' S. HAFIZUR RAHMAN (MEMBER).-Hafiz Khuda Yar, who was a Constable in the Police Force before he was dismissed from service, has come up in appeal against that dismissal and impugns, in that connation the order of the S. P., Multan, dated 16th January, 1979. Also assailed is the order, dated 26th June, 1980 made by the D. I.-G., Multan Range, rejecting the departmental appeal, and the order dated 25th October, 1980 turning down the revision petition. The appellant contends that the three orders are contrary to the rules and the law and unjust and oppressive.
2. A brief background of the case would be appropriate. The appellant was posted at P. S. Dunyapur, when on 14th November, 1978 he is alleged to have severely thrashed one Muhammad Baqir Shah which resulted in bleeding from the latter's nose. The victim's father, Dur Muhammad Shah filed a written complaint, producing a medical certificate in support. For this misconduct, the appellant was served a notice under rule 6 (3) (a) of the Police (E & D) Rules, 1975, calling upon him to show cause why he should not be dismissed. He denied the allegations as the outcome of personal enmity in his written reply but could not avail himself of the personal hearing as he was in Jail. The S. P., Multan, while issuing the dismissal order, recounted the appellant's previous misdemeanors which, according to the order, included (i) arrest on charge of rape, registered vide FIR No, 575 of 22nd December, 1978 in P. S. Khanewal, (ii) snatching forcibly Rs, 100 from one Ghulam Muhammad on 21st December, 1978 and thereafter raping his wife Jannat Bibi, the case aforementioned; and (iii) his habit of assaulting public men for his personal ends. He had been issued show-cause notice in respect of No, (ii) also. In the meantime the trial Court acquitted him "as the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt". The D. I.-G., Multan, rejected the appeal because, in his opinion, the acquittal was not honourable. In his order, the D. I.- G. Also mentioned that the appellant had been granted leave without pay on 25 different occasions for wilful absence from duty that he had been censured for corruption on 29th June, 1977 ; that his two years' service had been forfeited on 10th July, 1978 for torturing a person on beat duty ; and that his two years' service had again been forfeited on 9th October, 1978 for lodging a false report against one Ahmad Ali Shah.
3. The parties were heard. It was contended on behalf of the appellant that the impugned order was defective and illegal because it did not confine itself to that alleged act of the appellant for which proceedings under the E & D Rules had been initiated against him. Then, they were two show-cause notices but one order. In the matter of snatching Rs, 100 from Ghulam Ahmad and the allegation of raping his wife, the first part of the charge was of corruption but no enquiry had been held despite the appellant's insistence on one. In the second part he had been clearly acquitted by the trial Court. As for the charge of manhandling Muhammad Baqir Shah, this was a trumped up charge resulting from personal enmity. Regarding the verdict of the trial Court, it was submitted that according to the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in PLD 1963 SC 185 and the Sind Service Tribunal in 1931 PLC (C S T) 263 in the case of a criminal charge against a civil servant there were two alternatives before the authority; either wait for the Court decision or hold a proper departmental enquiry. The Punjab Service Tribunal too had followed this principle while deciding the case of Anis-ur-Rehman v. I.-G. Police in Appeal No, 929/763 of 1980. The instant appellant was dismissed during the pendency of the case in the Court and this meant following neither one principle nor the other. The appellant mentioned the long history of the family dispute which had resulted in the second show-cause notice about beating up Baqir Shah, including litigation between his family and the other family, and reiterated his demand for an enquiry which demand had not been accepted. It was submitted that the allegation against him had been taken on its face value while his own defence had been completely ignored. Moreover, the parawise comments state that the punishment was for the second show-cause notice only (beating up Baqir Shah) but the D. I. G's order refers to both notices, as does the order of the I.-G. P. The learned counsel, in this context, referred to 1980 SC 307 (Islamabad Club case) wherein it was held that a decision could not but be about the show-cause notice. In any case, he had not been provided opportunity to defend himself because both show-cause notices were served while he was in Jail.
4. The learned District Attorney averred that the appellant had been dismissed for misconduct mentioned in the second show-cause notice i. e. Causing hurt to M. Baqir Shah, and that his harping on the first show-cause notice was only an attempt to divert the main issue. The appellant had a very bad record of service, and it can also be said that the punitive action against him was the outcome of that record.
5. We have given careful consideration to this case and to the submissions of the parties. We are inclined to agree with the respondents that misdemeanour in the Police Force cannot be given routine treatment and that because of the intimate welfare of the public connected with the character and acts of policemen, the latter had an extra responsibility to be well-behaved and disciplined. However, this does not mean that an errant policeman should not be treated with equity and justice. In this case, howsoever bad the record of the appellant may be, he deserved to be dealt with under the rules for the charges against him. If in his previous career be had committed criminal or sinful acts, it was the responsibility of his superiors who did not rid the force of his presence. We notice, however, that in most of the acts of indiscipline mentioned in the impugned orders he had already received punishment. This meant that those acts were past and done and should not be brought up again and again. As for the two show-cause notices, it was incumbent upon the authority to provide means to the appellant to present his defence if he was in Jail and to give him a proper hearing.
6. In the light of the above conclusion we are inclined to remand this case to the S. P., which we now proceed to do. The three impugned-orders are set aside. The appellant, however, will not be re- instated in service in view of his record, unless he is found not guilty in the fresh proceedings. These fresh proceedings should start with a personal hearing by the S. P. The proceedings will cover all the charges except the one of raping the wife of Ghulam Muhammad in which the appellant has been acquitted by the Court. The learned Magistrate has observed in his judgment that one material witnesses i, e. The wife, could not identify the appellant while the other, Ghulam Muhammad himself, was unreliable. In the light of this observation the appellant can be taken to have been acquitted of this charge without a stain on his character. We do not think any direction about the need for a regular enquiry is necessary; we leave that to the discretion of the S. P. Who can decide whether the circumstances of the case call for an enquiry or not.
7. The upshot of the matter is that the appeal is accepted to the extent stated above.