' RAJA SAEED AKRAM KHAN, J. -- Through the instant appeal, by leave of the Court, the appellants have challenged the judgment of the High Court dated 6.8.2015, whereby the writ petition filed by respondents No, 1 and 2, herein, has been accepted.
2. Succinctly, the facts leading to this appeal are that this Court while delivering the judgment in a case reported as Bashir Ahmed Mughal v. Azad Government and 6 others (2014 SCR 1258), declared partially the provisions of Section 3 of the Azad Jammu & Kashmir Shariat Court Act, 1993, as ultra wires the Interim Constitution Act, 1974 (hereinafter shall be referred as Act, 1974), set aside the appointments of the Judges made on the strength of the provisions of said section and also issued some directions therein, to the Government. Thereafter, an Ordinance (No, XVIII of 2014) for amendment in the Azad Jammu & Kashmir Shariat Court Act, 1993, was promulgated by the worthy President of Azad Jammu & Kashmir on 12.12.2014, which inter alia, contained the provisions regarding appointment of Judges of the Shariat Court after consultation with the Hon'ble Chief Justice of Azad Jammu & Kashmir and the learned Chief Justice of the Shariat Court. The appointment, Notification of appellants No, 4 and 5 was issued on 27.3.2015, which was amended through another Notification issued on 28.3.2015. Respondents No, 1 and 2, herein, filed a writ petition before the High Court challenging the vires of the Azad Jammu & Kashmir Shariat Court (Amendment) Ordinance (No, XVIII of 2014) and appointment Notification of the Judges of the Shariat Court (appellants No, 4 and 5, herein). The version of the respondents-petitioners, therein, was that the afore-mentioned Amendment Ordinance and the appointment Notification have been issued against the spirit of the judgment of this Court delivered in the supra case, ultra vires the Act, 1974 and also against the spirit of independence of judiciary. The learned High Court vide impugned judgment dated 6.8.2015 while accepting the writ petition, set aside the Shariat Court (Amendment) Ordinance (No, XVIII of 2014) as well as the appointment Notification of appellants No, 4 and 5, herein. Hence, this appeal by leave of the Court.
3. Mr. Abdul Rashid Abbasi, Advocate, appearing for the appellants submitted that the impugned judgment of the High Court is against law, rules and the principles of natural justice which is not sustainable in the eye of law. He contended that the impugned judgment is based on misinterpretation of the provisions of the Act, 1974 as well as Azad Jammu & Kashmir Rules of Business, 1985. He added that Ordinance (No, XVIII of 2014) and the appointment Notification of appellants No, 4 and 5 have been struck down by the learned High Court mainly on the ground that Ordinance (No, XVIII of 2014) has been issued in violation of Azad Jammu & Kashmir Rules of Business, 1985, whereas, neither such ground was agitated in the memo. Of writ petition nor the same was argued at the time of hearing, the arguments in the writ petition. He added that the aforesaid point has been taken-up by the High Court suo motu, but on this point no opportunity of hearing was provided to the appellants which otherwise is against the principle of natural justice.
Furthermore, the point which has not taken in the pleadings, cannot be resolved as it is settled principle of law that no relief can be granted beyond the pleadings. He further submitted that the learned High Court also summoned the record relating to the promulgation of Ordinance and examined the same without any information to the appellants. In continuation of the arguments, he contended that although placing the Ordinance before the Cabinet could be deemed to be necessary before introducing the same in the Legislative Assembly, however, failure to place the same before the Cabinet did not affect the promulgation of the Ordinance, but the learned High Court failed to understand this legal proposition in its true perspective. He added that no illegality has been committed while promulgating the Ordinance as the President is fully empowered under Act, 1974 to legislate through Ordinance and the only condition is that when the Assembly is not in session. Admittedly, at the time of making and promulgation of Ordinance, the Assembly was not in session which reflects the bona fide on the part of the issuing authority. He forcefully contended that the impugned judgment regarding making of and promulgation of the Ordinance is self- contradictory as in the majority judgment, it has been declared that "making" and "promulgation" of the Ordinance are two different steps, but while declaring the Ordinance as ultra vires the Act, 1974 treated the same as one step and held that there should be no session of the Assembly from the date of making the Ordinance till its promulgation. He added that the Ordinance has been struck down by the High Court on account of violation of the provisions of Act, 1974, but no such violation has been pointed out in the impugned judgment. The learned High Court has failed to take into account that the process of consultation and appointment of appellants No, 4 and 5 being in accordance with the provisions of the Shariat Court Act, 1993 (as amended through the impugned Ordinance) and in accordance with the spirit of the judgment of the apex Court in Bashir Ahmed Mughal's case (supra), could not be struck down. He added that the learned High Court has not read the record as a whole, rather the High Court read the same in parts as the learned High Court only reproduced the dissenting note made by one of the Member of Legislative Assembly and has not discussed the opinion of the other Members. Even otherwise, it was not the job of the High Court to discuss the Legislative Assembly's proceedings. The learned counsel for the appellants left the other points regarding authenticity of the affidavit appended with the writ petition in support of the contents of the writ petition; whether the same was attested by a competent person or not, and the consultation process. He lastly argued that the direction issued by the High Court for introducing the draft bill for amendment of Act, 1974 within 30 days, is beyond the jurisdictional competence of the High Court as legislation including the amendment in the Constitution, falls in the competence of the legislature only. In this way, the impugned judgment is without jurisdiction and also agairct the sprit of the judgment of the apex Court in apex Court in Bashir Ahmed Mughal's case (supra). He has relied upon the cases reported as Dr. Muhammad Akram v. Allotment Committee, Mirpur Development Authority (PLD 1985 S.C. (AJ&K) 113), Muhammad Ameen v. Muhammad Younas (1993 SCR 340), Azad Government and 3 others v.
