1. WAHIDUDDIN AHMAD, J.-This review petition is directed against the order of this Court in Civil Petition for Special Leave to Appeal No. 320 of 1969, dated the 8th March 1969. By this order the petition was dismissed as barred by time.
2. The office note showed that the petition was barred by 186 days. The petitioner filed an application for condonation of delay. He was unable to give explanation for the delay in filing the petition for special leave to appeal as late as on the 25th September 1969. This Court held that according to its decision in the case of Kalachand Sikdar and others v. Fazlul Karim Mian and others (16 D L 4 417) the petitioner was only entitled to condo--nation of delay for such time as he has taken in exhausting his remedies in the High Court. It was, therefore, held that he was entitled to condonation of delay up to the 26th July 1969, when he obtained the copy of the order rejecting his application to grant certificate under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent.
3. In this connection it will be noticed that the judgment of the High Court was delivered on the 22nd January 1969. The peti--tioner applied for its copy on the 11th February 1969, which was completed and supplied to him on the 7th March 1969. Lie filed an application for obtaining certificate under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent to file Letters Patent Appeal which was dis--missed on the 17th June 1969. The petitioner applied for its copy on the 17th June 1969, which was supplied to him on the 26th July 1969. He filed petition for special leave to appeal on the 25th September 1969. Thus the question for consideration was whether the petitioner was entitled to condonation of delay in filing the petition for special leave to appeal on the 25th September 1969. The plea of the petitioner that the Court was closed for summer vacation during the month of August 1969, and therefore, under section 4 of the Limitation Act, the petitioner was entitled to claim extension of time up to the re- opening of the Court was taken note of. The petitioner also contended that he was misled by the practice in the High Court that no civil appeal is filed during the vacation and, therefore, the delay in filing the application for special leave to appeal was liable to be condoned. These contentions were repelled by this Court by the above-mentioned order.
4. The petitioner has filed this review petition and has urged the same point as was urged by him when his petition for special leave to appeal was dismissed. Ch. Abdur Rahman, learned counsel for the petitioner, has contended that under section 4 of the Limitation Act, the petitioner is entitled to claim extension of time up to the re-opening of this Court. He also contended that as in the High Court no civil appeal is entertained during the vacation, the petitioner was misled and, therefore, the delay may be condoned under section 5 of the Limitation Act. Both these contentions were considered by this Court and repelled by order dated the 8th December 1969, it cannot, therefore, be said that there is any mistake or error apparent on the face of the record about the view taken by this Court on the above-mentioned two questions. Thus, no ground has been made out to interfere in this matter in the review jurisdiction of this Court.
5. Even otherwise there is consensus of opinion in this sub--continent that a Court cannot be deemed to be closed within the meaning of section 4 of the Limitation Act during a vacation, if for the purpose of the particular business in question the office of the Court is open. In this connection reference may be made to the cases of Kisanlal v. Tansukkrai (AIR 1941 Nag.216), Dharamsi Moraji Chemical Co. Ltd. v. Occhavlal Hargovindas (AIR 1927 Bom.480), Hajab Banu v. Muhammad Shafi (1883 A W N 254), British India Steam Navigation Co. v. Sharafally (AIR 1923 Mad. 435) and Fateh Muhammad v. Chothu Ram (AIR 1921 Lah. 237). It may be mentioned that under the rules of this Court its offices remain opened during the vacation for doing ordinary business. In these circumstances, it cannot be said that the Court was closed during the vacation so as to attract the pro--visions of section 4 of the Limitation Act, The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner was misled by the practice in the High. Court in not accepting civil appeals during the vacation has also no bearing on the facts of the present case. The explanation to section 5 of the Limitation Act, which refers practice prevalent in the High Court has no application Thus any practice of the High Court has no bearing on the filed in this Court. There petition is dismissed.