contained in the Evaluation Report as is apparent from clause 2(a) contained in Appendix 1. The extent of the clout enjoyed by World Bank can be gauged from the fact that it can declare misprocurement even after conclusion of the contract as mentioned above. The decision to select or reject the bidders was not for the WAPDA to make. It had merely intimated to the appellant the decision of the World Bank. Order dated '30.03.2016 passed by WAPDA reinforces this position, operative part whereof reads as under Grounds for Disqualification of Petitioner: ' In accordance with Clause-2(a) of Appendix -1 of the Guidelines which are integral part of the Financing Agreement, WAPDA furnished the report evaluating the applications received by the Borrower/WAPDA for the Contracts. Thereafter, the list of proposed pre-qualified bidders, together with a statement of their qualifications and reasons for the exclusion of applicants for pre- qualification, was submitted for the comments/ recommendation of World Bank wherein the Petitioner was included in the proposed list of prequalified applicants for the Contracts.
' However, World Bank did not qualify the Petitioner and rejected Borrower's/WAPDA's recommendations of qualifying the Petitioner by using its powers under Clause-2(a) of Appendix-1 of the Guidelines which are an integral part of the Financing Agreement.
' Accordingly the Borrower (WAPDA) deleted the Petitioner from the list of Prequalified Applicants for the Contracts and issued Disqualification Notification vide Letters dated 12th February, 2016 bearing No,GM/PD/Dasu HPP/Addl.C.E. (Contracts)/Dam-35/1537-43 and No,GM/PD/Dasu HPP/AddI. C . E. '
(Contracts)/Dam-35 /1544-49 .
' There should, therefore, be no doubt that order dated 30.03.2016 and disqualification notices dated 12.02.2106 (impugned in the writ petition) were merely consequential to the decision of the World Bank.
11. The fundamental, natural precept of contract interpretation is that agreement are construed in accordance with the parties' intent. The words of the contract, however, cannot be interpreted in a vacuum. The context is provided by the other parts of the contract, the circumstances in which the contract was made and the commercial purpose as objectively understood. In Melanesian Mission Trust Board v.
Australian Mutual Provident Society (1996) 74 P&CR 297, Lord Hope said ' The approach that must be taken to the construction of a clause in a formal document of this kind is well settled. The intention of the parties is to be discovered from the words used in the document.
Where ordinary words have been used, they must be taken to have been used according to the ordinary meaning of those words. If their meaning is clear and unambiguous, effect must be given to them because this is what the parties are taken to have agreed to by their contract. Various rules may be invoked to assist interpretation in the event that there is an ambiguity. But it is not the function of the Court, when constraining a document, to search for an ambiguity. Nor should the rules which exist to resolve ambiguities be invoked to create an ambiguity which, according to the ordinary meaning of the words, is not here. So the starting point is to examine the words used in order to see whether they are clear and unambiguous. It is of course legitimate to look at the document. As a whole and to examine the context in which these words have been used. But unless the context shows that the ordinary meaning cannot be given to them or that there is an ambiguity, the ordinary meaning of the words which have been used in the document must prevail.
' Inevitably, therefore, the first step in the interpretive/process of identifying the true meaning of a contractual provision is to consider the normal meaning of the words used therein. Employing the tools of interpretation as aforesaid, the intention of the parties to financing agreement of which the Guidelines were an integral part is unambiguous and not open to diverse interpretations that World Bank had an overarching role and retained absolute discretion, inter alia, in matters relating to procurement process and selection of proposed pre-qualified bidders. WAPDA accepts this interpretation as is apparent from the contents of order dated 30.03.2016. Before the learned Single Judge in Chambers and even before us, the stance of WAPDA remained that it was bound by the decision of World Bank to deselect the appellant from the list of proposed pre-qualified bidders.
The process of submission of Evaluation Report by WAPDA containing the list of proposed pre- qualified bidders, in terms of clause 2(a) of Appendix 1, was tentative and subject to approval of the World Bank. The misprocurement clause in the Guidelines shines further light on the all- encompassing and predominant role of World Bank in the procurement process. Any other interpretation would be inconsistent with the contextual text of the Guidelines. This Court is not prepared to read into the Guidelines a right in favour of WAPDA which it accepts does not exist. It would also amount to rewriting the Guidelines which is not lawfully permissible.
