Briefly the facts are that the appellant is a tenant of respondent in respect of the shop premises bearing No. O. T. 8/83, Kagzi Bazar, Karachi. The respondent filed an ejectment application on the ground that the premises is required for the personal use and' occupation of his son, additionally it was also alleged that the premises was originally let out as a godown but the appellant has made alterations without the permission of the respondent and converted it into a shop where he is carrying on business. The learned Controller by his order dated 23rd December, 1979, granted ejectment on the ground that the premises is bona fide required for the personal use of the respondent's son.
2. Mr. Nuruddin N. Ramzan the learned counsel for the appellant has contended that on the basis of the evidence on record the respondent has not been able to establish his bona fide need for use and occupation of the disputed premises. He has contended that the respondent is occupying a shop in which he is carrying on business and there are other shops also belonging to the respondent in the same Urban area, and therefore bona fide need has not been established. He has further contended that the respondent has not stated in his evidence that the shop which he is occupying is not sufficient and suitable for his son's business. Both the submissions of the learned counsel for the appellant are inter-connected and therefore I will deal with them together.
3. The appellant's case is that the respondent's shop is 3 time bigger than the disputed premises in which the respondent is carrying on the business as a cloth merchant. It has been brought out on record that there are other shops also in the same urban area which are owned by the respondent.
The respondent in his evidence has stated that his son Mihammad Saleem is a graduate and unemployed for the last about 3 years. His son wants to establish an independent business of his own and for that purpose he requires the premises in which his son will carry on his business.
Muhammad Saleem has also reiterated these facts and has stated that he wants to establish his independent business and that he is not a partner in his father's business who is running a shop which is situated near the disputed premises.
4. The learned counsel for the appellant contended that the respondent has a very large shop .Sufficient to accommodate his son and that some other shops which are situated in the same urban area belonging to the respon--dents are vacant and therefore the premises are not reasonably and bona fide required by the respondent. It is an admitted position that the respondent has several shops in the building adjacent to the shop where he is carrying on business. The question, however, remains whether those shops are lying vacant and are suitable for the business of his son. The respondent has categorically stated that none of the shops belonging to him are vacant. In this regard the appellant has stated that "I think that some shops are vacant". This statement by itself is so vague and indefinite that it can hardly establish that the shops are vacant. The appellant is carrying on his business in the disputed shop which is close to the shops said to be vacant, but he is unable to state how many shops are vacant. He has not given the number of the shops which are said to be vacant. A mere statement that a person thinks the shop to be vacant does not prove that it is really vacant.
5. Section 13, subsection (3) sub-clause (a)(u), provides that in case of anon-residential building the ejectment will be granted if conditions laid down therein are satisfied. The requirement of the landlord should be in good faith for his own use or the use of his male children. Secondly the landlord or his said child is not occupying in the same urban area in which such building is situated for the purpose of his business any other such building suitable for his needs at the time; and thirdly, the landlord has not vacated such a building without sufficient cause in the said urban area.
6. The respondent has positively stated that he and his son do not occupy any shop or building in the same Urban area. It is true that the respondent owns some shops which are on the same street and other shops are in another building which is adjacent to the shop in which the respon--dent is carrying on his business. The respondent has explained in his statement, the suitability of the disputed premises for the need of his son. The respondent and his son have stated that all the other shops have been rented to other tenants. Those, shops are small and inside but the disputed shop is on the main road side and in front of respondent's own shop. Muhammad Saleem the son of the respondent for whom the disputed premises is required has stated that the disputed shop is opposite and near his father's shop and is located at an important place from business point of view as it is in the main bazar. He has further stated that he has no shop of his own and he is not carrying on any business with his father or any body. He wants to run his independent business. It is thus clearly established A that the other shops owned by the respondent have not been proved to be lying vacant. From the evidence on record it is also established that those shops are not suitable for the business requirements of the respondent's son.
7. The learned counsel for the appellant has contended that the respondent has not stated in his evidence that the shop in possession of the respondent was not suitable for his son. A perusal of the evidence makes it clear that respondent's son wants to establish his own independent business and, therefore it was not necessary to explain why the respondent could not ask his son to run the business as contended by the learned counsel. Mr. K. B. Bhutto the learned counsel for the respondent has submitted that the respon--dent has established the bona fide requirement and it is the prerogative of the landlord to choose which of the shops he requires for his purpose. The learned counsel has relied upon PLD 1977 Lah. 1094, PLD 1975 Lah. 308 and 1973 SCMR 185. In the present case the respondent has proved his personal bona fide and reasonable need and has further established that the disputed shop is more suited for his requirements.
8. The learned counsel for the appellant has contended that the respondent had objected to appellant's use of the premises as a shop and therefore his demand to use it as a shop instead of a godown proves lack of bona fide. The objection of the appellant is that the premises was let out as a godown and as the respondent had objected to its conversion into a shop, the respondent cannot use it as a shop. If the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is accepted and taken to its logical conclusion then it will mean that if a premises has been let out for a particular purpose then the landlord if he requires it for his personal use should use it for the same purpose. It would amount to imposing an embargo on the private rights of the landlord. A landlord is entitled to convert a godown into a shop and a shop into a godown for his own requirement. The appellant's objection in this regard is unjustified.
9. The learned counsel for the appellant further contended that the notice dated 17-4-1976 served by the respondent did not mention that the premises was required for his bona fide use and occupation but soon thereafter ejectment application was filed on this additional ground. In the circumstances according to the learned counsel the requirement of the respondent is not bona fide. But this notice the respondent had asked the appellant to refrain from converting the godown into a shop. It was served only for a specific purpose. Merely because the personal need was not intimated does not lead to the inference that the premises was not required reasonably and bona fide. By cogent and convincing evidence the respondent has categorically proved his bona fide and reasonable requirement and therefore the contention raised on behalf of the appellant has no force.
10. In the circumstances the appeal is dismissed and the appellant is allowed two months time from to day to hand over vacant possession of the disputed premises to the respondent. Parties to bear their own costs.