MUNIB AKHTAR, J.--- By means of this judgment, we intend disposing off the petitions listed in para 6 below. These petitions arise under the Sacked Employees (Re-instatement) Act, 2010 ("2010 Act") and it will be convenient to set out, at the outset, the relevant provisions of the statute. These are as follows: "2. Definitions.- In this Act, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context,- ...
(f) "sacked employee" means --
(i) a person who was appointed as a regular or ad hoc employee or on contract basis or otherwise in service of employer, during the period from the 1st day of November, 1993 to the 30th day of November, 1996 (both days inclusive), and was dismissed, removed or terminated from service or whose contract period was expired or who was given forced golden hand shake during the period from the 1st day of November, 1996 to the 12th day of October, 1999 (both days inclusive); ...
13. Petition to the Review Board.-- (1) A sacked employee, as provided in section 11, may within ninety days of the enactment of this Act, prefer a petition to the Sacked Employees' Review Board for review of such order of sacked employee's dismissal or removal or termination from service on account of absence from duty or misconduct or misappropriation of Government money or stock or unfitness on medical grounds."
2. Learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the petitioners all came within the meaning of "sacked employees" as given above, i.e., in the first paragraph of clause (f) (herein after referred to as the "First Paragraph"). It will be seen that that requires for the concerned person to have been employed within the period first specified ("first period") and for him to have been, inter alia, terminated from service within the second specified period ("second period"). Learned counsel submitted that these two conditions applied in the case of each of the petitioners. It was submitted that the petitioners were employed with the Respondent No.1, the Civil Aviation Authority ("CAA") on daily wages basis. Therefore, they were employees within the "or otherwise" provision contained in the First Paragraph. After the enactment of the 2010 Act, the petitioners sought re-in statement as therein provided. Initially, there was some issue with whether the petitioners came within the scope of the 2010 Act, but ultimately the matter was resolved in their favour by the concerned sub- committee of the Federal Cabinet, whose decision was communicated to the concerned quarters, including CAA, and the position confirmed by the Law Ministry by office memorandum dated 26.04.2013. However, CAA did not re-instate the petitioners in accordance with the 2010 Act, with the result that the petitioners were constrained to file the instant petitions. Learned counsel submitted that their case came squarely within the four corners of the statute and hence they were entitled to appropriate relief from the Court. It was prayed accordingly.
3. Learned counsel for CAA opposed the petitions. It was submitted that the 2010 Act came into force on 08.12.2010 and, as provided in section 3, the necessary application had to be made by the person claiming to be a sacked employee within 90 days. Learned counsel submitted that the petitioners did not come within the scope of the First Paragraph. The reason was that while each stood terminated from service within the second period, none was employed within the first period, as required by the paragraph. Explaining his position, learned counsel submitted that the petitioners were each employed on daily wage basis on a contract for around 89 days (i.e., less than 90 days) and that after each such period lapsed, he was then employed under a separate and fresh contract for a like period, but after a "break" of one or two (i.e., at most a few) days.
However, it was accepted that the first such contract in the case of each petitioner started some time in the first period. In other words, it was the case of CAA that each petitioner was not continuously in employment with it from the relevant date in the first period till the relevant date in the second period, but rather was employed under discrete and separate successive contracts, each of which lasted a bit less than 90 days. It followed from this, learned counsel submitted, that in the case of each petitioner, the period of employment, as reckoned backwards from the date of termination (which fell in the second period) was around 89 days from the latter. But each such date did not fall within the first period. Therefore, the conditions of the First Paragraph did not apply and hence the petitioners were not sacked employees within the meaning of the 2010 Act. Learned counsel further submitted that CAA had non-statutory rules of employment and hence the petitions were not maintainable. It was also submitted that the petitions were hit by laches, since they had been filed several years after the date of the enactment of the 2010 Act. Learned counsel submitted that the petitions ought therefore to be dismissed. Learned DAG, in a very fair statement, submitted that the case sought to be made out by CAA could not be supported.