Genuine Rights Commission AJ&K and 7 others (1999 SCR 1), Zahida Mehmood v. Muhammad Sabir Khan and 5 others (2000 SCR 78), Board of Trustees and another v. Muhammad Azam Durani (2004 SCR 401), Azad Government and 3 others v. Ayesha Shoukat and another (2011 SCR 119), Ehtezaz Asghar and another v. Ch. Muhammad Sajawal and 2 others (PLJ 2012 S.C. (AJ&K) 132), Inayatultah v. Capt. (Retd.) lnayatullah Khan and another (PLD 1985 S.C. (AJ&K) 85), Azad Government v. Haji Abdul Rashid and others (1999 SCR 345), Syed Mumtaz Hussain Naqvi and 9 others v. Raja Muhammad Farooq Haider Khan and 4 others (2014 SCR 43), Muhammad Tariq Khan v. The State (1997 SCR 318), Meer Haider Shah v. Azad Government and others (1992 SCR 320), The State of Orissa and others v. Bhupendra Kumar Bose and others (AIR 1962 S.C. 945), R.K. Garg v. Union of India and others (AIR 1981 S.C. 2138) and S.P. Gupta v. M. Trkunde (AIR 1982 S.C. 149).
4. Conversely, Raja Sajjad Ahmed Khan, Advocate, the learned counsel for the respondents strongly opposed the arguments addressed by the learned counsel for the appellants. He submitted that the appellants failed to point out any legal defect in the impugned judgment. He contended that in the writ petition, the respondents, herein, specifically challenged the vires of the impugned Ordinance on the ground that the same is in conflict with Act, 1974, Azad Jammu & Kashmir Rules of Business, 1985 and is also against the spirit of the judgment of the apex Court delivered in Bashir Ahmed Mughal's case. He added that no step has been taken in pursuance of the judgment of this Court of appointment of Aalim Judge and also failed to furnish any reason for the establishment of Shariat Court as this Court has already observed in the judgment supra that present structure of the Shariat Court failed to achieve the object of Shariat Court Act, 1993. After such findings, the said Act has impliedly been declared ultra vires Act, 1974. Moreover, the respondents, herein, also taken the ground that the official appellants, herein, have made and promulgated the Ordinance in violation of the judgment of the apex Court to induct the persons of their own choice and also proved before the High Court that the Ordinance has been issued in violation of Azad Jammu & Kashmir Rules of Business, 1985. Thus, the argument of the learned counsel for the appellants that no such point was agitated before the High Court is contrary to the pleadings of the parties and against the record. While relying upon a case reported as Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan v. Arshad Mehmood and 9 others (2013 SCR 929), he submitted that even without challenging the vires of any law, if it comes to the notice of the Court that any piece of legislation is lacking the Constitutional backing or is promulgated without Constitutional competence, the same may be declared ultra vires the Constitution or ignored. He added that it is an admitted fact that the impugned Ordinance has not been placed before the Cabinet prior to its promulgation, which is a mandatory requirement of Rule 23 of the Azad Jammu & Kashmir Rules of Business, 19b5. In this way, the learned High Court has rightly held that the official respondents, appellants, herein, have failed to follow the due course of law. He added that the argument of the learned counsel for the appellants that prior to record the findings upon Rule 23 of the Azad Jammu & Kashmir Rules of Business, 1985, no opportunity of hearing was provided to them, is not supported by law as the learned High Court has ample power to call for the record of any case and if some law points are involved the same can be resolved by the High Court without affording an opportunity of hearing.
While drawing the attention of this Court towards different paragraphs of the judgment delivered in Bashir Ahmed Mughal's case, he submitted that the official appellants, herein, were bound to take necessary steps in the light of the directions/guidelines given by this Court in that judgment but they failed to do so and issued the impugned Ordinance in a hasty manner. The impugned Ordinance was issued against the spirit of the judgment of the apex Court, therefore, the learned High Court was fully justified to hold that the Ordinance was promulgated in disregard of the judgment of the apex Court. He added that after placing the matter before the Legislative Assembly there was no occasion to make legislation on the subject which was already pending at the competent forum which itself shows the mala fide on the part of the appellants, because no such task was given by this Court in Bashir Ahmed Mughal's case. This Court while directing the authority to appoint/empower the Judges of the High Court as Judges of the Shariat Court, was conscious of all aspects involved in the matter. He has relied upon the cases reported as Syed Mumtaz Hussain Naqvi and 9 others v. Raja Muhammad Farooq Haider Khan and 4 others (2014 SCR 43), The Collector of Customs, Karachi and others v. Messrs New Electronics (Pvt.) Limited and 59 others (PLD 1994 S.C. 363), Mst. Sushila Devi v. Madan Mohan and another (AIR 1960 Allahabad 546) and Syed Fayyaz Hussain Qadri v. The Administrator Lahore Municipal Corporation, Lahore and 4 others (PLD 1972 Lahore 316).
5. We have heard the arguments of the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the record alongwith the impugned judgment. In the light of the arguments, the moot point as emerged in this appeal, is the vires of the Ordinance under the provision of which appellants No, 4 and 5, herein, claim their appointments. To appreciate this proposition, the stand of the appellants taken in the written statement and written arguments is of vital importance. Appellants No, 1 to 3, herein, in their written statement before the High Court have categorically taken the stand in pars 2 that Ordinance (No, XVIII of 2014) has been made and promulgated quite in accordance with the dictum laid down by the apex Court. The relevant portion of the said paragraph reads as under:- "to remove the vacuum and establish. Shariat Court according to direction of the apex Court on urgent basis, Ordinance (No, XVIII of 2014) has been promulgated which is quite in accordance with the dictum of the apex Court as contained in the aforesaid judgment."
' They have also categorically mentioned in pars 5 of the written statement that:-- "The Ordinance has since been presented in the Legislative Assembly in shape of a bill. It is totally incorrect that appointments of the learned Judges of the Shariat Court were made hurriedly. The appointments have been made after due process in accordance with the direction of the Hon'ble Supreme Court."
' Whereas, appellants No, 4 and 5, herein, in ground "G" of their written statement before the High Court have stated the background of the case in the following manners:- "It is respectfully submitted that session of the Assembly was convened on 9.12.2014 and the Ordinance No, XVIII was laid before the Assembly on 10.12.2014 and on the same date the Ordinance was sent to the Select Committee. The session of the Assembly was adjourned sine die on 11.12.2014.
The letter of Secretary Law dated 8.12.2014 (Annexure "RC/1") is appended herewith whereby, the Ordinance No, XVIII was sent to the Secretary Assembly and the Notification dated 11.12.2014 (Annexure "RC/2") is placed on record showing that the session of the Assembly was adjourned sine die. It is respectfully submitted that the promulgation of the Ordinance was affected from 12.12.2014 while publication of the same into the Gazette of Azad Jammu and Kashmir on 12.12.2014.
