The petitioner is defendant in the suit brought by the United Bank Limited for recovery of Rs.3,78,147.74. The petitioner applied for leave to defend the suit and it was allowed vide the impugned order dated 13-4-1981 "subject to the payment of Rs.2 lacs into Court within a period of two months or furnishing bank guarantee for that sum and to furnish ordinary security in respect of the balance of the suit amount" The grievance is that the condition is oppressive and unwarranted, firstly because the loan is secured against stocks lying in custody of the Bank and secondly because the petitioner has a claim of its own against the Bank in respect of which a suit is pending.
The trial Court expressed the view that the pendency of the civil suit would not provide a ground for granting unconditional permission to defend the suit,
2. A special law namely the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance (XIX of 1979) was enacted for the purpose of providing a speedy and efficacious method for recovery of loans advanced by the banks and for this purpose the summary procedure of Order XXXVII, C. P. C., was made applicable by subsection (2) of section 7. Under rule 3 of Order XXXVII, the defendant has no right to defend the suit unless the Court grants him leave to do so. The leave can be granted upon an application of the defendant supported by affidavits which disclose such facts as would make it incumbent on the holder to prove consideration or such other facts as the Court may deem sufficient to support the applica--tion. While granting leave to defend, the Court may impose conditions involving payment into Court upon giving security, etc. As the Court thinks fit. The Court has been given a discretion in the matter of imposing a condition which should accord with the situation. The imposition of condition, therefore, is within the jurisdiction of the trial Court.
3. Section 12 of the Ordinance provides for an appeal against any order, judgment, decree passed against a person but expressly bars an appeal from an interlocutory order which does not dispose of the entire case before the special Court. There is no provision for a revision or any other remedy against an interlocutory order.. The intention of the Legislature, therefore, seems to be against any interference during the trial until the matter has been finally decided. This arrangement accords with the objective of the law, for, all interference during the pendency of the suit is bound to delay the conclusion of the trial.
4. The question, therefore, arises if when the law has barred an appeal or other remedy from an interlocutory order, should the party be permitted to circumvent that law by recourse to the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court. The question has by now been settled by a number of authorities following upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Ibrahim v. Muhammad Hussain (PLD 1975 SC 457), in which the Supreme Court had held that an order passed under section 13(6) of Ordinance (VI of 1959) was not appealable. Recourse. Thereafter, was made by parties to the constitutional jurisdiction against such order. A Division Bench of this Court in Muhammad Saeed v.
Mst. Saratul Fatima (PLD 1978 Lab. 1459), held that :- "It therefore, follows that what the Legislature held to be an interlocutory order not by itself fit to be appealable, should not by such a device be held fit enough to attract the more important, and at a higher level, the constitutional jurisdiction. Any contention, or practice to the contrary, would defeat and deflect the legislative intent, which has been disapproved in Mumtaz Hussain Bhutta v. Chief Administrator Auqaf, etc. 1976 SCMR 450."
"As the said Ordinance (W. P. Waqf Properties Ordinance XXVIII of 1951) has taken away the right of the petitioner to interim relief, learned counsel submitted that this was a ground which entitled the petitioner to prosecute a writ petition despite the pendency of the proceedings in the District Court.
The argument is misconceived because the writ jurisdiction of the superior Courts cannot be invoked in aid of injustice and in order to defeat the express provisions of the statutory law. That was also the view taken by this Court in Sayyed Muhammad Ali Shah Bokhari v. The Chief Administrator of Auqaf, Punjab, Lahore and others '.972 SCMR 297 and we respectfully agree with it."
The view taken in Muhammad Saeed's case was endorsed by a Division Bench of this Court in Amanullah v. Mukhtar Ahmad Khokhar (1979 CLC 199). There is no room for doubt that any interference with interlocutory orders by recourse to the constitutional jurisdiction is bound to delay the proceeding before the Special Court and thereby defeat and deflect the objective of the Legislature.
I, therefore, decline to intervene.
5. The writ petition is dismissed in limine.