' Brief facts giving rise to the institution of present revision petition are that Respondents No, 1 and 2 filed a suit for declaration before learned trial Court, Vehari praying therein that the orders dated 26.11.2008, 29.6.2009 and 13.3.2010 passed by the official respondents be declared as illegal and unlawful and based on mala fide and are liable to be set aside. The suit was resisted by the petitioner by filing written statement. The petitioner instituted an application under Order VII Rule 11, CPC for the rejection of the plaint, which was dismissed vide order dated 24.9.2012 by learned trial Court. The learned trial Court after receiving reply by Respondents No, 1 and 2 vide order dated 17.11.2012 not only dismissed the application for grant of temporary injunction but also rejected the plaint under Order VII Rule 11, CPC. The Respondents No, 1 and 2 instituted an appeal on 01.12.2012 before the District & Sessions Judge, Vehari, which was accepted by way of impugned order dated 13.5.2015 and the case was remanded to the learned trial Court for its decision afresh after framing of issues and recording of evidence by the parties.
2. It is contended by learned counsel for the petitioner that impugned order is illegal and unlawful.
It is further contended that while deciding the application for grant of temporary injunction the plaint can also be rejected.
3. Heard. Record perused.
4. It is settled principle of law that while rejecting the plaint only contents of the plaint are to be looked into. Reliance is placed on a celebrated judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan reported as "Haji Abdul Karim and others v. Messrs Flonida Builders (Put) Limited" (PLD 2012 Supreme Court 247). Relevant portion is reproduced herein below: "After considering the ratio decidendi in the above case, and bearing in mind the importance of Order VII, Rule 11, we think it may be helpful to formulate the guidelines for the interpretation thereof so as to facilitate the task of Courts in construing the same.
' Firstly, there can be little doubt that primacy, (but not necessarily exclusivity) is to be given to the contents of the plaint. However, this does not mean that the Court is obligated to accept each mid every averment contained therein as being true. Indeed, the language of Order VII, Rule 11 contains no such provision that the plaint must be deemed to contain the whole truth and nothing but the truth. On the contrary, it leaves the power of the Court, which is inherent in every Court of justice and equity to decide whether or not a suit is barred by any law for the time being in force completely intact. The only requirement is that the Court must examine the statements in the plaint prior to taking a decision.
' Secondly, it is also equally clear, by necessary interference, that the contents of the written statement are not to be examined and put in juxtaposition with the plaint in order to determine whether the averments of the plaint are correct or incorrect. In other words the Court is not to decide whether the plaint is right or the written statement is right. That is normal course and after the recording of evidence. In Order VII, Rule 11 cases the question is not the credibility of the plaintiff versus the defendant. It is something completely different, namely, does the plaint appear to be barred by law.
' Thirdly, and it is important to stress this point, in carrying out an analysis of the averments contained in the plaint the Court is not denuded Of its normal judicial power. It is not obligated to accept as correct any manifestly self-contradictory or wholly absurd statements. The Court has been given wide powers under the relevant provisions of the Qanun-e-Shahadat. It has a judicial discretion and it is also entitled to make the presumptions set out, for example in Article 129 which enable it to presume the existence of certain facts. It follows from the above, therefore, that if an averment contained in the plaint is to be rejected perhaps on the basis of the documents appended to the plaint, or the admitted documents, or the position which is beyond any doubt, this exercise has to be carried out not on the basis of the denials contained in the written statement which are not relevant, but in exercise of the judicial power of appraisal of the plaint."
