1. AZIZ-UR-REHMAN, J.---Regarding issue framed by this court vide order dated 12th December, 2014, it is forcefully contended by the learned counsel for the Plaintiff that the Plaintiff is not a 'customer' of the Defendant Bank, though the Plaintiff has admittedly availed facility of loan from the Defendant Bank in the sum of Rs.25 million [inclusive current outstanding with the Plaintiffs employer] at 3% interest rate per annum. The tenure of loan is 20 years and as agreed was to be serviced-both principal and interest on a monthly basis. [see page 43 of the Court file].
2. Notwithstanding the above, however, Mr. Faisal Siddiqui, learned counsel for the Plaintiff in the above suit, argued that the Plaintiff does not fall within the definition of section 2[c] of F.I.O., 2001, as such the above civil suit has been filed by the Plaintiff inter alia for recovery and damages.
3. ' In contra, learned counsel for the Defendant Bank forcefully argued that admittedly the Plaintiff has availed loan facility from the Defendant Bank, therefore, the issue settled in present civil suit on 22.12.2014 to the effect that "whether this Court in its civil jurisdiction can decide issue 'as to whether the Plaintiff in the instant suit having any relationship of the customer within the meaning of section 2[c] of the F.I.O., 2001? cannot be adjudicated upon properly inter alia in view of the bar contained in subsection (4) of section 7 of F.I.O., 2001.
4. ' For ready reference it would be appropriate to reproduce herein subsection (4) of section 7 of F.I.O., 2001 as under: "[4] Subject to subsection [5], no Court other than a Banking Court shall have or exercise any jurisdiction with respect to any matter to which the jurisdiction of a Banking Court extends under this Ordinance, including a decision as to the existence or otherwise of a finance and the execution of a decree passed by a Banking Court." [Underlining is mine].
5. ' Bare perusal of section 7[4] of the F.I.O., 2001, would show that 'no ' Court other than a Banking Court has or can exercise any jurisdiction with regard to any matter to which the jurisdiction of Banking Court under Ordinance XLVII of 2001 i.e. including, a 'decision' as to the exercise or otherwise, of a finance and the execution of a decree having been passed by a Banking Court extends.
6. ' It is significant to note that F.I.O., 2001 is a special law and over-rides all other laws as per and in view of section 4 of F.I.O., 2001. For ready reference and convenience purposes the same is reproduced as under:- "4. Ordinance to override other laws.---The provisions of this Ordinance shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force."
7. ' If subsection (4) of section 7 of the F.I.O., 2001 is read in juxtaposition of section 4 of F.I.O., 2001, then one can easily reach the conclusion that a question including a decision as to the existence or not existence of finance falls exclusively within the jurisdiction of Banking Court and not of any other court.
8. ' The words, a decision as to the 'existence' or 'otherwise' of loan or finance as implied in subsection
(4) of section 7 of F.I.O., 2001, needs not to be given restricted meanings. The issue, whether the Plaintiff availed any finance from the Defendant Bank or not in my view also falls within the meaning of subsection (4) of section 7 of F.I.O., 2001. The word used 'otherwise' not only extends to the 'existence', 'non-existence', of a 'loan' or 'finance' but also embraces within its' ambit a 'decision' viz-a-viz the question in hand i.e. whether the Plaintiff has availed any finance or not or otherwise, the Plaintiff is a customer of Defendant Bank or not. In the case of Lalchand and 2 others v. Officer on Special Duty, Federal Land Commission and 3 others [1984 CLC 2396], the court while, dilating upon the word 'otherwise', made the following observation:-- "3. ...In our view, also the word "otherwise" in the proviso in question embraces not only transactions in the nature of gifts but also any other transaction whereby right or interest in land is transferred or created. A transfer of land through exchange will also be covered by the word "otherwise".
9. ' Likewise, the meaning of the word 'otherwise' as having been dilated upon in the case of Sardar Abdul Ghafoor Khan and 3 others v. The Federal Land Commission, Islamabad [PLD 1979 Lahore 375] reads as under:-- "3. ... The word "otherwise" according to its dictionary meaning connotes "in any other way" or "any other ways". Its plain ordinary meaning has therefore the effect of enlarging the category of the transactions described by the preceding word or phrase. It is a word of the widest amplitude."
10. ' In view of the above, I am of the view that issue framed by this Court in above suit to the effect 'whether this Court in its' civil jurisdiction can decide an issue as to whether the Plaintiff in the instant suit having any relationship of the customer within the meaning of section 2[c] of the F.I.O., 2001, cannot be appropriately adjudicated upon by the High Court in a civil suit in view of the above express bar contained in subsection (4) of section 7 of F.I.O., 2001. The issue framed on 22.12.2014 in view of the above discussion is answered in negative.
11. ' Under circumstances, the Banking Suit No.1135/2010 [Summit Bank Limited v. Ghufran Atta Khan] tagged with this civil suit bearing Suit No. 662/2010 [Ghufran Atta Khan v. M/s Atlas Bank Limited] is ordered to be de-tagged and thereafter, office is directed to send it back to the Banking Court immediately for decision on merits and strictly in accordance with law.