The facts giving rise to the present Constitutional Petition may be briefly stated.
2. The petitioner claims himself to be a lessee in respect of three plots of land measuring 62 kanals, 18 marlas, 10 kanals and 10 marlas and 21 kanals and 5 marlas, as described in paragraph 1 of this petition. The land in question is admittedly Nazul land which is under the Management of the Government of Punjab (respondent No. 1) and had been given to the petitioner on the basis of year to year lease. According to the respondents the latest lease had expired by 30-6-1980. It is also stated by the respondents that action had been taken only in respect of plot of land measuring 62 kanals, 18 marlas. According to the petitioner, respondent No. 2 (Deputy Commissioner, Lahore) served the petitioner with a notice under section 5(1) of the West Pakistan Lands and Buildings (Recovery of Possession) Ordinance. Vide this notice the petitioner was directed to appear on 29- 9-1980 to show cause why he should not be evicted The petitioner does not accept the validity of the notice nor the proceedings initiated on the show-cause notice by the respondent No. 2. In respect of plot measuring 10 kanlas 10 marlas, the petitioner claims to be still in occupation while in respect of land measuring 21 kanlas 5 marlas he stated that he had been forcibly evicted. The sole point that arises for consideration in the present writ petition is whether the petitioner is liable for eviction under section 5 of the Ordinance. The West Pakistan Govern--ment Lands and Buildings (Recovery of Possession) Ordinance IX of 1966 was promulgated on 4-4-1966 to provide for the speedy recovery of possession of Government Lands and Buildings from outgoing lessees and licensees and unauthorised occupants and this is precisely the purpose which has been shown in the preamble of this Ordinance. The term "land" has been defined in section 2(c) in the following words: "Lands" means land which .Vests in or is in the possession or under the Management and control of Government and is used or held for purposes other than agriculture."
The terms "lease" and "lessee" have the same meaning as the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (IV of 1882). The "unauthorised occupant" has been defined in clause (f) of section 2 of the Ordinance as follows:- "Unauthorised occupant" means a person who is in occupation of any land or building without the express permission or authority of the Government."
Section 3 of the Ordinance provides that if, on the expiry of the period of any lease or licence in respect of a land or building of which Government is the lessor or l:censor or on the determination of such lease or licence on the ground of breach of any covenant imposing an obligation on the lessee or licensee to give up possession of the demised land or building required for any public purpose, the lessee or licensee refused or failed, or refuses or fails, to vacate that land or building and put Government into possession of the same, any officer authorised by Government in this behalf may, notwithstanding any thing contained in any other law for the time being in force or in any contract at any time enter upon the demised land or building and recover vacant possession of that land or building by evicting the lessee or licensee and may also demolish and remove the structures, if any, erected or built thereon by the lessee or licensee. It is also provided in section 3 that before demolishing and removing any structures under this section, the Officer was authorised to issue a notice to the lessee or licensee calling upon him to remove such structures within the period specified in the notice. Section 5 relates to the power of the Government to cause eviction of unauthorised occupants and for the sake of convenience may be reproduced below ;
(1) If Government is satisfied after making such enquiry as it thinks fit that person is an unauthorised occupant of any land or building, it may, by order in writing, direct such person to vacate the land or building within the period specified in the order.
(2) If any person refuses or fails to vacate any land or building as directed by an order made under subsection (1), any Officer authorised in this behalf by Government may notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, enter upon such land or building and recover possession of the same by evicting such person and may also demolish and remove the structures, if any, erected or built by that person.
Section 6 provides that for the purposes of recovering land or building under the provisions of section 3 or section 4 or section 5, an officer authorised by Government in this behalf may use or cause to be used such force as may be necessary.