The Azad Jammu and Kashmir Assembly was not in session on 12.12.2014."
' In ground "J", of the written statement they have taken the stand that through Ordinance No, XVIII, the Ordinance No, XVII, promulgated on 12.12.2014, was repealed. The relevant ground of the written statement reads as under:-- "(J) It is worthwhile to submit that through the Ordinance No, XVIII, which was promulgated on 12.12.2014, the Ordinance No, XVII which was also promulgated on 12.12.2014 (kindly see Gazette No, 105, Annexure "RD") was repealed. The juxta-position perusal of Ordinances No, XVII and No, XVIII would show that the amendment in Section 3(2) of Shariat Court Act, 1993 was of similar nature in both the Ordinances. It, therefore, follows that provision of Section 3(2) of Shariat Court Ordinance amended through .Ordinance XVII was also effective till 12.12.2014, the date of promulgation of the Ordinance XVIII. Keeping in view the whole state of affairs, it is quite clear that the Ordinance No, XVIII of 2014 was never promulgated on a date to which the Assembly was in session."
' It will also be useful to reproduce here the relevant paragraphs, i,e,, 2, 3 and 7 of the written arguments filed on behalf of appellants No, 4 and 5, herein, before the High Court which reads as under:-- "2. In compliance to the aforesaid provision of law firstly Ordinance XVII of 2014 was made on 21.11.2014, which was repealed through Ordinance No, XVIII of 2014 which was made on 1.12.2014. Both the Ordinances were published in official Gazette No, 105, 107 simultaneously on 12th December, 2012 (Annexure "PA" with the Writ Petition and Annexure "RD" with the written statement of the respondents No, 5 and 6). Perusal of both the Ordinances in juxta-position would show that amendment in Section 3(2) of Shariat Court Act,. 1993 was of similar nature which provided a consultative process required to be undertaken for the appointment of the Judges of the Shariat Court.
3. Ordinance No, XVII made on 21.11.2014 was not introduced as a Bill before the Legislative Assembly, rather before promulgating on 12.12.2014, the provisions of Ordinance. XVIII of 2014 which was made on 1.12.2014 was laid before, the Legislative Assembly on 9.12.2014 and the Assembly constituted a Selection Committee on 10.12.2014 (Annexure "RC/2" appended with the written statement of respondents 5 and 6).
' It is worthwhile to submit that Ordinance made on 1.12.2012 was promulgated on 12.12.2012 and prior thereto the contents of the Ordinance were laid as a Bill before the Legislative Assembly. The introducing of the bill of the Ordinance before its promulgation does not mean that the Ordinance could not be promulgated on 12.12.2014 on a date when the Assembly was not in session
4. .
5. .
6. .
7. Since on introduction of a Bill on 9.12.2014, the Assembly did not pass a resolution disapproving the Ordinance, rather the Assembly constituted a Select Committee, in this view of the matter mere laying the Ordinance at the floor of the Assembly and constituting the Select Committee shall not the floor of the Assembly and constituting the Select Committee shall not be deemed to passing the resolution disapproving the Ordinance. The provision of Section 41, Interim Constitution Act has not been violated in any manner, therefore, from the date of promulgation of the Ordinance i,e, 12.12.2014 and till the expiration of, four months Le.
12.4.2015, the Ordinance shall have the same force and effect as an Act of the Assembly and in this perspective of the matter the Ordinance was having force of law when the consultative process was completed as well as when the appointment of the respondents No, 5 and 6 was notified vide Notification dated 27.3.2015, the date to which the Ordinance No, XVIII was having the force of law: The Ordinance shall be deemed to have been repealed at expiration of four months and in this view of the matter Section 56-C(c) read with Section 5(C)(E) and Section 6-A of General Clauses Act provides, where a law is repealed or is deemed to have been repealed, by under or by virtue of this Act the repeal shall not affect any right, privileges, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under the law. Since, during currency of the Ordinance the respondents 5 and 6 were appointed, a right has. Accrued to the respondents 5 and 6 and the privileged has also been extended to the respondents 5 and 6, therefore, irrespective of the expiry of Ordinance during statutory period, the appointment of the humble respondents is protected."
' Leaving aside the contention of the respondents, herein, according to the pleadings and written arguments of the appellants, herein, the admitted position is that the first Ordinance was made on 21.11.2014 and till 12.12.2014 the same was not promulgated and before its promulgation, through another Ordinance made on 1.12.2014, the same was repealed. Moreover, before promulgation of Ordinance made on 1.12.2014, the same was introduced in Assembly as a Bill. As the learned counsel for the appellants has waived the other points taken in memo. Of appeal and only focused on proposition of vires of the Ordinance and spirit of Bashir Ahmed Mughal's case (supra), therefore, in our view, to resolve the controversy, following questions require resolution by this Court:--
(i) Whether Ordinance (No, XVIII of 2014), was made and promulgated according to the spirit of Act, 1974 or not, and
(ii) Whether the judgment of this Court delivered in Bashir Ahmed Mughal's case (2014 SCR 1258), has been implemented in letter and spirit while enacting the Ordinance (No, XVIII of 2014) or not?
' To appreciate the first point, whether sub-Constitutional legislation has been made in accordance with the spirit of Act, 1974 or not; we have gone through the record. In the light of hereinabove, discussed facts, the relevant portions of the pleadings of the parties as well as the written arguments, we have to judge the wires of the Ordinance (No, XVIII of 2014), in the light of Section 41 of the Act, 1974. For proper appreciation the relevant provisions of Ordinance (No, XVIII of 2014) are reproduced as follows:-- "2. Amendment of Section 3, Act IX of 1993. In the Azad Jammu & Kashmir Shariat Court Act, 1993 (Act IX of 1993), in Section 3, following amendments shall be made:--
(i) Sub-section (2) shall be substituted as under:--
(2) The Court shall consist of the Chief Justice and two or more Muslim Judges to be appointed by President after consultation with the Chief Justice of Azad Jammu & Kashmir and the Chief Justice of Shariat Court: ' Provided that a Judge of High Court may be appointed as a Judge of Shariat Court for a period not exceeding three years."
