' The dispute involved in this case relates to a building site (plot), transferred to one Anwar Ali, under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, hereinafter referred to as the said Act. Anwar Ali sold the site to Sh. Ghulam All who, in turn, transferred the same to Sh.
Meraj Din and his wife, Mst. Nazir Begum. Thereafter, respondents Nos. 3 and 4, Muhammad Ayub and another, purchased the plot from Meraj Din and his wife, Mst. Nazir Begum. Respondents Nos. 3 and 4, hereinafter referred to as the respondents, sought eviction of the petitioners, Haji Bashir Ahmad and others, from the said site. It was alleged by the respondents that the petitioners were their statutory tenants inasmuch as they occupied the site at the time of its transfer in favour of Anwar Ali. It was complained by the respondents that the petitioners had not paid any rent despite their demand. It was denied by the petitioners that the relationship of landlords and tenants existed between the parties, Their plea was, however, repelled by a Rent Controller and, therefore, their ejectment was ordered without going into the question of default. The petitioners went in appeal but without success. They have, therefore, invoked the Constitutional jurisdiction of this Court to assail the orders of the two Tribunals below.
2. It was contended by learned counsel for the petitioners that the petitioners were in adverse possession of the disputed site when it was transferred to the Anwar Ali, the predecessor-in- interest of the respondents, in the year 1962. According to him, their possession was not the one contemplated by clause (6) of section 2 of the said Act and, therefore, section 30 thereof was not attracted. In addition, it was urged by him that the site in dispute did not fall within any of the categories of immovable property specified in section 30. It was, therefore, maintained by learned counsel for the petitioners that the petitioners could not be treated as statutory tenants of the property in dispute.
3. In reply, it was submitted by learned counsel for the respondents that the petitioners were in possession of the disputed site at the time of its transfer. According to him, it was rightly held by the two tribunals below that they were in possession of the property in question as statutory tenants. It was also urged by him that since the respondents were successor-in-interest of the original transferee they were landlords of the petitioners and could, therefore, seek their eviction it was, however, not denied by him that the disputed property was transferred to Anwar Ali as a plot (building site).
4. The word "possession", occurring in section 30 of the said Act, was defined in clause (6) of section 2 thereof. In view of that definition it was incumbent on the respondents to show that the petitioners were in occupation of the disputed site in pursuance of the order of a Rehabilitation Authority or a Custodian or any other officer authorised or permitted by the Central or Provincial Government or there was any notification of the Central Government declaring their possession as possession for the purpose of the said Act. He could not refer to any such order but invited my attention to a notification issued by the Central Government on 13th October, 1959 and referred to in paragraph 2 of the judgment Mst. Chiragh Bibi v. Mst. Rahim Bibi (1). Its full text appears at page 361 of PLD 1959 (Central Statutes Part). According to the said notification, if a person was in undisputed possession of evacuee property before 21st December, 1958, he was also to be deemed to be in possession thereof for the purpose of the said Act. Learned counsel, however, could not point out any evidence showing that the petitioners were in possession of the disputed site before the above date. 1, therefore, agree with learned counsel for the petitioners that the respondents had failed to establish that
(1) PLD 1964 Lab. 137 ' the petitioners' possession of the disputed site at the time of its transfer in favour of Anwar Ali was the possession as contemplated by section 30 of the said Act.
5. As for the other limb of the argument of learned counsel for the petitioners, a perusal of section 30 would show that it deals with houses, shops, industrial concerns, cinema houses and printing presses but not with plots (building sites). I, therefore, agree with the learned counsel that the property in dispute which was transferred to Anwar Ali as building site did not fall within the purview of section 30.
6. The upshot of the above discussion is that since at the time of its transfer the disputed property was outside the ambit of section 30 of the said Act and the petitioner's possession thereof was also not the possession c as envisaged by section 30, they could not he treated as statutory tenants.
There was thus no relationship of landlords and tenants between the parties. In this view of the matter, the order of ejectment made against them is without jurisdiction.
7. Resultantly, I accept this writ petition, and set aside the orders of the two Courts below for being without lawful authority. There shall be no order as to costs.