3. In the first instance, a report was called for from respondent No. 2. (Deputy Commissioner, Lahore) and the same was submitted under No. Nazul/475, dated 15-12-1980. In this report, it was disclosed that the land in respect of which the notice had been issued was required for establishing a hospital and a school and the matter was under the active consideration of the Government and a decision in this behalf was soon expected. Paragraph 3 of the report contains the cause of proceedings and it was explained that in the month of August, 1980 it was brought to the notice of the Authorities that the petitioner had constructed one room and a Ahata with four- walls covering an area about 1 kanal, 155 sq. Ft. Without the permission of the Board of Revenue and that he was also a defaulter in the payment of the lease money to the extent of Rs. 11,610 which, however, had been cleared on 22-11-1980. It was, therefore, contended that the petitioner had violated the terms of the lease and it was under these circumstances that the action was taken under the provisions of the said Ordinance. As the report submitted was not comprehensive, therefore the respondents were directed to file parawise comments so that the various contentions raised in the writ petition may be fully attended to. In this report it was admitted that the petitioner had remained a lessee on the basis of year to year lease from 1964-65 till 1979-80 but had not been granted any lease for 1980-81 which fact had been verified from the record produced in Court. The petitioner is only relying upon the doctrine of holding over to justify continuance on the land in dispute. In respect of the properties specified at No. 1, described in clause (1) it was admitted that the land had been given to the petitioner for agricultural purpose only but the lease deed does not specify the purpose for which the land had been given, therefore, the concession made in the parawise comments does not in any way advance the case of the petitioner. It was, however, stated that the construction made on the land measuring 62 kanlas, 18 marlas was in violation of condition No. 7 in the lease deed. It was further submitted that the petitioner had submitted before the Deputy Commissioner in response to the notice and as such could not challenge the validity of the notice in this writ petition. In respect of other two plots of land described in sub-para. (b) it was admitted that the land in question was in occupation of the petitioner and that described in sub-para. (c) was also in also possession of the petitioner.
4. The learned counsel for the petitioner has laid much emphasis on the definition of term "Land" as given in the Ordinance in order to show that since the land had been given to the petitioner for agricultural purposes, he was not liable to be evicted under the provisions of the said Ordinance.
This contention has no legal force. As already stated above the land in dispute had not been given to the petitioner for agricultural purpose. Under clause (7) of the leases deed the petitioner was prohibited from raising any construction on the land in dispute without the permission of the authorities concerned. Having defined the term "land" in clause (c) of section 2 of the Ordinance, section 5 which is operative section empowers the Government to cause eviction of a lessee, licensee or unauthorised occupant from any land. In Mr. Manzur Qadir v. Mst. Amrui Hussain (PLD 1971 Lah. 537), the word `any' was interpreted. It was observed that the word `any' cannot necessarily be equated with 'specific' or `Particular', in the context of subsection (2) of section 10 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, and the word `any' has- to be given the wider meaning because the Government has been given the power to order tire transfer of all or every property in a manner other than the one provided in the Schedule to the Act.
Paragraph 14 of the judg--ment in which the term `any' has been interpreted in the light of its various definitions may be quoted with advantage: "The above submissions appear to us to be devoid of force. The interpretation of the word 'any' as meaning 'specific' or `particular' is neither supported by Judicial Dictionaries nor by dictionaries of the English Language. According to Black's Law Dictionary (3rd Edition)' `any' means some, one out of many, an indefinite number. According to Stroud's Judicial Dictionary `any' is a word which excludes limitation or qualification and is `as were as possible'. According to the Law Lexicon of British India compiled by Aiyyar (1940 Edition), the word `any' have one of several meanings, according to the circumstances it may mean `all', `each, 'every', 'some or more out of several.' In Webster's New International Dictionary of the English language `any has inter alia been explained as `indicating a person, thing, etc., as not a particular or determinate individual of the given category but whichever by chance may select'. Thus, the word `any' cannot necessarily be equated with `specific' or `particular', as suggested by the learned counsel for the appellant. In the context of the relevant Statute it appears that the word `any' has to be given the wider meaning because the Government has been given the power to order the transfer of all or every property in a manner other than one provided in the Schedule to the Act."
"This view finds further support from the use of the omnibus protec--tive expression 'an evacuee house ' in section 30 which clearly reflects the intention of the law-giver, namely, that in this context the word `house' has not been used in its technical sense. As rightly held by the Full Bench on the basis of The Queen v. Rowlands and others (1882) 8 Q B D 530 and Duck v. Bates (1884) 12 Q B D 79 the word `any' is an expression of utmost generality removing all limitations or qualifications. There seems to be no earthly reason as to why the occupants of a big mansion on the mere prospect of its fetching a better price should be denied the statutory protection ordinarily available to the occupant of a house transferred to another in derogation to if not frustration of the principle object of rehabilitation of the refugees."