(ii) Sub-section (4), shall be substituted as under:--
(4) A person shall not be appointed as a Judge of Shariat Court unless--
(a) he has for a periods, or for periods aggregating, not less than ten years been an Advocate or Pleader of the High Court or High Court in Pakistan, Or
(b) he has for a period of not less than ten years held a judicial office out of which not less than three years shall have been as District and Sessions Judge; and
(iii) After sub-section (4), substituted as above, a new sub-section (4-A) shalt be added as under- - '(4-A) One shall be an Aalim Judge having at least fifteen years experience in Islamic Law research or instruction.'
(iv) After sub-section (5), a new sub-section (5-A) shall be added as under:-- '(5-A) A Judge of Shariat Court shall not be removed from his office except in the like manner and on the same grounds as a Judge of the High Court under the Interim Constitution Act, 1974.'
3. Repeal. -- The Azad Jammu & Kashmir Shariat Court (Amendment) Ordinance, 2014 (Ordinance XVII of 2014) is hereby repealed."
' After going through the measures initiated for sub-Constitutional legislation, discussed in the preceding paragraph, the question of the validity of legislation does arise. To appreciate this aspect, it would be appropriate to examine the relevant provision of Act, 1974, i,e,, Section 41, which reads as under:-- "Power to make Ordinance. -- (1) The President may, except when the Assembly is in session, if satisfied that circumstances exist which render it necessary to take immediate action, make and promulgate an Ordinance as the circumstances may require.
(2) An Ordinance promulgated under this section shall have the same force and effect as an Act of the Assembly and shall be subject to like restriction as the power of the Assembly to make law, but every such Ordinance--
(a) shall be laid before the Assembly and shall stand repealed at the expiration of four months from its promulgation or, if before the expiration of that period a resolution disapproving it is passed by the Assembly, upon the passing of that resolution; and
(b) may be withdrawn at any time by the President.
(3) Without prejudice to the provisions of sub-section (2), an Ordinance laid before the Assembly shall be deemed to be a Bill introduced in the Assembly.
(4) The President shall likewise, except when the Council is in session, if so advised by the Chairman of the Council, make, promulgate and withdraw an Ordinance as the circumstances may require.; and the provisions of sub-section (2) and sub-section (3) shall apply to the Ordinance so made as if reference therein to Act of the Assembly and Assembly were references respectively to Act of the Council and Council."
' The careful study of the above reproduced provision postulates that the same vests the power in the President to promulgate an Ordinance if the President is satisfied that existing circumstances render it necessary to bring forth an emergent legislation. The powers conferred on the President to issue Ordinance are exercisable in the nature of an emergency which render it necessary for taking immediate action and such action becomes necessary at a time when the Legislative Assembly is not in session. However, while invoking this provision, the President cannot overreach the Assembly to do what the Assembly cannot do in exercise of its legislative power. It is settled law that once Ordinance has been validly promulgated, the same has the same force and effect as of an Act of the Assembly, however, if the same is not laid before the Legislative Assembly and approved, it shall lapse on the expiry of four months. Meaning thereby, that an Ordinance validly promulgated bears the life of four months. The power of the President under Section 41 of Act, 1974 regarding promulgation of Ordinance came under consideration of this Court in a case reported as Syed Mumtaz Hussain Naqvi and 9 others v. Raja Muhammad Farooq Haider Khan and 4 others (2014 SCR 43), wherein it has been observed that:-- "The plain reading of Section 41 of the Constitution Act shows that the President is empowered to promulgate the Ordinance; (a) when the Assembly is not in session; (b) when the President is satisfied that circumstances exist which require immediate action, then he may make and promulgate an Ordinance. The powers vested in the President under Section 41(1) are not unfettered. The powers of the President are subject to same restrictions which apply to the Assembly to make the laws. Further restriction is imposed that the Ordinance shall be laid before the Assembly and at the expiration of a period of four months from its promulgation it shall automatically stand repealed. Further powers is vested in the President that he may withdraw the Ordinance at any time. The conditions for issuing an Ordinance, thus, may be summarized that when the Assembly is not in session and the President is satisfied that the circumstances exist which render immediate action, he may promulgate an Ordinance. The existence of circumstances for satisfaction of the President taking immediate action is necessary."
' From the bare reading of Section 41 of the Act, 1974 and the case-law cited hereinabove, it is crystal clear that although, the President has the powers to promulgate an Ordinance, however, these powers are subject to some conditions and are not unguided. First condition is the satisfaction by the President that the existing circumstances render it necessary to take immediate action and the second condition is that the Legislative Assembly is not in session. The ingredients attached with the first condition are; the emergent situation and immediate action. It is pertinent to mention here that primary law making authority under the Constitution is the Legislature, however, the possibility cannot be ruled out that when the Legislature is not in session the circumstances may arise which render it necessary to take immediate action and in such a case in order to secure the public interest till the matter is brought before the Assembly (the Legislature) the President It can make laws through temporary legislation. As the power to promulgate an Ordinance is essentially a power to be used to meet an extra-ordinary situation, therefore, to consider the point, whether such extra-ordinary situation was available which constrained the President to exercise powers under Act, 1974, we have examined the case from this angle. This Court consciously directed the authorities in Bashir Ahmed Mughal's case (supra), to appoint the Judges of the High Court as Judes Shariat Court. After appointment of the Judges of the High Court as Judges Shariat Court vide Notification dated 13.2.2015 there was no such vacuum existing in absence of the Judges of the Shariat Court as the High Court's Judges were performing the duties of the Shariat Court Judges efficiently. The appointment notification of the Judges of the High Court as Judges Shariat Court dated 13.2.2015 further speaks that the Judges of the High Court are being appointed as Judges Shariat Court till the making of proper legislation, which itself proves the fact that even appellants No, 1 and 2, herein, have also not treated the Ordinance as proper legislation.
Thus, no emergent situation was existing. In such state of affairs, after laying of the Ordinance in shape of Bill before the Legislative Assembly, the Ordinance cannot be promulgated, thereafter.
Here, we would also like to discuss another surprising aspect of the case that an Ordinance was made and promulgated to meet the extraordinary situation, however, after promulgation, the Ordinance remained ineffective and the same was near to complete its Constitutional life when the appointment notification of appellants No, 4 and 5 was issued, meaning thereby, that no emergent circumstances were existing which constrained the President to exercise the powers under Section 41 of Act, 1974. The second ingredient attached to the said condition is, the immediate action. In the instant case, whether the action taken by the President was immediate or not; to resolve this point, it will be useful to consult the dictionary meaning of the word 'immediate' because this term is not defined in the statute.
