This petition is directed against the order dated 15.5-1980 passed by the learned District Judge, Sargodha exercising the powers of the Appellate Authority whereby he condoned the delay in filing the appeal before him against the order of the Rent Controller, and setting aside the order allowed ejectment of the petitioner on the ground of default and the landlord's personal need.
2. The respondent Jamil Ahmad had filed on 10-5-1978 an application for ejectment of the petitioner-tenant mainly on the ground that he had default in the payment of rent from the month of January, 1978 at the rate of Rs.300.00 per month, and that the shop in dispute was required in good faith by the landlord for his personal use. The Rent Controller dismissed the application on 7- 10-1979 against which the landlord filed the appeal on 19-12-1979 with an application under section 5 of the Limitation Act (IX of 1908) for condonation of delay on the ground that some time was spent in obtaining the court-fee stamps, and that delay in obtaining the copies was beyond his control, because he had no notice of their preparation. The learned District Judge accepted the explanation and condoned the delay, and also set aside the order of the Rent Controller and allowed the appeal directing the petitioner-tenant to vacate the premises within four months.
3. It is argued that delay 'was condoned by the learned District Judge on the basis of misreading of a proposition of law, that in computing the period of limitation; deduction of time. Should have been made from the date of the application to obtain the copies up to the date of their delivery and not up to that of their preparation. Learned counsel in that behalf referred to a few decisions to contend that deduction was possible up to the date the copies Wore ready for delivery and not from the date they were actually delivered, Each case has its own features and circumstances. In the instant case, the Rent Controller passed the order on 7-10-1979, and the respondent-landlord applied for the copies on 9-10-1979 which were prepared on 8-11-1974 and received on 17-12-1979, and the appeal was filed on 19-12-1979. There is no doubt that the appeal filed on 19-12-1979 was well within limitation if time was to be reckoned up to the date of delivery of the copies ; otherwise, it was late by only one day if time was to be calculated up to the date of their preparation. The application for condonation of delay was considered by the learned District Judge who observed that the terminus a quo in the matter of obtaining copies is not that clearly settled, and one may not expect an ordinary citizen to be much meticulous about the computation of period taken for obtaining copies. He, therefore, held that the more convenient and somewhat justifiable view seemed to be that where there is no notice by the Copying Agency, time should have been allowed till the date copies were delivered. Giving thought to the affidavit, the learned District Judge remarked that the delay as above-mentioned was well explained, and that the reason that one day was needed for purchase of the court-fee was accepted as being not an unreasonable time to be condoned. The learned District Judge, as it appears from his order, had applied his mind to the circumstances of the case and thought it proper to exercise discretion in favour of the appellant in condoning the delay which was only of one day, and repelled the argument that the respondent deliberately wasted time in persuing the matter before the Martial Law Authorities. It is well-settled that where a Court or a Tribunal has jurisdiction and .It determines that question, it cannot be said that it acted illegally or with material irregularity merely because it came to an erroneous decision on a question of fact or even of law. It is laid down in Muhammad Hussain Munir and others v. Sikandar and others (PLD 1974 SC 139) that it is wholly wrong to consider that the constitutional provision was signed to empower the High Court to interfere with the decision of a Court or 'tribunal of inferior jurisdiction, merely because in its opinion the decision is wrong. In that case it would make the High Court's jurisdiction indistingu--ishable from that exercisable in a full- fledged appeal, which plainly is not the intention of the Constitution-makers. When there is jurisdiction to decide a particular matter, then there is jurisdiction to decide it rightly or wrong and the fact that the decision is incorrect does not render the decision without jurisdiction. Following the rule there is no room to come to a different conclusion in the matter of condonation of delay from that arrived at by the learned District Judge.
4. In respect of the merits of the case, the learned District Judge observed that the lease was initially for five years which was extended & r another five years, and the petitioner enjoyed the full period. He discussed the material on record and found that the rate of rent for the second five years period was enhanced to Rs.300.00 per month, but the petitioner's payment of rent at the old rate of Rs.192.00 did not relieve him of his liability to honour his obligations which he himself had accepted for a long period of five years. According to the learned District Judge the default also stood proved. In the same way the statement of the landlord was believed and it was held that he was genuinely in need of the shop for his personal need. Both the questions relating to default and personal need in good faith are those which the learned District Judge has determined as of fact and the same cannot be interfered with in the exercise of the writ jurisdiction.
For the foregoing reasons there is no force in the petition and the same is dismissed with no order as to costs.