' ASAD MUNIR, MEMBER.--- The Appellants remained employed in WAPDA as Skilled Coolies on daily wages for about five years until 06.02.2010 when their services were terminated. The Appellants filed a joint grievance petition to challenge the termination of their services but the Punjab Labour Court No.5, Sargodha, through its order dated 15.02.2012, has returned the petition for its presentation before the proper forum having jurisdiction on the ground that the Labour Court has no jurisdiction in view of the provisions of sections 17(1-B) and 17(1-C) of the WAPDA Act, 1958.
2. Assailing the legality of the learned Labour Court's order dated 15.02.2012, the learned counsel for the Appellants, relying on WAPDA v. Muhammad Ashraf Naeem (1997 SCM R 1128) and the Project Director Ghotki (WAPDA) v. Commissioner, Workmen's Compensation (PLD 1992 Supreme Court 451), contended that the learned Labour Court erroneously declined to exercise its jurisdiction as the Appellants, being workmen employed on daily wages, were not civil servants. On the other hand, learned counsel for the Respondent has supported the impugned judgment for the reasons recorded therein.
3. I have gone through the impugned order whereby the learned Labour Court has held that it has no jurisdiction in view of the provisions of section 17(1-B) and section 17(1-C) of the WAPDA Act, 1958 which are reproduced below:- "(1-B) Service under the Authority is hereby declared to be service of Pakistan and every person holding a post under the Authority, not being a person who is on deputation to the Authority from any Province, shall be deemed to be a civil servant for the purposes of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973 (LXX of 1973).
(1-C) Any order of removal or termination of service passed by the Authority, in exercise of the powers conferred by subsection (1-A), shall not be called in question in any proceedings taken under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 (XXIII of 1969), or the Essential Services (Maintenance) Act, 1952 (LIII of 1952), or under any law for the time being in force, before any Court, Tribunal or Commission and any order passed by any Court, Tribunal or Commission after the thirtieth day of September, 1975, and before the coming into force of the West Pakistan Water and Power Development Authority (Amendment) Ordinance, 1979, setting aside or modifying or declaring any order of the Authority to be void and of no effect, shall stand vacated."
4. The Hon'ble Supreme Court examined the provisions of sections 17(1-B) and 17 (1-C) of the WAPDA Act, 1958, in WAPDA and another v. Muhammad Arshad Qureshi (1986 SCM R 18) wherein it was held that the FST alone has jurisdiction where the services of a WAPDA employee are terminated. Another case in point is Wasim Ahmed Khan v. WAPDA and 3 others (1997 SCM R 2000) wherein also the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the case of a Meter Reader followed its earlier judgment passed in WAPDA v. Muhammad Arshad Qureshi. I have also gone through the judgment in WAPDA v. Muhammad Ashraf Naeem, supra, relied upon by the learned counsel for the Appellants, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court upheld the FST's decision of reinstating in service a Lower Division Clerk employed in WAPDA. However, this judgment holds that the provisions of Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968, would apply to a workman employed in .WAPDA but does not lay down that a workman terminated by WAPDA can approach the Labour Court instead of the Federal Service Tribunal. Another case relied upon by the learned counsel is the Project Director Ghotki (WAPDA) v. Commissioner, Workmen's Compensation, supra, wherein it was held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that the FST had no jurisdiction where the terminated work-charged employees of WAPDA sought recovery of their termination dues. This authority is also distinguishable as the Appellants are not seeking recovery of any termination dues but have challenged their termination from service. Keeping in view the provisions of sections 17 (1-B) and 17(1-C) of the WAPDA Act, 1958, as interpreted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, I agree with the learned Labour Court that it had no jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the grievance of a WAPDA employee like the Appellant.
5. For what has been stated above, this appeal is dismissed for being without substance.