' In Chamber's 21st Century Dictionary (page 674), the word 'immediate' has been defined as follows:--
1. Happening or done at once and without delay my immediate reaction
2. Nearest or next in space, time, relationship, etc. The immediate family the immediate vicinity.
3. Belonging to the current time; urgent deal with the immediate problems first.
4. Having a direct effect and without anything coming in between the immediate cause of death O 16c: from Latin immediatus, from mediare to be in the middle."
' In the Concise Oxford Dictionary the, new Edition for the 1990 (page 589), the word 'immediate' has been defined as under:-- "/I'mi:ot/ adj.
1. Occurring or done at once or without delay (an immediate reply).
2. Nearest, next; not separated by others (the immediate vicinity; the immediate future; my immediate neighbour).
3. Most pressing or urgent (our immediate concern was to get him to hospital).
4. (of a relation or action) having direct effect; without any intervening medium or agency (the immediate cause of death).
5. (of knowledge) intuitive, gained without reasoning. Immediacy n. Immediateness n.[ME f. F immediate or LL immediatus (as In-1, MEDIATE)]."
' In Webster's Third New International Dictionary Unbridged and Seven Language Dictionary (page 1129), the word 'immediate' has been defined as under:-- "1 a. Acting or being without the intervention or another object, cause or agency: DIRECT, PROXIMATE (the cause of death) b: of or relating to psychic immediacy : being or occurring without reference to other states or factors : INTUITIVE (knowledge) 2 of relations between persons a: having no individual intervening : being next in line or relation : not secondary or remote (the parties to the quarrel) (only the family was present) (your are most to our throne Shak). B: standing in or being the relation of vassal and lord when the one holds directly of the other 3 a: occurring, acting, or accomplished without loss of time : made or done at once : INSTANT (an need for help) (agreed to an marriage) b of time near to or related to the present (sometime in the past) (the future is uncertain) 4: characterized by contiguity : existing without intervening space or substance (bring the chemicals into contact very cautiously); broadly : being near at hand : not far apart or distant (hid the money in the neighbourhood)."
' In 21st Century Practical Dictionary English to. English & Urdu (page 451), the word 'immediate' has been defined as follows:-- "(imediayt) adj.
1. Proximate 2. Instant 3. Close in time or space {{URDU TEXT}} received an immediate answer to our proposal. Immediate neighbour. {{URDU TEXT}} ' In the Dictionary of Law (English - Urdu) with legal and Islamic Maxims Dictionary, Compiled and Edited by Shazia Naz, Advocate High Court (page 432), the word 'immediate' has been defined as {{URDU TEXT}} ' In the Balck's Law Dictionary with Pronunciations Sixth Edition (page 749), the word 'immediate' has been defined as under:-- "Present; at once; without delay; nor deferred by any interval of time. In this sense, the word, without any very precise signification, denotes that action is or must be taken either instantly or without any considerable loss of time. A reasonable time in view of particular facts and circumstances of case under consideration. Next in line or relation; directly connected; not secondary or remote. Not separated in respect to place not separated by the intervention of any intermediate object,. Cause, relation, or right. Thus we speak of an action as prosecuted for the "immediate benefit" of A., of a devise as made to the "immediate issue" of B. Etc."
' In N.S. Bindra's Interpretation of Statutes, Seventh Edition (page1070), the word 'immediate' has been defined as follows:-- "The words 'forthwith' and 'immediately' have the same meaning. They are stronger than the expression 'within a reasonable time' and imply prompt vigorous action without any delay and whether there has been such action in a question of fact having regard to the circumstances of the particular case. In Thompson v. Gibson, it was held that the word' `immediate' meant 'with all convenient speed'. In Page v. Pearce, Lord Abinger said: 'When the Act says only that the Judge shall certify immediately after the trial, and does not more specially define the time, it must mean that it is sufficient if it be done within a reasonable time'. And Alderson, B. Said: 'As it is to be assumed to be a reasonable and proper act, prima facie, it is for the party who complains of it to show that he took an unreasonable time'. Where a statute provides that a certain thing shall be done immediately, to the position of the parties and the purpose for which. The Legislature intends that to the circumstances of the case. When a statute requires that something shall be done `forthwith' or 'immediately' or even `instantly' it would probably be that the act may be done some weeks afterwards."
' One of the dictionary meanings of the word 'immediate is `forthwith'. Both the words have been interpreted in a case reported as Keshav Nilkanth Joglekar v. The Commissioner of Police, Greater Bombay and others (AIR 1957 SC 28) in the following manners:-- "7. The meaning of the word immediately' came up for consideration in Thompson v. Gibson (1841)
8 M & W 282: 151 E R 1045 at p. 1047 (C) Holding that it was not to be construed literally, Lord Abinger C.B. Observed if they (acts of Parliament) "could be construed literally, consistently with common sense and justice, undoubtedly they ought; and if I could see, upon this act of Parliament, that it was the intention of the legislature that not a single moment's interval should take place before the granting of the certificate, I should think myself bound to defer to that declared intention. Both it is admitted that this cannot be its interpretation; we are therefore to see how, consistently with common sense and the principles of justice, the words 'immediately after wards' are to be construed.
' If they do not mean that it is to be done the very instant afterwards, do they mean within ten minutes, or a quarter of any hour, afterwards? I think we should interpret them to mean, within such reasonable time as will exclude the danger of intervening facts operating upon the mind of the Judge, so as to disturb the impression made upon it by the evidence in the cause". In agreeing with this opinion, Aderson. B. Expressly approved of the decision of Lord Hardwicke in Rex v. Francis (A).
This construction of the word 'immediately' was adopted in Page v. Pearce (1841 8 M. & W. 677 at p.