4. We have heard learned counsel as above and considered the record. The primary ground taken by learned counsel for CAA is that, for the reasons set out above, the petitioners do not come within the scope of the First Paragraph. With respect, we are unable to agree. It may well be the case that there was a practice of employing daily wage employees on successive contracts of employment each of which was less than 90 days, with a one or two day "gap" between each such contract.
Such a practice was (and is) perhaps resorted to in order to ensure that the relevant labor law legislation, which would otherwise change the status of the employee concerned if he were employed for 90 days or more, did not become applicable. We say nothing as to such practice.
However, in our view, it is of no relevance for present purposes. We are concerned only with the provisions of the 2010 Act. It is a piece of beneficial legislation, which must be construed and applied as such. In our view, the proper approach to the First Paragraph is to look at the employment as a whole, provided that it starts in the first period and ends in the second period. It is noteworthy that the First Paragraph does not specifically require that the employment should be literally continuous over the entire period without even a single day's "gap" or "break", and we see no reason why we should read such a limitation into the provision. The matter has to be approached pragmatically, and the concerned person's position viewed holistically. There is no doubt that each of the petitioners was employed with CAA from the first period to the second period. The successive "gaps" in the employment were merely a device or ploy used by CAA to avoid the labor law legislation. But, absent any such consideration, we have no doubt that any reasonable person, looking at the facts and circumstances of each petitioner as a whole, would conclude that they were employed with CAA throughout this period. Put differently, there can be hardly any doubt that, but for the peculiarities of labor law legislation and CAA 's desire to avoid it becoming applicable, there would not have even been the "gaps" and "breaks" that are now sought to be relied upon. We therefore hold that the petitioners came within the scope of the First Paragraph, and the submission to the contrary by learned counsel must, with respect, be rejected.
5. The objection as to maintainability is also, with respect, misconceived. We are here concerned with the applicability or otherwise of the 2010 Act, and not with any provision of the law under which CAA has been constituted or any particular term or condition of any contract of employment with it. The objection as regards lases also, with respect, fails to impress. The record shows that the final decision was taken at the Cabinet level and even confirmed by an opinion of the Law Ministry sometime in 2013. The petitions have been filed in 2014. There are no laches. It is clear that the petitioners never gave up the right they were claiming under the 2010 Act. Finally, we may note that during the course of submissions learned counsel for CAA referred to section 13(1) and submitted that the petitioners had failed to make applications before the Review Board. A bare perusal of the said provision shows that it applied only in those contingencies as are given in the last part of the subsection. In other words, if any of those contingencies did not apply to the concerned sacked employee, he did not need to apply to the Review Board in terms of section 13(1). No such allegation has been made against any of the petitioners and therefore the cited provision does not apply.
6. This judgment shall apply to the following petitions: C.Ps. Nos D- 296,297,298,299,300,301,301,302,303,304,305,306,307,308,309,310,311,312,313,314,315,316,317,318,all of 2014
7. In view of the foregoing, we conclude that the petitioners have made out a case of relief under the 2010 Act. These petitions are allowed. Accordingly, they are declared to be sacked employees within the meaning and for purposes of the 2010 Act. It is further declared that they stand re- instated and regularized in terms of the applicable clause of section 4 of the 2010 Act and must (subject to S.9) within 30 days hereof be issued a letter of re-in statement (to be delivered either personally against acknowledgement or by courier service with proof of delivery) for the purposes of section 8 and be allowed to resume duties within 90 days of such letter. For the aforesaid purposes the petitioners shall either individually or collectively, by courier service, within one week supply his/their latest address to the Respondent No.1 through its Director General along with a certified copy of this judgment. Each petitioner shall be entitled to the payment of compensation computed mutates mutants in terms as would be applicable under section 16. Each petitioner shall also be entitled to all other benefits to which he may be expressly entitled by or under the 2010 Act, but subject to section 19 thereof and shall not of course be entitled to any double benefit.