' From the bare perusal of the plaint it discloses a cause of action. Learned trial Court has passed order dated 17.11.2012 in complete oblivion of its earlier order dated 24.9.2012 whereby application under Order 7 Rule 11,,CPC filed by the present petitioner was dismissed. It is to be noted that no fresh application has been filed by the petitioner under Order 7 Rule 11, CPC for the rejection of the plaint. It is also discernable from the record that order dated 24.9.2012 has not been assailed by availing appropriate remedy hence same has attained finality. It appears from bare perusal of impugned order that Court only intends to dispose of the application for grant of temporary injunction and the arguments to that extent has been heard by learned trial Court hence rejection of plaint is not justifiable. It is also an established law that in such like situation the rejection of plaint while hearing arguments on an application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2, CPC cannot be passed. The difference between Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2, CPC and Order WI Rule 11, CPC has been elaborately discussed in case law reported as "Jewan and 7 others v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Revenue. Islamabad and 2 others" (1994 SCM 826). The relevant portion is reproduced herein below: "A plain reading of the Order VII Rule 11, CPC would show that the rejection of plaint under this provision of law is contemplated at a stage when the Court has not recorded any evidence in the suit. It is for the reason precisely, that the law permit consideration of only averments made in the plaint for the purpose of deciding whether the plaint should be rejected or not for failure to disclose cause of action or the suit being barred under some provision of law. The Court while making action for rejection of plaint under Order VII, Rule 11, CPC cannot take into consideration pleas raised by the defendant in the suit in his decease, as at that stage the pleas raised by the defendants are only contentions in the proceedings unsupported by any evidence on record However, if there is some other material before the Court apart from the plaint at that stage which is admitted by the plaintiff, the same can also be looked into and taken into consideration by the Court while rejecting the plaint under Order VII, Rule 11, CPC. Beyond that the Court would not be entitled to take into consideration any other material produced on record unless the same is brought on record in accordance with the rules of evidence. We may point out here that there is marked different between the scope of proceedings of an application under Order XXXIX, Rules 1 and 2, CPC, filed by the plaintiff for grant of temporary injunction in a pending proceeding and the rejection of the plaint under Order VII, Rule 11, CPC, on account of failure to disclose a cause of action in the plaint or the plaint being barred under some provision of law. In the former case, the Court while deciding the application for grant of temporary injunction ascertains existence or otherwise of a prima facie case, balance of convenience and the possibility of irreparable injury to the party seeking injunction in case the relief is withheld. While considering existence or otherwise of a prima facie case in proceedings under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2, CPC, the Court is not only entitled. To look into the pleadings of the plaintiff and documents filed by him in support of case but it can also take into consideration the documents of pleadings filed by the defendant.
However, the Courts while rejecting a plaint under Order VII, Rule 11, CPC on the ground that the plaintiff failed to disclose any cause of action or the suit is barred under some provision of law, the extent of examination of relevant facts by the Court to reach these conclusions has to be only on the basis of averments made in the plaint and any other material or document which is admitted by the plaintiff The reason for this different approach while rejecting a plaint under .Order. VII Rule El, CPC is quite obvious. In the former proceedings (under Order XXXIX, Rules I and 2, CPC) even if the Court reaches the conclusion that the plaintiff has failed to make out a prima facie case, it can only refuse to grant temporary injunction and reject the application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2, CPC but this rejection cannot result in the dismissal of the suit which proceeds to trial notwithstanding a finding by the Court that the plaintiff has failed to make out a prima facie case for grant of temporary injunction. On the contrary, if the Court reaches the conclusion that the plaint failed to disclose any cause of action or suit appears to be barred under some law, the proceedings come to an end immediately and the plaintiff is non-suited before he is allowed an opportunity to lead evidence and substantiate his allegation made in the plaint. We are, therefore, of the view that the rejection of plaint at a preliminary stage when the plaintiff has not led any evidence in support of his case, is possible only if the Court reaches this conclusion on consideration of the statements contained in the plaint and other material available on record before the Court which the plaintiff admits as correct. "
' This judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan has consistently been followed in case laws reported as "Mushtaq Hussain v. Province of Punjab through Collector Jhelum District and 6 others" (2003 M LD 109), "Muhammad Tariq Mahmood and 2' others v. Anjuman Kashmiri Bradari Khisht Faroshan through President Abdul Ashfaq and 21 others" (2003 GLC 335), "Mst. Amina v.
Muhammad Easa and 11 others" (2008 YLR 1405) and "Iftikharul Haq v. District Canal Officer and others" (2005 CLC 1740). Learned counsel for the petitioner failed to point out any illegality and material irregularity in the impugned order.
5. The ratio of above judgment is that while passing order on an application for the grant of temporary injunction, plaint cannot be rejected.
6. For what has been discussed above, this petition has no force, hence, same is hereby dismissed in limine.
(R.A.) .