678: 151 E R 1211 at p. 1212 (D), Lord Abinger C.B. Observing: `It has already been decided, and necessarily so, that the words immediately afterwards in the stature, cannot be construed literally; and if you abandon the literal construction of the words, what can you substitute but 'within a reasonable time? " In the Queen v. The Justices of Berk Shire (1879) 4 Q.B.D. 469 at p. 471 (E), where the point was as to the meaning of "forthwith" in S. 52 of 35 and 36 vict, chapter 94, Cockburn, C.J. Observed: "The question is substantially one of fact. It is impossible to lay down any hard and fast rules as to what is the meaning of the word 'immediately', in all cases. The word 'forthwith' and 'immediately' have the same meaning. They are stronger than the expression 'within a reasonable time', and imply prompt, vigorous action, without any delay, and whether there has been such action is a question of fact, having regard to the circumstances of the particular case. The same construction has been put on the word "forthwith" occurring in contracts. In Hudson v.. Hill, (1874) 43 LJCP 273 at p. 280 (F) which was a case of charter party, it was observed at page 280: "Forthwith" means without unreasonable delay. The difference between undertaking to do something 'forthwith' and with a specified time is familiar to everyone conversant with law. To do a thing `forthwith' is to do it as soon as is reasonably convenient'."
' After taking into account the dictionary meaning of word `immediate' alongwith the interpretation made in the referred case and the books cited, it can safely be gathered that the word 'immediate' means to take an action forthwith or without any delay. In the light of this interpretation, we have examined the proposition in hand, whether the action taken by the President to meet the alleged emergent situation was forthwith? Here it would be relevant to examine once again the dates of making of and promulgation of the Ordinance. The first Ordinance was made on 21.11.2014, but no step for its promulgation was taken till 12.1.2014. The same was repealed by another Ordinance (No, XVIII of 2014) before its birth on 1.12.2014. It also appears from the record that the second Ordinance was tabled in the Legislative Assembly as Bill, i,e,, on 9.12.2014 and thereafter was promulgated on 12.12.2014. It may be observed here that in the Constitutional provision the word 'immediate' is not used without having wisdom, as we have observed hereinabove that the powers for such legislation can only, be exercised when the emergent circumstances exist and immediate action is required, but from the dates of making of and promulgation of the Ordinance, it reveals that the word `immediate' has not taken into consideration according to its spirit. Thus, keeping in view the circumstances of the case, it can be concluded that neither the extra-ordinary situation was available nor the action taken by the President was an immediate action. Therefore, the promulgation of the Ordinance in such manners/circumstances, is clearly contrary to the Constitutional scheme which cannot be declared as proper or valid legislation. It may also be observed here that the provisions under Section 41 of the Act, 1974 do not give power to the President to act at his own will rather the Constitutional provisions demand that if such situation arises where the immediate legislation is required, the President has to act immediately without any delay, but this course has not been adopted in the case in hand. The result of the careful appreciation of the provisions of Section 41 of Act, 1974 leads to the conclusion that once a bill is introduced in the Legislative Assembly, the President's powers of promulgation of the Ordinance are vanished and he cannot promulgate the Ordinance. Any Ordinance which is made but not promulgated validly, is not a law to be enforced rather it is mere a Bill, the fate of which depends upon the action and proceedings of the Legislative Assembly.
6. Now another question arises, whether the President enjoys the powers to re-promulgate an Ordinance? While appreciating this aspect, it may be stated that it is now settled that the President has no such powers to re-enact the same. This question has also been answered by this Court in the case reported as Syed Mumtaz Hussain Naqvi and 9 others v. Raja Muhammad Farooq Haider Khan and 4 others (2014 SCR 43) in the following manners:-- "The view expressed in Raja Niaz Ahmed Khan's case (PLD 1988 SC (AJ&K) 53) that the President has power to re-enact an Ordinance in all the circumstances is not correct and the view that the President can prorogue the Assembly session for issuing an Ordinance is overruled. The judgment has been delivered in the circumstances that the Ordinance was promulgated in the year 1982. The Assembly was not in existence and the President remained re-enacting the Ordinance repeatedly on the same subject. There may be extraordinary circumstances where the Assembly is not in existence, the elections to the Legislative Assembly are not held within time due to unforeseen circumstances. In that case for smooth running of the business of the Government, the President may re-enact an Ordinance.
15. There is a certification issued by the Secretary AJ&K Legislative Assembly brought on record by the respondents, herein, that after promulgation of the amending Ordinance on 9.7.2012 nine sessions of the Legislative Assembly have been convened. Thus, it is held that under sub-section (2)(a) of Section 41 of the Constitution Act, it was mandatory to lay the Ordinance before the Assembly within the period of four months and the President has no power to re-enact the same."
' As we have drawn the conclusion that the Ordinance (No, XVIII of 2014), was not Constitutionally promulgated, hence, it is neither enforceable as law nor has any legal status except mere a Bill introduced in the Legislative Assembly. In our opinion, in view of this conclusion, it hardly requires any detailed deliberation on the point of violation of Rules of Business, 1985. Even otherwise, on this legal proposition an authoritative full Court judgment in Syed Mumtaz Hussain Naqvi's case (supra), is holding the field and principles of law enunciated in this regard are fully applicable to the case in hand.
7. The arguments of the learned counsel for the appellants that appellants No, 4 and 5 were performing their duties in pursuance of the legislation, therefore, they had been protected, has no substance. In our opinion, provisions of Section 41. Of Act, 1974 were invoked, not to make legislation in compliance of the judgment of this Court rather just to appoint the. Judges in the Shariat Court; therefore, in the light of the legal precedents exercise of legislative powers in the manners as cited hereinabove, is a fraud played with the Constitution which cannot be given any legal cover.
Reliance can be placed on a case reported Dr. D.C. Wadhwa and others v. State of Bihar and others (AIR 1987 SC 579) that:- "It is settled law that a Constitutional authority cannot do indirectly what it is not permitted to do directly. If there is a Constitutional provision inhibiting the Constitutional authority from doing an act, such provision cannot be allowed to be defeated by adoption of any subterfuge. That would be clearly a fraud on the Constitutional provision."
