1. MUHAMMAD AFZAL ZULLAH, 7.-Leave to appeal has been sought from judgment of the Lahore High Court, dated 20-4-1981, whereby a constitutional petition, arising out of the striking off, of the defence of the petitioner (tenant) under section 13 (6) of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 (and his consequential eviction from the property in dispute) was dismissed.
2. Non-compliance with the order of the learned Rent Controller for deposit made under section 13
(6) is not denied. The learned Single Judge in the High Court, after noticing the argument advanced before him, namely, that, "the petitioner was misled by the order passed under section 13 (6)", considered this plea in the context of the proceedings before the learned Rent Controller. He came to the conclusion that the decision on facts by the learned Controller, which was affirmed by the learned first appellate Court, was against the petitioner. It was also held that they had not acted illegally or even with any material irregularity in the exercise of their jurisdiction, and that their orders were not without lawful authority. Therefore, the writ petition was, liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.
3. No doubt a tenant is entitled to an opportunity of showing cause before his defence is struck off ; as held in Din Muhammad and another v. Uma Hayat and others (1), relied upon by the learned counsel, who has now raised contention in this behalf ; but this exercise need not be done in a full- fledged trial as if it were a regular matter being dealt with under the Civil Procedur Code (Municipal Committee, Gujranwala v. Barkat Bibi and S others (2) an Ghulam Muhammad Khan Lundkhor v.
4. Safdar Ali (3). The requirement o the principle of natural justice will be satisfied if the tenant and/or his counsel is made aware of the proceedings or proposed action with regard to the striking of the defence. Once that is done, it is not necessary for Rent Controller to invite, ask or order the tenant to produce evidence. Normally the tenant, when he is made aware of the default with regard to the deposit under section 13 (6), either takes the plea that he has made the deposits and h is granted a short time to produce the receipts. In such cases this would satisfy the requirement of justice regarding opportunity. If, on the other hand, his plea in other than that of deposit, he or his counsel makes the statement in this behalf immediately so as to avoid criticism on the basis of afterthought if he postpones explanation. And, once he is afforded an opportunity to offer an explanation verbal or in writing may be on the same day when the question whether proper deposit has been made or not
(1) (1981) SCMR 326(2) (1979) SCMR 264 arises) it would again satisfy the requirement of justice with regard to oppor--tunity ; unless a genuine and honest request for a short adjournment is sought to produce some material in support of his explanation ; of course; other than that material which in available a. The time when this question arises. If the request for adjournment in this behalf is intended to delay the proceedings and is vexatious the Rent Controller would be duty bound and also perfectly justified to refuse the same ; because one of the purposes of the relevant law is to expedite the disposal of cases brought thereunder. And, on the other hand, if the request merits acceptance, one or two short adjournments would normally be considered enough to decide the . Questions relatable to the deposit of rent and the striking off of the defence. It is necessary to emphasize that while doing so, there is no need to frame issues nor to record evidence in any formal manner. Examination of original documents and/or copies, as also the process of questioning the parties and/or their counsel, normally proves not only helpful but conclusive in this behalf-purpose being always not to incur avoidable delays.
5. In this case it is noted in the impugned order that the matter was adjourned by the learned Rent Controller (on 18-9-1980 to 22-9-1980) for the consideration of the merits of the explanation offered from the petitioner's, side. There was enough time and opportunity to the petitioner to make an explanation, if he so desired and to substantive it by any material other than his own verbal or written statement. If as stated now by the learned counsel, the petitioner was misled by his own counsel (who appeared before the Rent Controller) regarding the language of the order passed under section 13 (6), the counsel could have made a statement in this behalf provided! He wanted to support his client.
6. After hearing the learned counsel, we are satisfied that the striking o6 of the defence of the petitioner by the learned Rent Controller was not without lawful authority. The High Court could not have interfered in its writ jurisdiction, and rightly refused to do so. Therefore, this petition is dismissed as having no force.