12. Adverting to the findings in the judgment under challenge, it was stated that WAPDA passed the impugned order, in the words of the learned Single Judge in Chambers, "on the dictated exercise of powers by the World Bank." Semantics apart, the fact of the matter is that the World Bank by virtue of the Guidelines/financing agreement retained the power to reject the name(s) of the proposed pre-qualified bidders in the Evaluation Report prepared by the WAPDA. As stated in the earlier part of this judgment, the actions of WAPDA were a consequence to the exercise of power by World Bank/IDA in rejecting the name of the petitioner. The appellant, therefore, could not have challenged the decision made by WAPDA on 30.03.2016 and the disqualification notices dated 12.02.2016 without impugning the financing agreement as well as the Guidelines for which it had to necessarily implead World Bank/IDA as a party in the writ petition. Clearly, the appellant in a backhanded way has impugned the action of World Bank in rejecting its name as a proposed pre- qualified bidder without impleading it as a party. It may be added that in Ground "D" of this appeal, the appellant stated that IDA could be sued in this country by any individual for enforcement of his fundamental rights. However, World Bank/IDA was not made a party to the writ petition filed by the appellant even though WAPDA in its order dated 30.03.2016 specifically made it known that the name of the appellant was rejected by the World Bank in exercise of powers under clause 2(a) of Appendix-1 to the Guidelines. Notwithstanding the stance taken in Ground "D" of the appeal, the appellant's counsel did not urge it during the course of arguments. Needless to state that it is an accepted position that World Bank could not be sued in the writ petition instituted by the appellant both because it does not perform any functions in connection with the affairs of the federation etc and also because it has no presence in this country. Without throwing a challenge to the power of World Bank/IDA contained in the Guidelines, it is futile to argue that the appellant is entitled to due process under Article 10-A of the Constitution. Learned counsel for the appellant in rebuttal also raised, for good measure, the allegation of discrimination on the ground that the appellant was singled out of the array of proposed pre-qualified bidders. The contours of this argument were not fully developed by the learned counsel for the appellant. It may be that discrimination was alleged in relation to other conditionally pre-qualified bidders. Be that as it may, the appropriate question is whether discrimination is expressly or impliedly authorized by the terms of Guidelines from which the World Bank draws its powers. The answer is in positive. In any event, the ground of discrimination is not available to the appellant in view of the clear wording of Article 25 of the Constitution.
13. We also find substance in the submission made by the learned counsel for the respondents that the order challenged in this intra court appeal was in the nature of a consent order against which no appeal could lie. From the reading of the judgment, it becomes clear that the learned counsel who appeared on behalf of the appellant before the learned Single Judge in Chambers accepted the fact that the Guidelines applied to the procurement process and that WAPDA was bound by the decision of the World Bank with regard to the deletion/rejection of the names of the proposed pre- qualified bidders. It is further apparent from the judgment that the learned counsel for the appellant also accepted that the appellant's remedy lay in approaching the World Bank in terms of clauses Nos.11 to 14 of Appendix III of the Guidelines as it had no grievance against WAPDA. The appellant's counsel before us, however, placed reliance upon a judgment reported as Ahmad Khan v. Rasul Shah and others PLD 1975 SC 311 in which it was held that an admission which is wrong in point of fact or is made in ignorance of legal right has no binding effect on the person making it. As a principle of law, there can hardly be any dispute with it. However, this principle cannot apply to the submissions or concessions made by the counsel during the course of arguments with regard to legal issues or the inferences required to be drawn from the documents. If the position advanced by the learned counsel is accepted, the entire machinery of administration of justice would collapse. Be that as it may, the learned counsel who appeared before the learned Single Judge in Chambers conceded no more than what was conceded before us. The only exception being that the appellant's counsel before us took exception to the fact that WAPDA accepted the dictate of World Bank. It may be added that even before us, it was not agitated that the procurement process was not subject to the Guidelines or that the appellant was not under notice of the same before submitting the bid documents. Having accepted that the Guidelines would govern the procurement process, the appellant could not impugn its disqualification by the World Bank as the Guidelines clearly reserved the right with the World Bank over the selection of the pre- qualified bidders as has already been held above.
14. It was also argued that the subsidiaries of the appellant and their staff were qualified to undertake the project and that the appellant was ready and willing to provide a joint venture agreement to World Bank if indeed that was what was required by it in order to pre-qualify for bidding. 'We place it on the record that the learned counsel for WAPDA ,categorically stated that subsidiaries of the appellant were not qualified. We are, however, not concerned with the merits of the case as we have come to the conclusion that the learned Single Judge in Chambers rightly held that the appellant had no right to bring the action against WAPDA which had done no more than to intimate the decision of World Bank to the appellant and acted accordingly by issuing disqualification notices. The financing agreement and the Guidelines were beyond the reach of the municipal laws and the World Bank in law was not amenable to the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 199 of the Constitution. The order passed by the learned Single Judge in Chambers, therefore, calls for no interference.
15. We are also satisfied on examination of record that WAPDA went out of its way to facilitate the appellant by approaching the World Bank time and again seeking review of its decision to reject the name of the appellant as proposed pre-qualified bidder. The appellant participated in the procuring process knowing full well that it was subject to the Guidelines. The learned Single Judge in Chambers having held in paragraph 10 of the impugned judgment that no directions could be issued to the World Bank and that the Guidelines were not a "law" within the meaning of the Constitution nevertheless directed WAPDA to facilitate the appellant in approaching the World Bank in terms of clauses 11 to 14 of Appendix-III to the Guidelines, which clauses, according to the learned Single Judge in Chambers, provided the dispute resolution mechanism. The learned Single Judge in Chambers also extended the date of final bid (09.06.2016) for another three weeks to enable the appellant to approach the World Bank. Learned counsel for WAPDA informed us that instead of three weeks the date of final bid was extended to four weeks. The appellant's counsel, however, when confronted with this stated that the appellant is only interested in seeking its remedy in the Court.
16. The World Bank, according to the learned counsel for WAPDA, is heavily committed to various power projects in this country with amounts running into billions of dollars. It's funding and involvement in 'projects have enormous impact on policy formulations and procurement procedures. As stated earlier, its lending and the Partial Credit Guarantee offered by it shall in addition to bringing transparency to the project help. To attract private sector financing. It would bring particularly damaging consequences if petitions challenging negotiated contracts which are associated with important national goals are allowed to prevail more so when they have no merit.
17. The appellant has failed to convince us that there is any legal infirmity in the order passed by the learned Single Judge in Chambers. Resultantly, this appeal fails and is accordingly dismissed.