8. Before dilating upon the second point, i,e,, whether the judgment of this Court delivered in Bashir Ahmed Mughal's (supra) case has been implemented in letter and spirit or not, it will be appropriate to discuss the background of the supra case with the salient features of the same. The background of the case (supra) was that a writ petition was filed before the High Court through which the appointments of the Judges of the Shariat Court were challenged on numerous grounds; however, the learned High Court dismissed the said writ petition. Most of the parts of the judgment of the High Court delivered in that writ petition have reproduced by the Hon'ble Author Judge while handing down the judgment in Bashir Ahmed Mughal's case. The crux of survey of the judgment of the High Court was that all the Judges of the High Court were unanimous on the point that the appointments of the Judges of the Shariat Court, without consultation of the Chief Justice are against the concept of independence of judiciary. Only disability, shown by the learned Judges of the High Court for declaring the provisions of Shariat Court Act, 1993 dealing with the appointment of the Judges, as ultra vires the Constitution was, the barrier of the judgment of this Court delivered in Genuine Rights Commission's case (1999 SCR 1). However, this Court while delivering the judgment in Bashir Ahmed Mughal's case (supra) crossed the said barrier while holding that:-- "47. As we have observed that in the previous pronouncement in the Genuine Rights Commission's case (1999 SCR 1), the principle of law regarding the vires of Act, 1993 has not been enunciated on the touchstone of the provision of Section 4 of the Constitution Act and the Constitutional concept of independence of judiciary, thus, the said judgment is not a hurdle for deciding the writ petitions of the appellants. Even otherwise, in our considered view, no Judge-made law can be applied or interpreted in such a manner which results into making any provision of the Constitution as inoperative or redundant. If such-like interpretation is allowed it amounts to subversion of the Constitution Act. Therefore, in the light of the hereinabove stated detailed reasons, the principle of law laid down in the referred Genuine Rights Commission's case (1999 SCR 1), cannot be applied in the manner to make the provisions of Sections 3 and 4 of Constitution Act inoperative and redundant. Moreover, according to the celebrated principle of law, the Courts while interpreting the law do not legislate or create any new law or amend the existing law. The Courts only declare true meanings of law which are already existing. Such interpretation of law will be applicable from the date of enactment of the interpreted law. As in this case we have interpreted the Constitutional provisions of Section 3 and subsections (1) and (2) of Section 4 of the Constitution Act, thus, this interpretation has to be deemed applicable from the date of enforcement of the Constitution Act.
Our this view finds support from the principle of law enunciated by the apex Court of Pakistan in the case reported as Malik Asad Ali and others Vs. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs, Islamabad and others (PLD 1998 SC 161), the brief verdict of the apex Court reads as follows:-- "135. .....The Courts while interpreting a law do not legislate or create any new law or amend the existing law. By interpreting the law, the Courts only declare the true meaning of the law which already existed. Therefore, to that extent the law declared by this Court is applicable from the date the law is enacted.'"
' This Court while laying down the dictum in the judgment (supra), discussed the powers of the High Court and functioning of the Shariat Court in the present form and observed that if the Judges of the High Court can competently and effectively dilate upon the matters to be dealt with by the Shariat Court's Judges then what is the necessity of the establishment of Shariat Court. This is why, the establishment of new Courts was also discussed on the touchstone of Section 46 of Act, 1974.
Before reproducing the relevant paragraph, it may be observed here that although, the said section does not debar to establish the other Courts, however, the same does not allow to establish the parallel judicial system. The relevant paragraph of the said judgment reads as under:-- "40. We would also like to discuss here another aspect of the matter. Since the inception of the Azad Jammu & Kashmir State, the High Court is efficiently and effectively performing the functions of administration of justice according to the assigned jurisdiction whether it is Constitutional writ jurisdiction or any other jurisdiction as original, revisional or appellate, conferred under any other law including the confirmation of the death sentences. The "right of life" is very basic fundamental right whereas in the present scheme of law, the cases of confirmation of the death sentences are referred to the Shariat Court. Which is neither established under the Constitutional provisions nor is according to the concept of the independence of judiciary. Thus, conferring upon such Court the powers of confirmation of the death sentence amounts to empowering such Court to deal with the most important Constitutionally guaranteed fundamental right of life while taking away the same from the jurisdiction of the Constitutionally established High Court. No doubt, according to the Constitutional provisions, other Courts can be established but not as parallel Courts for mere accommodation of some persons on the basis of favouritism or nepotism rather there should be some legal specific purpose for establishment of such Courts which cannot be achieved by the already established Courts. In this context Section 46 of the Constitution Act is reproduced as follows:-- '46. High Court to superintend and control all Courts subordinate to it, etc. -- (1) The High Court shall superintend and control all other Courts that are subordinate to it.
(2) There shall, in addition to the Supreme Court of Azad Jammu & Kashmir and the High Court, be such other Courts as established by law.
(3) A Court so established shall have such jurisdiction as conferred on it by law.
(4) No Court shall have any jurisdiction which is not conferred on it by this Act or by or under any other law.'
(underlining is ours)
' The phraseology of sub-sections (2) and (3) speaks that such other Courts can be established by law in addition to the Supreme Court of Azad Jammu & Kashmir and the High Court. The establishment of such other Court does not mean for conferring the jurisdiction already vested in the Supreme Court and High Count or to establish parallel addition Supreme Court or the High Court. The word "in addition" clearly conveys the intention of legislature that for establishment of such Courts, there must some additional object which cannot be achieved through the already established Courts. Otherwise the establishment of such other Court without the additional object or jurisdiction will amount to destruct the whole system of administration of justice which cannot be the true spirit of the Constitution or intention of legislature."
' The most important feature i,e,, the composition of Shariat Court, has been examined in Bashir Ahmed Mughal's case (supra) in the light of Article 203-C of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, in the following manners:-- "42. In our considered view, the present composition of the Shariat Court appears to be superfluous because there is no special features, qualification or distinction in the composition of the Shariat Court except the mode of appointment. The-examination of Act, 1993 reveals that it has been basically established to examine the status of law whether or not it is according to the Injunctions of the Holy Qur'an and Sunnah. But regrettably, not a single person as Judge has been included to achieve this purpose. Whereas in this context Article 203-C of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan contains the provision in regard to the special qualification of Judges "not more than three shall be the Aalim having atleast fifteen years experience in the Islamic Law research or instruction". Thus, if at all there is any necessity of establishment of the Shariat Court for achieving the purpose, then there must be some distinction in its composition as compares to the High Court to justify the establishment of a separate Court. Otherwise, if the qualification and terms and conditions of the Judges of the Shariat Court are same, then why the jurisdiction which has been conferred upon Shariat Court cannot be exercised by the Judges of the High Court having same qualification and privileges.
