GHULAM SAFDAR SHAH, J.--The 44 petitioners before us are Afghan nationals who call themselves Pawindas. Each one of them has filed separate petition against the order of respondent No, 1 dated 9-6-1969 by which they were informed that unless they obtained national passports from Afghan Embassy or naturalization certificates from the Government of Pakistan their applications for the renewal of money-lending licenses would not be considered. Since all the petitions involve common questions of law and facts they would be disposed of together by this order.
2. The case of the petitioners is that since time immemorial they have continued to reside in the territories of Pakistan doing money-lending business under licences issued by the authorities that when the licenses last issued to them in 1964 were about to expire they applied to respondent No, 1 for their renewal but in spite of many reminders given to him the said respondent failed to decide their applications ; that some of the applicants then filed a Civil Suit in the Court of III Civil Judge, First Class, Karachi for declaration that they were entitled to the renewal of their licenses and the same could not be cancelled except according to the provisions of section 5 of the West Pakistan Money Lenders Ordinance, 1960 (hereinafter called the Ordinance); that in spite of the said suit having been decreed in their favour, respondent No, 1 declined to renew their licenses holding that unless the petitioners were to obtain national passports from Afghan Embassy or naturalization certificates from the Government of Pakistan their applications would not be considered. The petitioners have also assailed the impugned order on the grounds of mala fides. In this respect their case is that after having obtained the decree of the civil Court, respondent No, 1 arbitrarily dismissed their applications. Upon these facts it is contended that the impugned order of respondent No, 1 virtually amounts to the cancellation of their licenses and since it was passed in disregard of the provisions of section 5 of the Ordinance it was illegal and without jurisdiction. The petitioners have prayed that this order be quashed and respondent No, 1 be directed to renew or issue them fresh licenses.
3. The respondents are contesting these petitions and for that purpose have filed the counter- affidavit of one Abdul Aziz who is a clerk in the office of respondent No, 1 and deals with the grant of licenses under the Ordinance. The case of the respondents is that the petitioners had applied for the renewal of licenses in 1965 and their applications were referred to the Superintendent of Police (Special Branch), Karachi for report ; that this officer submitted his report in which he made adverse comments against the petitioners and opposed their applications; that respondent No, 1 in the exercise of his power under the Ordinance considered these applications and rejected them that the petitioners challenged this order in appeals before the Commissioner, Karachi which were dismissed on 16-3-1966 ; that after this decision the petitioners kept quiet for three years until 26th May 1969 when only four of them namely Muhammad Sadiq, Rozi Khan, Shaikh Nazir and Zafar Khan again applied for the renewal of their licences; that those applications were treated for the grant of new licenses and the petitioners were informed that unless they obtained national passports from Afghan Embassy or naturalization certificates from the Government of Pakistan under Act VII of 1926 their application could not be considered ; that this order was challenged by the petitioners in appeals before the Commissioner, Karachi which are still pending.
4. The petitioners have filed, through Garabi Khan petitioner, a rejoinder affidavit to the counter- affidavit of the respondents. In the rejoinder affidavit they have not specifically denied that their renewal applications were rejected by respondent No, 1 in 1966. In fact what they have disputed is that they were not informed of any such decision and further that they had not filed any appeals before the Commissioner, Karachi. They however admit to have filed appeals against the order of respondent No, 1 dated 9-6-1969, but they allege that these appeals are nullity in law and must be ignored for the purpose of these petitions.
5. In view of the rival contentions of the parties, the case of the petitioners was one for the renewal of licenses whereas according to respondent No, 1 it was for the grant of new licenses. This controversy appears to us to be immaterial as the Ordinance does not make any discernible distinction between the renewal and the grant of a fresh licence except that if before its expiry an application is made for the renewal of a licence then under the rovisions of section 3(5) of the Ordinance it would remain effective unless the renewal application is disposed of. Apart from this limited protection, the policy of the Ordinance is to put a ban on money-lending business, after a date to be notified in this behalf by the Government, unless one was to hold, what the Ordinance calls, an "effective licence." In this respect reference may be made to the provisions of section 3 of the Ordinance which read :- "3. (1) No money-lender shall, after a date to be notified in this behalf by Government carry on or continue to carry on the business of money-lending unless he holds an effective licence under this Ordinance.
