' Muhammad Azam Khan, C.J.--The above titled appeal, by leave of the Court, arises out of the judgment of the High Court of Azad Jammu & Kashmir dated 17th October, 2014, whereby revision petition filed by the appellants, herein, has been dismissed.
2. The facts necessary for the disposal of this appeal are that the respondent filed a suit for recovery. Of Rs, 1,38,86,540/- in the Court of District Judge, Bagh on 10.07.2013. During pendency of the suit, the respondent filed an application for grant of amendment in the plaint and temporary injunction. The learned District Judge vide order dated 10.05.2014 allowed the application for amendment and directed the appellants, herein, to furnish security equivalent to Rs,6,49,38,798/-.
Feeling aggrieved, the appellants filed a revision petition before the High Court which was dismissed vide impugned judgment dated 17.10.2014, hence, this appeal by leave of the Court.
3. Mr. Abdul Rashid Karnahi, Advocate, counsel for the appellants, argued that the judgment passed by the High Court is against law and the facts of the case. He stated that the learned High Court while passing the impugned judgment failed to adhere to the provisions of Order II, Rule 2, C.P.C., in its true perspective. He argued that in the first round of litigation, up to the Supreme Court there was no such claim which they sought through amendment. The original suit was filed for recovery of Rs, 1,38,86,540/-, whereas, afterwards it cannot be allowed to add more amount. Even otherwise, the condition imposed by the District Judge was not prayed in the application for amendment and it is settled principle of law that no relief can be granted against the pleadings.
The learned counsel referred to and relied upon the case reported as AJ&K Council & 3 others vs. Messers Paidar Builders [2011 SCR 5951.
' In the case titled AJ&K Council & 3 others vs. Messers Paidar Builders [2011 SCR 5951, this Court has observed that while deciding the application for amendment of the pleadings, facts of the case as well as implication of the proposed amendment are also to be considered. The amendment application cannot be dismissed without considering the whole facts of the case only after discussing General Law on the subject matter. Each and every word of the proposed amendment is to be judged keeping in view the fact that whether the complexion of the suit will be changed or not.
4. While controverting the arguments, Sardar Pervaiz Akhtar, Advocate, counsel for the respondents, submitted that the judgment of the High Court is perfectly legal. He submitted that there are concurrent findings recorded by the Courts below which cannot be disturbed. The learned counsel for the appellants failed to point out any misreading or non-reading of the record. He submitted that under Order XXXVIII, Rule 5, C.P.C., it is discretion of the District Judge to impose any condition.
He strongly argued, that the order of the District Judge dated 30.08.2013, through which the amendment was allowed, has not been challenged before the High court, therefore, this appeal is liable to be dismissed on this sole ground. In continuation of' his arguments, he stated that amended plaint has been filed and the matter is in process. The appeal has been filed only just to linger on the matter which is not warranted under law. The learned counsel while relying upon the case reported as Abdul Hameed vs. Fazil Karim [2011 SCR 269], submitted that amendment can be allowed at any stage even before this Court. He requested for dismissal of the appeal.
' In the case titled Abdul Hawed vs. Fazil Karim [2011 SCR 2691 this Court observed that the application for amendment of pleadings can be made at any stage and the Courts should be liberal in granting permission so that the real controversy should be properly attended to and resolved by the Court to protect the litigants from multiplicity and uncalled for rounds of litigation.
5. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. During pendency of the suit for recovery, the plaintiff-respondent filed an application for amendment in the suit and also requested for direction to the defendant to furnish security. After hearing the parties, the trial Court on 10th May 2014, allowed the amendment and also directed the defendant-appellants, herein, to furnish security equivalent to Rs,6,49,38,798/- before the next date of hearing. This order was challenged by way of revision petition in the High Court which was dismissed.
6. The plaintiff/respondent, herein, is a construction company who was allotted work for the construction of the building of Government College of Education for Women, Bagh, through open tender. The work order was issued on 26th August 2010. The plaintiff after furnishing the security of rupees 9.4 million started the work. The plaintiff/company remained submitting the bills for work done which were duly approved and ultimately when the bill of the company for the work done was not paid up-to 25th April, 2015, amounting to Rs,1,38,86,540/-, then a dispute arose between the parties, the company filed a suit for recovery of the amount. During pendency of the suit, an application for amendment was filed to the effect that up to now, the "company has worked equivalent to the amount of Rs,6,49,38,798/- and company is also entitled for rendition of the accounts. It was also prayed that defendants be directed to furnish security equivalent to the said amount. The Trial Court after hearing the parties, allowed the amendment and directed the defendant-appellants, herein, to furnish the security of the said amount. The appellants challenged the order by way of revision petition in the High Court, which was dismissed.
7. Order VI, Rule 17, C.P.C., governs the amendments of pleadings. It has been observed by this Court in a number of cases that amendment should liberally be granted, provided; (a) it does not alter the complexion of the suit; (b) the proposed amendment is necessary for just decision and resolving real controversy between the parties; (c) the amendment application has not been filed with mala-fide intention and; (d) and by allowing the application the case will not unnecessarily be prolonged. A perusal of original suit as well as the amendment application leaves no doubt that the plaintiff wanted to add further amount in the suit for work they have done later on and the material which the plaintiff has colected for construction. The amendment does not mean that decree has been passed. The amendment appears to be just and necessary for avoiding the multiplicity of the proceeding.
