' MUHAMMAD GHAZANFAR KHAN, J.- Through the instant petition, the petitioners have called in question the order dated 10.11.2015 rendered by learned District Judge, Tank whereby the appeal filed by petitioners against the order dated 30.7.2015 of learned Senior Civil Judge, Tank was dismissed.
2. In essence, respondents Nos.1 to 7 filed a suit against petitioners and proforma respondents for partition, declaration and perpetual injunction in respect of a plot fully mentioned in the heading of plaint. Along with the plaint, they filed an application for temporary injunction. After hearing the arguments, the learned Senior Civil Judge, Tank .Allowed the application by restraining the petitioners and proforma respondents from making any kind of construction or changing the nature of the suit land for a period of six months or till the final decision of the case, whichever is earlier in time, vide order dated 30.7.2015.
3. Aggrieved from the order dated 30.7.2015, the petitioners filed an appeal which was dismissed by learned District Judge, Tank vide order dated 10.11.2015, hence the instant revision petition.
4. Learned counsel for the petitioners argued that the orders of both the Courts blow granting interim injunction in favour of respondents Nos.1 to 7 is beyond jurisdiction and scope of both the Courts below and the orders amount to perpetuate an illegality. He further argued that element of prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable loss, which are necessary for grant of temporary injunction, are missing in the present case, so, the orders of Courts below are liable to be reversed.
5. On the other hand, learned counsel for respondents Nos.1 to 7 argued that respondents have prayed for partition of their share from the suit property and it is imperative to maintain the corpus of litigation as it is more than settled law that unless the joint property is partitioned by metes and bounds, every co-owner/co-sharer would be deemed to have ownership rights in every inch of the suit property and no-one can be allowed to change the nature of the property until and unless it is partitioned by metes and bounds or specific permission is granted by other interested persons.
6. I have heard the arguments of learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the record.
7. Suffice it to say that it is a case of partition and the party seeking partition has been granted interim relief to the extent of restraining the present petitioners and proforma respondents from raising 'construction over the suit property till it is partitioned or six months whichever is earlier. The apex Court in case reported in 1989 SCM R 130 has held that every co-owner in the joint property is interested in each and every inch of joint ownership and no co-owner can take possession of any specific portion or change its character unless the property is partitioned by metes and bonds.
Same view has been confirmed in 1996 CLC 275 (a) and 1999 CLC 598. The learned counsel for petitioners has relied upon 2016 CLC 176. This judgment is of no avail to the petitioners as in the said judgment, it was held by his lordship that:- "The rationale behind this principle is that each co-owner of an undivided property is presumed to be the owner in possession of each inch of the land."
' Similarly, another proposition discussed in the said judgment is that:--- "It would be pertinent to note that there are two exceptions to the general principle discussed hereinabove, where a co-owner cannot seek injunctive relief regarding his proprietary or possessory rights as a co-owner without seeking partition." .So, the rationale behind the ruling, relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioners, is also that the partition is the only solution for a co-owner to use and possess the exclusive ownership over a specific portion of land. In the circumstances, the orders of both the Courts below are correct and in accord with law, hence need no interference.
8. For the reasons mentioned, the instant petition being devoid of substance is hereby dismissed.
However, the learned trial Court is directed to dispose of the present suit preferably within six months after receipt of this order.