' The appellant while serving as Chief Consultant Pediatrician (BS-20) in Allama Iqbal Memorial Hospital, Sialkot was proceeded under PEEDA Act, 2006 alongwith four others under following charges:--
(i) He was absent from duty on 30.04.2008 at 11:45 when a child, Haider Sultan was brought in Children OPD of Allama Iqbal Memorial Hospital, Sialkot.
(ii) He showed indifferent attitude towards a serious patient He left the child after examination and did not wait for his recovery.
' Dr. Riaz Ahmed Ch. (PMO/BS-20), Medical Superintendent, Punjab Institute of Cardiology, Lahore was appointed as inquiry Officer vide Order No. S.0(INQ)1-10/2008 dated 11.11.2008. On his retirement from Government service, the Chief Minister appointed Dr. Arshad. Iqbal Dar (PMO/BS-20) Ex- Director Health Services (EPI) as inquiry officer vide order dated 15.06.2010. It is after recommendations of inquiry officer and fulfillment of other codal formalities, the appellant was dismissed from service by the Chief Minister Punjab/Competent authority vide order dated 30.07.2011. The appellant preferred a review petition, which was also rejected by the Chief Minister Punjab, vide order dated 07.07.2014. Consequently, he filed this service appeal on 04.08.2014 on various grounds agitated in the memorandum of appeal.
2. However, during the course of arguments learned counsel for the appellant mainly emphasized on a legal objection that as per Section 9(1)(a) of PEEDA Act, 2006, the inquiry officer required is to be an officer, one rank senior to the accused officer but in the present case not only the appellant but both the inquiry officers appointed by the competent authority one by one were in BS-20. This cuts at the root of the proceedings followed in inquiry which is violation of statutory provision laid down in the PEEDA Act, 2006. Hence, the recommendations of the inquiry officer and the penalty' imposed are not sustainable in the eye of law.
3. On the other hand learned District Attorney assisted by the Law Officer through a better statement placed on behalf of respondents argued that although appellant as well as both the inquiry officers in this case were in BS-20 during the conduct of inquiry proceedings but it is not fatal to the recommendations of the inquiry officers because according to Section 9(1)(a) of the PEEDA Act, 2006, the inquiry officer or the convener of the inquiry committee should be a rank senior to the senior most accused. Whereas, in PEEDA Act, 2006 word "rank" indicates not the grade or pay scale but the official or social status or position of the inquiry officer. Since in this case both the inquiry officers by virtue of their posting were senior in rank to the appellant, hence they were rightly appointed to hold an inquiry against an officer although in same pay scale but posted against a junior post.
4. I have heard the arguments and perused the record.
5. It is an admitted position that in this case not only the inquiry officer but the appellant against whom the inquiry was conducted both were serving in BS-20. The version of respondents is totally misconceived that the word "rank" used in the PEEDA Act, 2006 indicates not the grade (basic pay scale) but the social or official position and standing of an inquiry officer. The word "rank" is visibly indicating the fact that it is used to establish grade or basic pay scale of the officer who is appointed as inquiry officer or convener of the inquiry committee. The relevant provision of PEEDA Act, 2006 reads as under:- "Appointment of inquiry officer or an Inquiry Committee: The Inquiry Officer or the Convener of the Inquiry Committee as the case may be, shall be, a rank senior to the Accused Officer and where two or more accused are proceeded against jointly, the Inquiry Officer or the Convener of the Committee shall be of a rank senior to the senior most accused."
' Since the inquiry in this case is conducted by an officer of the same rank i.e. BS-20 as the accused officer (appellant) was enjoying when he was proceeded departmentally under PEEDA Act, 2006, hence the proceedings conducted so are in fact nullity and violation of statutory provision laid down in the Act ibid, consequently not sustainable.
6. For the reasons recorded above, this appeal is partially allowed, both the impugned orders are set aside and the case is remanded to the competent authority for holding a regular inquiry against the appellant strictly in accordance with law and procedure and within stipulated period.
Resultant, the appellant is reinstated into service. The intervening period be treated as leave of the kind due.