4. From the above discussion it becomes abundantly clear that under section 5 of the Ordinance Government is legally competent to cause eviction of lessees whose term has expired or who have violated the terms and conditions of the lease and that is the purpose for which the Ordinance had been promulgated.
5. The contention of the petitioner that the doctrine of holding-over was applicable to Government lands and that he shall be deemed to be a tenant in respect of the said land even after the efflux of the period of lease has no merit. The learned counsel for the petitioner relied on Muhammad Yousaf v. Province of Punjab (PLD 1976 Lah. 328). This judgment is of no avail to the petitioner as it was overruled by a D. B. m Writ Petition No. 989 of 1976 decided on 19-12-1978. This judgment is also a complete answer to the contention raised by the petitioner that the petitioner falls under the definition of term 'tenant' and was entitled to the protection under paragraph 25 of M. L. R.-115. Mr. Justice Aftab Hussain who is author of the judgment had taken pains to examine the entire case- law and relying on Wali Muhammad v. State (PLD 1971 Lah. 433), observed that a lessee in respect of the Government land was not entitled to the extension of lease as a matter of right.
6. In a recent judgment reported as Iris Sammuel Gill v. Government of Punjab (PLD 1979 Lah. 467).
Mr. Justice Muhammad Ilyas has also dealt with the question of powers of the Government to cause the eviction of an unauthorised occupant of a Government quarter. Though this case did not relate to the eviction from land but the observations made in respect of section 5 of the Ordinance are relevant "The petitioner's father occupied the quarter in question as a licensee According to subsection (1) of section 4 of the West Pakistan Government Lands and Buildings (Recovery of Possession) Ordi-- nance, 1966 (hereinafter referred to as the Ordinance) his licence stood revoked on his retirement.
Under subsection (2) of section 4 ibid, the petitioner's father was bound to put the Government into possession of the quarter in dispute after the determination of his licence and as he did not do so, the Government is authorised to recover its possession by evicting him. Since his family members, including the petitioner, were inducted into the quarter by him (petitioner's father), after the revocation of his licence each one of them is to be treated as an unauthorised occupant within the meaning of sub-clause (ii) of clause (f) of section 2 of the Ordinance. Under section 5 of the Ordinance, if they refuse or fail to vacate the quarter they can be evicted by the Government.
Section 6 of the Ordinance provides that for the purpose of recovering possession of any land or building under the provisions of section 4 or section 5, an officer authorized by the Government may use or cause to be used such force as may be necessary. According to subsection (2) of section 11 of the Ordinance, no suit is competent against any person in respect of anything which is, in good faith done or intended to be done under the Ordinance."
7. It was submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the action taken by the respondent No. 2, in respect of land measuring 62 kanals, 18 marlas was in violation of the stay order granted by the civil Court on 18-10-1978 in a snit filed by the petitioner against the Government. In the judgment Iris Sammuel Gill v. Government of Punjab it was also held that in view of provisions of section 10 of the said Ordinance civil Court did not have any jurisdiction to grant a stay order in respect of anything done in good faith under the Ordinance.
8. On the basis of the above discussion it may be concluded that the Government. Was authorised to cause the eviction of the petitioner under the provisions of the said Ordinance after the expiry of the lease or on the petitioner's contravening any of the conditions of the lease after service of the notice under section 5. The petitioner has not controverted the fact that respondent No. 2 initiated proceedings in pursuance to the said notice. As a matter of fact the contention raised on behalf of the respondent is that the petitioner had been appearing before the Deputy Commissioner. The proceedings so initiated by the respondent No. 2 after the service of notice under section 6 of the said Ordinance cannot be termed as without lawful authority.
9. No ground has been made out for interference in the exercise of writ jurisdiction. This writ petition has no force and is hereby dismissed with no order as to costs.