8. The counsel for the appellants laid much stress on the point that under the provisions of Order II, Rule 2, C.P.C., the plaintiff shall include the whole claim in the suit. The argument is not available to the appellants because the plaintiff initially filed suit for recovery of certain amount of work done and before filing the application for amendment he has done some more work and he also collected the construction material on the spot. He wants to include the said relief by way of amendment. The provisions of Rule 2 of Order II, C.P.C, are not applicable. This rule postulates that, every suit shall include the whole of the claim, which the plaintiff is entitled to make in respect of the cause of action and if he fails to include any portion of his claim, he shall be precluded to bring such claim in subsequent suit. Further, if plaintiff omits to pray one of the several reliefs, which is arising from the same cause of action, he shall be barred to pray for such omitted relief in subsequent suit. A party is at liberty to add relief by way of amendment at the later stage which was not available to him at the time of filing of the suit.
9. The trial Court ordered the defendant-appellants, herein, to furnish security equivalent to the amount of Rs,6,49,38,798/-. Rule 5 of Order XXXVIII, C.P.C., empowers the Court to order the defendant to furnish the security for production of the property. We deem it proper to reproduce Rule 5 of Order XXXVIII, C.P.C., which reads as under:- "5. Where a defendant may be called upon to furnish security for production of property.--(1)
Where, at any stage of a suit, the Court is satisfied, by affidavit or otherwise, that the defendant, with intent to obstruct or delay the execution of any decree that may be passed against him--
(a) is about to dispose of the whole or any part of his property, or
(b) is about to remove the whole or any part of his property from the local limits of the jurisdiction of the Court, ' The Court may direct the defendant, within a time to be fixed by it, either to furnish security, in such sum as may be specified in the order, to produce and place at the disposal of the Court, when required, the said property or the value of the same or such portion thereof as may be sufficient to satisfy the decree, or to appear and show-cause why he should not furnish security.
(2) The plaintiff shall, unless the Court otherwise directs, specify the property required to be attached and the estimated value thereof.
(3) The Court may also in the order direct the conditional attachment of the whole or any portion of the property so specified."
10. A perusal of the above referred provisions makes it clear that when the Court is satisfied that the defendant may defeat the decree by disposing the whole or any part of the property before passing of the decree which may be passed against him. He may remove the same from the local limits of the jurisdiction: of the Court, then the Court may direct the defendant to furnish security for the amount which the Court deems proper. Under the codal provisions the trial Court has power to order for security and attachment of the property subject to the satisfaction and the satisfaction is from an affidavit or otherwise. The trial Court after perusal of the record, allowed the amendment of the suit for recovery of Rs,6,49,38,798/- and while deciding the application for security observed that amendment has already been allowed and suit for recovery of Rs, 6,49,38,798/- is already pending and from the affidavit, contents of the plaint and the record, the Court is satisfied that if ultimately the decree is passed in favour of the plaintiff, it will be difficult for him to recover the amount, therefore, passed the order for security in a legal manner.
11. It was argued by the counsel for the appellants that order for furnishing the security is not maintainable because under Order XVIII, Rule 7, C.P.C., the Court may attach the property of the defendant which is within the territorial jurisdiction of the Court. The argument is not available to the appellant because there is no property of the appellant in jurisdiction of the Court and if security is not furnished and ultimately the suit of the plaintiff-respondent, herein, is decreed, it would be difficult to recover the decretal amount. We are fortified in our. View from the judgment titled Mohiuddin Molla vs. The Province of East Pakistan [PLD 1962 SC 119] wherein, it was observed as under: "A power to grant relief necessarily implies power to take all such steps as may be needed to ensure the grant of relief to the plaintiff. Full relief is not granted to a plaintiff by a paper decree. It is only when the decree is satisfied that he gets full relief and the Court has power to pass all such orders as may be required for the satisfaction of the decree unless any such order be expressly or by necessary implication prohibited. Order XXXVIII, Rule 5, should be regarded as a praision which recognizes a Civil Procedure Code, generally speaking, does not create new powers but regulates the exercise of power already possessed by the Court. Even before the Civil Procedure Code was enacted the Civil Court possessed powers of the kind mentioned in the Civil Procedure Code. It possessed these powers because the Civil Court has jurisdiction to determine and protect civil rights and for the protection of those rights the exercise of such powers is essential."
' In the case titled Travel Agents Association of Pakistan vs. M/s Skyline (Pvt.) Travels Ltd. [1992 CLC 16441, It has been observed as under: "....That the Court has to satisfy itself before making any such order that the defendant is about to leave the country or dispose of his property with a view to frustrate or delay the execution of the decree that may be passed against him. But it may be pointed out that such satisfaction can be deduced from the affidavits and from the surrounding circumstances of the case as well.
' I am therefore satisfied that the defendants are intending to leave the country with intent to frustrate or delay the execution of any decree that may be passed against them, and therefore I direct that defendants shall furnish security in the sum of Rs,9,42,848.77 within a period of one month, failing which attachment before judgment shall be issued against Defendant No, 1 in respect of their assets and office premises and the passports of Defendants Nos.2 to 7 shall be impounded."
12. The result of the above discussion is that finding no force in this appeal, it is hereby dismissed with no order as to the costs.
' Before parting with, we may observe that we have come across the judgment of this Court delivered in Appeal No, 257 of 2013, decided on 19th December, 2013 in appeal titled Recent Construction Company vs. Chief Engineer & others. While disposing the stay order matter in the case in hand, we directed the trial Court to dispose of the matter within a period of 3 months. We have noted that despite lapse of 11/2 year, the case could not be decided due to the revision petition in the High Court and the appeal by the appellants, herein, in this Court. The trial Court is directed to decide the matter within a period of 3 months after receipt of order of this Court.