(2)A money-lender may apply to the Collector for a licence which may be granted for such period, in such form and on such conditions, and on payment of such fees, as may be prescribed.
(3)No money-lender shall carry on the business of moneyiending except in accordance with the terms and conditions of such licence."
"Effective licence", without which no one could continue moneylending business after a date notified by the Government is defined by section 2(i) of the Ordinance to mean "a licence which has not been suspended or cancelled or which has not expired". The learned counsel for the petitioners admitted before us that he was not aware if the required notification was published by the Government so as to debar the petitioners from carrying on their business under the licenses last issued to them under the Sind Money Lenders Act. He, however, conceded that the notification in question, even if it was published, was not relevant for the purpose of these petitions as the petitioners enjoyed their licenses for the full period for which they were issued.
6. Apart from the fact that until the Government was to publish the required notification under section 3(1) of the Ordinance, prescribing a date after which no money-lender could continue in his business without holding an "effective licence", the Ordinance did not effect the validity of licenses issued under the repealed Sind Money Lenders Act so long as they had not expired or not suspended or cancelled upon one or more of the grounds mentioned in section 5 of the Ordinance.
7. The grievance of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that by refusing to renew the licenses respondent No, 1 had virtually cancelled them without complying with the mandatory provisions of section 5 of the Ordinance and consequently the impugned action was wholly without jurisdiction.
It that the learned counsel contended be really true then his grievance would be well founded as admittedly the provisions of section 5 were disregarded by respondent No, 1 while passing the impugned order.
8. The case of the petitioners as set out in the petitions is as if respondent No, 1 has cancelled their licenses but this is not the correct position. The correct position is set out in Annexure C-1 dated 30- 5-1969, which is the representation of the petitioners to the Commissioner, Karachi. In this document it was alleged that the petitioners were granted last licenses by the Registrar of Money Lenders, Karachi under the Sind Money Lenders Act which were valid up to 30-6-1965. It was further alleged that after the coming in to force of the Ordinance in the District of Karachi on 1-5-1965, they applied to respondent No, 1 for the renewal of their licenses but no decision was taken on their applications. Upon these allegations they prayed to the Commissioner to direct respondent No, 1 to renew their licenses according to the provisions of the Ordinance.
9. It would be seen that on their own showing the last licenses issued to the petitioners under the Sind Money Lenders Act were valid up to 30-6-1965. It would therefore follow that after this date, unless their licenses were renewed, the petitioners could not continue doing money-lending business as they would not be the holders of "affective licenses" under the Ordinance. It is an admitted position that the last licenses of the petitioners, issued under the Sind Money Lenders Act, were not renewed by respondent No, 1 and consequently expired on 30-6-1965 by efflux of time.
The petitioners are therefore wrong to contend that their licenses were cancelled by the said respondent without complying with the provisions of section 5 of the Ordinance. In fact the very contention of the petitioners is misconceived as the cancellation of a licence is treated differently under the Ordinance than the renewal of a licence. In the case of cancellation the Collector (respondent No, 1) is required by section 5 of the Ordinance to afford an opportunity of hearing to the moneylender before his licence could be cancelled on one or more of the grounds mentioned in that section whereas in the case of renewal of a licence the Ordinance is wholly silent, leaving the matter to the discretion of respondent No,
1. In this respect some guidance is found in Rules 10, 11, 12 and 13 of the Rules made under section 29 of the Ordinance but according to those Rules all that respondent No, 1 is required to do is to make such enquiries as he considers necessary to satisfy himself that there is no bar to the renewal of a licence but otherwise the rules are silent as to the consideration upon which his decision should be made. The policy of the Legislature in this respect is understandable. It is well-established that unlike the case of an existing licence, in which the licensee is deemed to have vested rights, no one has a vested right to the grant of a fresh licence or to the renewal of one which has expired by efflux of time. We are of the view that this principle would apply with added force in the case of money-lending licences which involves public interest. If any authority is needed for this proposition reference may be made to the Supreme Court judgment reported at page 178 of the PLD Issue of 1961. In that case their Lordships were called upon to consider the grant of licences under the Arms Act which were held to involve public interest but the principle of the judgment would be applicable to the money- lending licences as well which also involve public interest. In fact the various provisions of the Ordinance indicate that public interest is the principal object which has to be taken into consideration before a money-lending licence is issued under the Ordinance. In this respect reference may be made to section 19 of the Ordinance which makes it a penal offence, punishable with imprisonment which may extend to six months or with fine or with both, if any one is found doing money-lending business without being in possession of an "effective licence."
