This order will dispose of three writ petitions bearing Nos. 1731, 576 and 4903, all or 1979. These are being taken together as a common question of law arises in them.
2. Writ petition No. 1731 has been filed jointly by ten persons. They were employees of the Packages Limited. They were dismissed from service on different dates falling between 9th September, 1974 and 5th March, 1975 by different orders after regular inquiries. They filed separate petitions before a Labour Court agitating against the orders of their dismissal. Their case was that they were two unions in the Packages Ltd. They belonged to a union which had lost the referendum ; by way of victimization the members of the opposite union forcibly prevented them from attending to their work. The Labour Court consolidated all the petitions and held a joint trial with the consent of the parties. By an order dated 30th June, 1977 it allowed all the petitions and directed the re- instatement of the petitioners in service without any back benefits. The petitioner preferred separate appeals before the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal for obtaining directions for obtaining relief of back benefits. The Packages Limited did not challenge the order of re- instatement but preferred cross objections merely asking for the dismissal of the appeals without calling in question the procedure adopted by the Labour Court in, consolidating all the petitions.
3. In Writ Petition No. 576 there are twenty petitioners. They challenged the order of the Punjab Road Transport denying promotions to them as ticket examiners. In this case too, the Labour Court consolidated all the petitions and disposed them of by one order. This order was challenged before the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal by Board as well as by persons who were likely to be effected by the order of the Labour Court.
4. Writ Petition No. 4903 has been filed by nine persons. They were charge-sheeted for assaulting a Director of their company. After regular inquiry they were dismissed from service. They filed separate petitions challenging their dismissal from service. In this case also the Labour Court consolidated all the petitions and dismissed them by one order. The petitioners preferred appeals before the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal.
5. In all the writ petitions the Labour Appellate Tribunal set Aside the orders of the Labour Court and remanded the cases for retrial on a common ground, namely, that the Labour Court was not legally competent to consolidate cases of the various petitioners and hold joint trials. In these writ petitions the correctness of the view taken by the Appellate Tribunal has been challenged.
6. In coming to the view that the joint trials held by Labour Court were illegal the learned Appellate Tribunal was mainly influenced by the fact that a Labour Court was a Court of limited jurisdiction and such it did not possess any inherent powers under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure to consolidate the cases of various petitioners. To support its view it relied upon two decisions of this Court reported as Maqsoadan Bibt v. Bhuno (PLD 1965 Lah. 183) and Jalal Din v. Muhammad Akram Khan (PLD 1963 Lah. 596).
7. The petitions moved by the petitioners before the Labour Court fell under section 2i-A (4) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. As provided by that subsection the matters raised in the said petitions were to be deemed as if these were industrial disputes. Now the Industrial Relations Ordinance does not prescribe any pro--cedure of its own for the disposal of such disputes ; instead it constitutes a Labour Court into a civil Court and clothes it with all the powers which a civil Court possess under the Code of Civil Procedure. Thus, section 36, subsection (2) of the Ordinance lays down Labour Court shall, for the purpose of adjudicating and deter--mining any industrial dispute, be deemed to be a Civil Court and shall have the same powers as are vested in such Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Act of 1908) including the powers of-
(a) enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath ;
(b) compelling the production of documents and material objects ; and
(c) issuing commissions for the examination of witnesses or docu--ments.
The extent and scope of powers possessed by a Labour Court under the above provision came up for consideration in Brooke Bond (Pak.) Ltd. v. Second Sind Labour Court (PLD 1973 Kar. 189). In this case the question that fell for determination before a Division Bench was if the Labour Court could issue a temporary injunction under Order XXXIx, rules-1 and 2, of the Code of Civil Procedure to restrain an employer from terminating the services of his employee. The Division Bench held that section 36 (2), ibid., did not confer upon. a Labour Court all the powers of the Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure but that it gave only those powers to it which could be described as of procedural nature.
8. An order with regard to consolidation is usually made when a number of suits or petitions although filed by different parties involve identical questions of laws and facts. Such an order is essentially one of procedural nature. Of course if d joint trial of diverse petitions is not likely to further the ends of justice or as a result thereof some substantive right of a party is likely to be effected the matter may perhaps no longer remain to the domain of procedure alone. But then in the absence of any such likelihood it is based upon the consideration of convenience for the parties and the Tribunal.
9. The learned Appellate Tribunal was right in holding that a Labour Court was a Court of limited jurisdiction but I am not sure if it was also right in taking the view that it had no inherent powers at all. There is a clear distinction between jurisdiction and inherent powers. (See Raja Parthasaradhi Appa Row x. Raja Rengiah Row (1 L R 27 Mad. 168). Every Tribunal which performs judicial or quasi- judicial function has the implicit power to take such steps as are necessary for the exercise of its jurisdiction even though its jurisdiction may be of limited nature. B These steps include the power to regulate its procedure unless the statute under which it operates has limited its power in this regard either by prescribing a specific procedure for it or by forbidding it from proceeding in a particular manner. The foundation of this power is not section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure as the learned Appellate Tribunal seems to think but it is inherent in the very constitution of the Tribunal itself. It may also be mentioned that by expression section 151 does not invest a Civil Court with any fresh power but it merely saves these which vest in by virtue of being a Court.
