' MUHAMMAD FARRUKH IRFAN KHAN, J.---Through this single order I propose to decide the following six writ petitions in which common question of law and fact is involved:-
1. Two writ petitions bearing Nos. 2405/11 and 3763/11 filed by Jameel Ahmad Naaz and M/s RehmanBrothers Pvt. Ltd. Against the orders of the learned Rent Tribunal dated 17.05.2010 and that of the learned Appellate Court dated 08.01.2011.
2. Three writ petitions bearing Nos.3992/12, 7071/12 and 26635/11 filed by Messrs Faya International Pvt. Ltd. M/s Atlas Trade Impex Ltd. And Khawar Saeed against the eviction orders of learned Rent Tribunal dated 01.02.2011 and that of the learned Appellate Court dated 06.01.2012.
3. One writ petition No,4504/13 filed by Qamar Ali Khan against the eviction order of the learned Rent Tribunal dated 01.02.2011 and that of the learned Appellate Court dated 08.01.2013."
2. Briefly the facts of the case are that respondent filed separate ejectment petitions against the aforesaid writ petitioners seeking their eviction from the demised premises inter alia on the grounds of willful default and expiry of tenancy period. All the writ petitioners filed application for leave to defend, whereby, they denied existence of relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. After hearing the arguments, learned Rent Tribunal declined leave applications of all the writ petitioners and passed final eviction order against which their appeals were also dismissed by the learned Appellate Court.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioners argued that both the courts below committed material illegalities and irregularities while passing impugned orders/judgments that the demised premises are situated in "gardee Trust Building" which is a trust property; that according to provision No,11 of the Trust Deed dated 21.10.1959 the trustees could not sell out the property of the trust without prior permission of the High Court; that some of the trustees in sheer violation of the aforesaid provision of the Trust Deed sold out the demised premises to respondents and that too without the consent of all trustees; that one of the trustee .Namely Yoosoof Ebrahim Gardee has challenged the sale deed in favour of respondents by filing a civil suit which is pending adjudication before the court of competent jurisdiction; that since the title deed in favour of the respondents is already under question before the competent court, therefore, until the decision of said suit, the learned courts below were not justified in passing their eviction order; that the petitioners are tenants of Y.E.
Gardee Trust and continuously depositing rent in favour of said trust; that the petitioners denied existence of relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties and the question could not be determined without recording of evidence of the parties; that the learned courts below non-suited the petitioners in a summarily manner which is not warranted under the law; that the learned courts below passed the impugned orders/judgments without appreciating the material available on record as such the same are not sustainable in the eye of law.
4. On the converse, learned counsel for respondents submits that the impugned orders/judgments are well reasoned; that the respondents are owner of the demised premises on the basis of a valid registered sale deed; that admittedly the petitioners are tenants of previous owner, therefore, after purchase of the demised premises by the respondents, they attained the status of landlords by operation of law; that the petitioners cannot claim possession over the demised premises for an indefinite period merely on the basis of pendency of the civil suit; that the petitioners denied existence of relationship of landlord and tenant which is otherwise apparent on the face of record, therefore, both the learned courts below were fully justified in passing the impugned orders/judgments and no occasion arises for this Court to intervene with the same in the Constitutional jurisdiction.
5. I have heard the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the record.
6. The only question which requires determination is that whether the petitioners can deny relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties merely for the reasons that according to provision No,11 of the Trust Deed dated 21.10.1959 trustees were not authorized to sell out the demised premises to the respondent. Before proceeding further it would be advantageous to reproduce aforesaid provisions of the Trust Deed which provides as under:-- "(1]) The Trustees shall not after the death of the Settler, demise any here ditament and premises for the time being forming part of the trust property or any part thereof for a term exceeding five years without the previous sanction of the High Court within whose jurisdiction Trust property is situated. "
' It is thus manifestly clear from the aforesaid clause that it did lay any restriction upon the trustee to sale out the demised premises. Section-37 of the Trusts Act, 1882 provides as under:- "37. Powers to sell in lots, and either by public auction or private contract. ---Where the trustee is empowered to sell any trust-property, he may sell the same subject to prior charges or not, and either together or in lots, by public auction or private contract, and either at one time or at several times, unless the instrument of trust otherwise directs. "
' Now the point which requires consideration is whether the instrument of trust laid any restriction upon the trustees to sale out the trust property. In this regard-clause No,13 of the aforesaid Trust Deed is very much relevant which reads as under:- "(13). The Trustees shall have power during the life time of the settler with his consent in writing and after his death at their absolute discretion from time to time to sell, exchange or transfer or otherwise dispose off for any consideration on such terms and conditions as they think fit, the whole or any part thereof all the lands, here ditament and premises for the time being forming part of the trust property by public auction or private contract and subject to stipulation as to title or evidence of title or otherwise as they may deem proper and shall invest the sale proceeds in some or more of the investments authorised by these presents. "
' It is thus evident from the bare reading of the aforesaid clause that the instrument itself authorized its trustees to sale out, transfer or exchange the trust property, therefore, contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the trustee could not sale ofit the demised premises is not tenable.
7. So far as filing of civil suit by one of the trustees whereby validity of registered sale deed in favour of respondents is called in question is concerned, suffice it to say that merely on the basis of 'pendency of said suit the petitioners cannot justifiably occupy the demised premises for an indefinite period. It is evident from the record that pendency of eviction petitions was very much in the knowledge of A the co-trustee who has challenged the validity of sale deed in favour of respondents but he did not make any effort of becoming party in the eviction petition. Even otherwise the petitioners cannot take premium of that civil suit which is a matter between a trustee and the respondents.
8. Now, coming to the objection of the learned counsel for the petitioners that sale transaction of the demised premises in favour of respondents were made without the consent of all the trustees as such they were invalid, it has constantly been held that scope of a rent tribunal is very limited as it has to decide a matter arising between a tenant and landlord and it has no jurisdiction to decide the intricate question of title. Furthermore this issue is sub judice before the court of competent jurisdiction and this Court at this juncture, does not want to comment on this point lest it may prejudice the case of either side. At present a valid registered sale deed is in the names of respondents and even if in the end that registered sale deed is declared invalid by the competent court even then it would not change the status of the petitioners, who were admittedly inducted in the demised premises as tenants by Y.E. Gardee Trust. It is settled principle of law that once a tenant is always a tenant. After purchase of demised property the respondents attained the status of landlords and the petitioners became the tenants by operation of law. It is also apparent from the record that after change of ownership, due notice was issued to the petitioners but despite this fact they refused to acknowledge the status of respondents as their landlord. This denial on the part of the petitioners is contumacious. It is settled principle of law that when a tenant denies relationship of landlord and tenant but through the material available it is not so established on record, he is liable to be evicted straightaway.# Reliance is placed on case reported as Ahmad Ali alias AU Ahmad V. Nasar-ud-Din and another (PLD 2009 Supreme Court 453).
9. For what has been stated above, learned counsel for the petitioners are unable to point out any illegality or irregularity in the impugned orders/judgments calling for interference by this Court in its Constitutional jurisdiction. Resultantly, all the aforesaid Constitutional petitions being without any substance are dismissed with costs.