43. As it has been observed hereinabove that the only difference is of mode of appointment. Such arbitrary mode which practically amounts to adopt a mechanism of bypassing the Constitutional provisions providing the consultation with the Chief Justices, is one of the reasons to create doubts in the minds of the public-at-large regarding such Court's establishment for accommodation of some persons on the basis of favouritism and nepotism. Ultimately, such-like doubts result into damaging the dignity of the judiciary and shaking the public confidence upon such an important State organ. Therefore, in our opinion, if there is a necessity of establishment of the Shariat Court for achieving the specified purpose, then it must be given Constitutional status and protection. In its composition there must be some Judges having special qualification relevant to the specified purpose to be achieved, like the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan which provides for induction of Ulema as Judge Shariat Court having atleast fifteen years experience in the Islamic Law research or instruction."
' While declaring Section 3 of the Azad Jammu & Kashmir Shariat Court Act, 1993, partly ultra vires the Act, 1974, this Court has held as under:-- "50. In the light of the hereinabove discussed detailed reasons, we conclude that the provisions of Section 3 of Act, 1993 are partly ultra vires to the Constitution Act to the extent of:--
(i) empowering the appointing authority to appoint the Judges of the Shariat Court without consultation of the Chief Justices;
(ii) lacking the necessary provision of induction of Aalim Judge for achieving the specific object of Islamization of law;
(iii) lacking the provision and procedure for removal of Judge of Shariat Court.
' Thus, this law in the indicated terms is made in contravention of sub-section (2) of Section 4 of the Constitution being violative of Constitutional spirit, independence of judiciary, amounts to take away and abridge the Constitutionally guaranteed fundamental right of access to justice and equal protection of law. Resultantly, the appointments of all the Judges right from 1993 under this provision of law (except the proviso of sub-section (2) of Section 3 of Act, 1993), are void and also the impugned appointment notification bearing No, LD/AD/2031-80/2012, dated 15.11.2012 of respondents No, 5 and 6 in Appeal No, 99/2014 titled Sadaqat Hussain Raja Vs. Azad Government and others, is declared without lawful authority. However, according to the spirit of the Constitutional provisions i,e, Section 56 of the Constitution Act and keeping in view the principle of law laid down by this Court in the latest judgment reported as Muhammad Younas Tahir and another Vs. Shaukat Aziz, Advocate, Muzaffarabad and others (PLD 2012 SC (AJ&K) 42), all the acts done by the Judges of the Shariat Court appointed under the provision of Section 3 of Act, 1993 are declared valid on the principle of de facto doctrine including the drawing of the financial benefits, etc."
' Lastly, this Court held in the supra case that if at all, the authority decides to establish the Shariat Court then the authority has to legislate while taking into consideration the following features:-- "51. We hold that for establishment of the Shariat Court according to the spirit of the Constitution for achieving the object mentioned in Act, 1993, the legislation having following features is required:--
(a) There must be a provision for induction of atleast one Aalim Judge, possibly having the qualification as near to Mujtahid or atleast the qualification provided under Article 203-C of 'the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, i,e,, having atleast fifteen years experience in the Islamic Law, research or instruction;
(b) the mode of appointment of Judges with consultation of the Chief Justice of Azad Jammu & Kashmir and the Chief Justice of High Court who is also Chief Justice of Shariat Court; and
(c) providing mode of removal of Judge of Shariat Court for misconduct, incapability of properly performing functions of duties by reason of physical or mental incapacity."
' After survey of the above reproduced paragraphs of Bashir Ahmed Mughal's case (supra), the directions issued by this Court can be summarized as under:--
(i) The consultation of the Chief Justices for the appointment of Judge Shariat Court is mandatory and there is no concept of appointment of Judges without consultation of both the Chief Justices;
(ii) The present composition/establishment of the Shariat Court failed to achieve its object; the qualification and terms and conditions of the Judges of the Shariat Court are same, then why the jurisdiction which has been conferred upon Shariat Court cannot be exercised by the Judges of the High Court having the same qualification and privileges; if there is any necessity of the Shariat Court then reasons shall be assigned to justify the establishment of separate Court;
(iii) While making the composition there must be a provision for induction of at least one Aalim Judge, having fifteen years' experience in the Islamic Law, research or instruction;
(iv) Immediately under proviso of sub-section (2) of Section 3 of Act, 1993, the appointment of the Judges of the High Court as Judges of the Shariat Court.
' After the judgment passed by this Court in Bashir Ahmed Mughal's case (supra) first step to be taken immediately according to the spirit of the judgment, was the appointment of the High Court Judges as Judges of the Shariat Court. In the judgment supra, the word 'immediate' has been used for the said purpose, but the record shows that the notification of the appointment of the High Court Judges as Judges Shariat Court has been issued after a considerable delay. Meaning thereby, the direction of this Court has not been taken into account seriously. Moreover, it is also pertinent to mention here that the said notification was issued when an application for implementation of the judgment of this Court was filed by the other party which reflects the non- serious attitude of the authority regarding the implementation of the judgment of this Court.
9. As the Shariat Court in the present form appears to be a parallel Court, therefore, the next direction issued by this Court was that as the qualification and terms and conditions of the Judges of the Shariat Court and Him Court are same, then why the jurisdiction which has bee. Conferred upon Shariat Court cannot be exercised by the High Court, therefore, reasons shall be assigned to justify the establishment of the Shariat Court. After the said direction by this Court, it was mandatory for the Government to assign reasons to justify the establishment of the Shariat Court in the light of Section 46 of the Act, 1974. However, the record shows that before sub-Constitutional legislation, no reason whatsoever has been assigned in this regard. After scrutinizing the whole record, we failed to gather anything from which it could be ascertained that any step was taken in compliance of this direction. It was the basic step; as the matter of appointment of the Judges, is the next step. First of all it was enjoined upon the authority to assign justification for establishment of a separate Court. In this scenario, it can safely be held that this direction has also not been complied with in letter and spirit.
10. Before dilating upon the next direction issued by this Court regarding the induction of an Aalim Judge, it may be observed here that the Shariat Court is a Court of unique nature and the purpose for establishing the same is to test the statute on the touchstone of Shariah with the assistance of Ulema and Scholars and to convey its opinion to the authority concerned. The important part of the special jurisdiction of the Shariat Court is to determine, after due examination, whether any law is repugnant to the Injunctions of Islam or not. The scope of the expression "Injunctions of Islam" has not been left with the discretion of the Court or notions of an individual. It has been clearly spelt out as the Injunctions which has been laid down in the. Holy Qur'an and the Sunnah of the Holy Prophet (P.B.U.H.). If any law in force is challenged, the Shariat Court would be within its