1 10. The two authorities cited by the learned Appellate Tribunal in support of the view it has taken are really not relevant as they relate to substantive rights and not merely to matters of procedure.
In Jalat Din v. Muhammad Akram Khan the question for consideration was if the High Court could review a decision which it had already recorded in a writ petition. In Maqsoodan Bibi v. Bhano a similar question arose with reference to the Court of the Guardian Judge. In both these cases it was held that the power to review an earlier decision did not inhere in a Court but that it related to the realm of substantive rights.
11. There is no provision in the Industrial Relations Ordinance which may militate against a joint trial of a number of petitions or may require that each petition submitted to the Labour Court must be tried separately. On the other hand section 25-A (10) permits workers having a common grievance arising out of a common cause of action to male a joint application to the Labour Court.] In the event various worker choose to file separate applications there can hardly be any objection to these being tried. Together.
12. There is also no bar in the Code of Civil Procedure to the consolidation of suits for the purpose of a joint trial. Not infrequently the Civil Court do consolidate suits where it is convenient to do so and the parties consent to such a procedure being adopted. As already pointed out. Section 36 (2) of the Industrial Relations. Ordinance constitutes the Labour Courts into Civil Courts and at least so far procedural matters are concerned it confers upon them the same powers which a Civil Court possesses. If for consideration of convenience a Civil Court can consolidate suits with the consent of the parties for the purpose of trial there is no reason why under similar circumstances the same power should be denied to a Labour Court.
13. It was of course open to the learned Appellate Tribunal to set aside the orders of the Labour Court and order fresh trials if, it found that as a result of consolidation of the various petitions the issues arising between the parties had not been properly tried or that one or more parties to the proceedings had been placed at disadvantage or for some Other reason there bad been a 'mistrial. But there is no such finding' by it in these cases. It has set aside the orders of the Labour Court simply on a question of law that the Labour Court had no power to consolidate the petitions for the purpose of trial. For the reasons already indicated its view in this regard cannot be support- -ed. It may be reiterated that the Labour Court had made the orders with regard to consolidation with the consent of the parties concerned and during the course of the hearing before the learned Appellate Tribunal none of them had objected to the procedure adopted by the Labour Court while disposing of the petitions, In the circumstances the order of the learned Appellate Tribunal is clearly unsustainable in law and as the illegality is apparent on the face of the record I think it is a fit case for interference by this Court.
14. The learned counsel appearing for the respondent in Writ Petition No. 1731 raised an objection with regard to the competency of the petition. His case was that as the petitioners in this petition had filed separate petitions before the Labour Court and presented independent appeals before the Appellate Tribunal they should have filed separate writ petitions in this Court. I do not find any real substance in this objection. The petitioners in- this writ petition are aggrieved by the same order for precisely the same reason. Even if P they had filed separate writ petitions these would have been heard together and disposed of by the same order. In the circumstances 1 am not prepared to throw out their writ petition on the ground that they have been jointly preferred it.
15. In Writ Petition No. 4903 another question also arises for consideration. The petitioners in this petition were stated to have assaulted the Director of the company on 19th July, 1975. The charge-- sheet was served upon them on 29th August, 1975. At the relevant time there was no time limit within which a charge-sheet was required to be served. On 23rd December, 1975 before the orders of dismissal could be made the Standing Order 15 (4) of the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 was amended and the following provision was added thereto, that is, "No order of dismissal shall be made unless the workman concerned is informed in writing of the alleged misconduct within one month of the date of such misconduct ......................
The learned Appellate Tribunal held that as the charge-sheets upon the petitioners were served after the expiry of one month the proceedings taken against them were invalid. It is difficult to subscribe to this view. By its very nature the time limit prescribed in this provision must be treated as of prospective nature, that is, it can apply tot those cases where charge-sheets have not been served before it came into force. To hold otherwise would invalidate all charge-sheets which were served prior to its enactment when there was no time limit and thereby condone all misconduct covered by such charge-sheets. I do not think that such a were and far-reaching result could have been intended by the Legislature. I should, therefore, think that the learned Appellate Tribunal was wrong in holding that no action could be taken against the petitioners because charge-sheets were not served upon them within 30 days of the date of the incident.
16. For the reasons stated above I declare the order of the learned Appellate Tribunal to be without any legal effect. The appeals of the petitioners should be considered as still pending and these should be disposed of in accordance with law. In the circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs.