' ZAFAR AHMED RAJPUT, J.--This High Court Appeal is directed against the order dated 12.02.1995, passed in Execution Application No, 48 of 1994, arising out of Suit No, 523 of 1990, whereby the learned Single Judge of this Court allowed the interest @ 14% per annum from the date of filing of the suit.
2. Briefly stated, the, facts of the case are that the respondents/ plaintiffs/D.Hs files Civil Suit No, 523 of 1990 in original civil jurisdiction of this Court for recovery of Rs,33,41,107=00 against the appellant/ defendant/J.D along with markup @ 18%,p.a. From the date of suit till realization, claiming therein that they had participated in an open auction for supply of computer stationery materials to the appellant and deposited Rs,63,200=00 along with the tender as earnest money and, being lowest, their bid was accepted, vide letter dated 14.06.1989, whereafter they supplied numerous material on various dates worth Rs,28,66,700=00 to the appellant according to the purchase order and finally submitted a consolidated bill on 10.08.1989 for the said amount, but the appellant failed to make payment thereof; hence, the cause of action accrued to respondents to file the suit for recovery of the earnest money, amounting to Rs,63,200=00, consolidated bills, amounting to Rs,28,66,700=00 and markup thereon @ 18% p.a. Amounting to Rs,4,11,207 =00 (total Rs,33,41,107=00).
Against the said claim of the respondents, the appellant admitted an amount of Rs,16,70,000=00 as payable to them. Consequently, the respondents filed an application, under Order XII, Rule 6 C.P.C.
To the effect that without waiting for the determination of the issues involved in the matter, the suit may be decreed to the extent of Rs,16,70,000=00 with markup @ 18% p.a. Being the admitted liability of the appellant. Hence the learned Single Judge of this Court, vide order and decree dated 22.02.1994 and 27.03.1994, respectively decreed the suit of the respondents partly to the extent of Rs,16,70,000-00 with interest thereon Q Rs,14% p.a. In consequence thereof, the appellant deposited an amount of Rs,17,04,756 =21, being the decretal amount after deduction of income tax, with the Nazir of the Court. Thereafter, respondents filed. Execution Application No,48 of 1994, claiming therein the interest/ mark-up from the date of the suit, which was allowed by the learned Executing Court, vide order dated 12.02.1995, holding that the appellant would pay the respondents the amount due on account of interest from the date of the suit till the date of deposition of decretal amount with the Nazir of the Court, within six weeks from the date of the order. Against this order, the instant High"Court Appeal has been preferred by the appellant.
3. None has made his appearance for the appellant despite the fact that the notice issued to the appellant for the date of hearing received back served. However, instead of dismissing this High Court Appeal in default, we have considered the grounds raised in this appeal for its disposal on merit and heard the learned counsel appearing for the respondents.
4. The appellant has assailed the impugned order on the grounds that it has substantively changed the decree passed partly in the suit, by granting interest from the date of the suit, which had earlier in fact been refused in terms of decree dated 27.03.1994, which amendment is not permissible under the provision of Section 152 C.P.C. The next ground raised in this High Court Appeal is that even in application under Order XII, Rule 6, C.P.C., the respondents did not pray for the grant of interest from the date of the suit and that the respondents did not even file any review application against the decree and under the circumstances where a decree was granted on admission in terms of the prayer made in that behalf, the respondents could not be permitted to claim more than what they had prayed for; that in any case of awarding interest, rate of interest and the period for which interest is to be awarded is in total discretion of the Court and as the original order dated 22.2.1994 stood complied with, the same does not contain any omission so as to warrant any amendment; hence, the impugned order is illegal and liable to be set aside.