10.The only question which remains to be considered is if respondent No, 1 had refused to consider the renewal application of the petitioners. In this respect the position taken in the counter-affidavit is that the application of the petitioners were referred to the Superintendent of Police (Special Branch), Karachi and after his report was received respondent No, 1, in the exercise of his discretion, rejected them in 1965. The case of the respondent further is that against this order the petitioners filed appeals before the Commissioner of Karachi and the same were dismissed.
This position was reiterated by the learned Additional Advocate-General who on the strength of official record made a statement from the Bar which was not challenged by the learned counsel for the petitioners.
11.The position was also not specifically denied in the rejoinder affidavit filed by the petitioners in which their only complaint was that no such decision was communicated to them. It would therefore follow that so far as their applications were concerned, they were rejected by respondent No, 1 in 1966, although the order of rejection may not have been communicated to the petitioners.
The result would be that no sooner their applications were rejected, the interim protection granted to them by subsection (3) of section 5 of the Ordinance came to an end and thereafter they could not continue money-lending business without incurring the penalty provided under section 19 of the Ordinance.
12.As already stated, the petitioners denied to have filed any appeals before the Commissioner against the impugned order of respondent No, 1, although the learned Additional Advocate- General made a statement from the Bar, on the strength of official record, which was not denied.
Whatever may be the case, at least this much is clear that their applications were rejected by respondent No, 1 in 1966, whereafter their licenses, which were valid up to 30-6-1965, came to an end. Whether they challenged this order, by filing appeals before the Commissioner, Karachi, is not of much importance because once their renewal applications were rejected their right to continue money-lending business ceased to exist. Assuming, however, that what the petitioners contend is true, perhaps it would be still open to them to file appeals before the Commissioner and for that purpose they might seek the condonation of delay on the ground that the impugned order of respondent No, 1 was not communicated to them. For this purpose ample provision is made in subsection (3) of section 8 of the Ordinance and if satisfied, the Commissioner might entertain the appeals by condoning the delay.
13.The next ground upon which the impugned order is assailed is that of mala fides. In this respect the case of the petitioners is that they had obtained a decree of the civil Court against respondent No, 1 by which they were declared to be entitled to the renewal of their licences. They contend that after they confronted the said respondent with the decree of the Court, he refused to renew their licences for unwarranted reasons. The contention is clearly without force. In this respect, section 10 of the Ordinance provides that :- "10.--(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other enactment, a suit by a money-lender for recovery of a loan or an application by a money-lender for the execution of a decree relating to a loan shall be dismissed unless at the time of the institution of the suit or at the time of presentation of the application for execution of the decree, as the case may be, the money-lender- (a)holds an effective licence granted under section 3 ; Or (b)holds a certificate granted under section 7 specifying the loan in respect of which the suit is instituted or the decree in respect of which the application for execution is presented,"
14.The admitted position is that when they filed the civil Suit, the petitioners were not the holders of "effective licenses" and therefore the suit was bound to be dismissed. Furthermore they could not execute the decree of the Court for want of such a licence of which they were not in possession at any relevant time. So far as sub-clause (b) of section 10 is concerned admittedly the suit filed by the petitioners was not on the basis of a certificate issued by respondent No, 1 and therefore the decree of the civil Court was wholly ineffective.
Considering that the suit of the petitioners and the decree of the civil Court both were ineffective, respondent No, 1 could ignore them and the allegation of mala fides against him would be misconceived.
15.There is yet another reason for which the petitioners are not entitled to the discretionary relief under Article 98 of the Constitution. In para. 7 ( f ) of the counter-affidavit it is alleged that the petitioners have been harassing and humiliating the citizens of Pakistan and have been charging exorbitant interest from their victims by adopting coercive and ruthless methods. One such instance of one Muhammad Wali Khan, a Stenographer in the Pakistan Family Planning Council, Karachi has been quoted in the counter-affidavit of respondents. These allegations have not been denied by the petitioners in their rejoinder affidavit. In the result the petitioners could not be extended any discretion particularly when they are foreign nationals.
16.In view of this discussion, we find no force in these petitions each one of which is dismissed with costs.