5. Learned counsel for the respondents has fully supported the impugned order. He has contended that the respondents in their suit for money specifically prayed for the markup @ 18% p.a. From the date of suit till realization and their suit was partly decreed by the learned single Judge of this Court on the admission of the appellant to the extent of Rs,16,70,000=00 with interest thereon at Rs,14% p.a. And it is, therefore, clear that the date from which interest was to be paid was not specified only due to inadvertence in the order dated 22.2.1994, hence the learned Executing Court rightly declared that the decree shall be deemed to include interest from the date of the suit. The learned counsel has further contended that under Section 47 of C.P.C. The Executing Court can interpret the decree to find out what the decree really has granted; and for this purpose the courts are entitled to refer to the pleadings and assertions to determine as to what extent the decree can be executed. He has further contended that under section 47 (ibid) all questions arising between the parties to the suit relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree shall be determined by the Executing Court and in the instant case the Executing Court has mainly executed the decree by interpreting it that the same shall be deemed to include interest from the date of the suit. The learned counsel has also contended that under section 34 of C.P.C., the respondents are even entitled to the interest from the date of demand notice given to appellant prior to filing of suit and thereafter for the period the suit remained pending adjudication. In support of his contention, the learned counsel has relied upon the following case-law:
1. Muhammad Lal v. Abdul Qudoos (PLD 1975 Quetta 29),
2. Major (Retd.) Mahmood Hussain v. Habib Bank Limited, Faisalabad (2001 CLC 2016),
3. Arif Ali Shah and another v. Province of West Pakistan (1969 SCM R 690).
6. It appears that the respondent specifically prayed for the markup 18% p.a. From the date of suit till realization, which was decreed by the learned trial Court on admission in part to the extent of Rs,16,70,000=00 with the interest thereon @ 14% p.a. And since the date from which the interest was to be paid was not specified in the decree, this question relating to the interpretation of the decree was determined by the learned Executing Court in the impugned order declaring that the "decree shall be deemed to include interest from the date of the suit."
7. The only question before us in this appeal is that whether the Executing Court was competent to determine this question, our answer is in affirmative in view of section 47 of the C.P.C., which reads as under:- "47. Questions to be determined by the Court executing decree.-(1) All questions arising between the parties to the suit in which the decree was passed, or their representatives, and relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree, shall be determined by the Court executing the decree and not by a separate suit.
(2) The Court may, subject to any objection as to limitation or jurisdiction, treat a proceeding under the section as a suit or a suit as a proceeding and may, if necessary, order payment of any additional court-fees.
(3) Where a question arises as to whether any person is or is not the representative of a party, such question shall, for the purposes of this section, be determined by the Court."
8. It may be examined that section 47 (ibid) empowers the Court executing decrees to determine all questions relating to execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree. The object of the section is not only to afford relief to the parties in the matters arising out of execution of decree but also to curtail the multiplicity of litigation, and the hardship to be faced by the parties. The words "all questions arising" A means the questions relating to or effecting the rights of parties to the suit. We are of the view that the question of payable, when specifically not mentioned in the decree is the question to be decided by the Executing Court.
9. Executing Court is vested with power to interpret the decree in the light of pleadings and judgment of the Court. This view is not disputed. A Divisional Bench of this Court in the case of Muhammad Afzal and another v. Pakistan International Airlines Corporation (2006 YLR 3074) has held that the power of Executing Court though is limited to the extent that it cannot go behind the decree, but where in the implementation and execution of decree, the question of its interpretation is involved, then it is for the Executing Court to examine the relevant record to conclude exact nature of the reliefs allowed to a party on the basis of decree framed in a suit.
10. It may also be examined that the interest from the date of the suit is ordinarily granted in view of Section 34 of C.P.C. In the instant case, the perusal of the decree shows that the learned trial Court awarded the interest to respondents @ 14% p.a. Therefore, the decree was not without any interest on the principal amount; however, the date from which the interest was to be paid was not itemized in the decree thus, the question arisen before the Executing Court was as to from which date the respondents are entitled to the interest. In this regard, the learned Executing Court has rightly observed the fact that the respondents in their pleadings had claimed for the interest from the date of suit and there was nothing in the circumstances of the case to show that they were not entitled to it, which due to inadvertence could not be specified in the decree. This order of the Executing Court, in our view, cannot be termed as "amendment in decree" but the "interpretation of the decree " .
11. In view of what has been discussed herein above, no interference in the impugned order is called for; therefore, this High Court Appeal is dismissed with no order as to costs. revisions by the competent authorities. Therefore, it is advisable to consult the official sources or legal professionals for the most up-to-date and accurate information.