' UMAR ATA BANDIAL, J.---The impugned judgment dated 14.04.2015 of the Lahore High Court affirms the judgment of the learned appellate Court dated 13.09.1999 to reverse the judgment of the learned Trial Court dated 07.02.1996 with the result that the respondents' suit for specific performance of agreement to sell dated 31.10.1987 stands decreed.
2. Learned counsel for the petitioners has raised three grounds of challenge to the concurrent findings of the learned High Court and the learned Appellate Court. Firstly, it is contended that the agreement to . Sell dated 31.10.1987 (Ex.P/1) is unsigned by any vendee and therefore their suit for specific performance is not maintainable under the principle laid down in Gulshan Hamid v. Abdul Rehman (2010 SCMR 334) and Farzand AU v. Khuda Bakhsh (PLD 2015 SC 187). Secondly, it is argued that two out of four vendees named in the agreement to sell (Ex.P/1), that is, Muhammad Mansha through his LRs [respondents Nos. 3(a) to 3(e)] and Nawab Din respondent No,4, filed an application before the learned High Court reporting their compromise with the petitioners, who are subsequent purchasers of the suit property, whereby they have relinquished their rights under the agreement to sell (Ex.P/1) in favour of the petitioners. This application was not decided by the learned High Court before or by the impugned judgment which is statedly against the law laid down in Khadim Hussain v. Province of Punjab and others (2014 SCMR 669) and Imtiaz Begum v.
Sultan Jan (2008 SCMR 1259). In any event by the exit of two vendee-plaintiffs it is claimed that the agreement to sell (Ex.P/1) stood frustrated and became unenforceable. Relies on Muhammad Ishaq v. Sufia Begum (1992 SCMR 1629). Thirdly, it is stressed that the vendees under the agreement to sell (Ex.P/1) respondents Nos.1 to 4 before us lacked the financial means to pay the balance price under the said agreement because in paragraph 6 of the plaint they admitted their inability to pay the requisite Court fee in the amount of Rs,8,640/- and they requested the learned Trial Court for time to deposit the same which prayer was allowed. This averment establishes the impecuniosity of the vendee-plaintiffs.
3. Respondents Nos. 5, 6, 7 and 8 are the vendors under the agreement to sell (Ex.P/1) ("vendors") which was executed on 31.10.1987 and also registered in the record of the Sub-Registrar Burewala on the same day in favour of respondents Nos.l to 4 ("vendees") for the sale of land measuring 15 Kanal, 7 Marla in Chak No,503/EB, Tehsil Burewala District, Vehari ("suit land") for a total sale consideration of Rs,115,125/- and against the payment of earnest money in the amount of Rs,38,025/-. The date of completion of sale upon the payment of balance amount of sale consideration and registration of sale deed is fixed in the agreement to sell (Ex.P/1) as 30.05.1988. In answer to the suit for specific performance filed by the vendees, the written statement of the vendors alleges breach of promise by the vendees, namely, their refusal to complete the sale as agreed on 30.05.1988 amounting to the repudiation of the agreement to sell (Ex.P/1). The vendors being in need of money therefore entered a fresh agreement to sell dated 04.06.1988 with the petitioners as the new buyers of the suit land. To incorporate the said sale transaction in the revenue record, the mutation of sale No, 146 dated 07.06.1988 was sanctioned by the Revenue Officer in favour of the petitioners. Upon learning about the said sale mutation, the respondent vendees filed their suit for specific performance on 11.06.1988. This suit was dismissed by the learned Trial Court on 07.02.1996. However, after carefully considering the objections taken by the petitioners and the vendors the appeal filed by the vendees was allowed on 13.09.1999 and the suit was decreed, inter alia, on the findings that time was not of the essence and that the petitioners are not bona fide purchasers for value without notice. The latter finding has been affirmed in the impugned judgment of the learned High Court dated 14.04.2015. It is not challenged before us by the petitioners. However, it is urged that other objections to the specific performance of the agreement to sell (Ex.P/1) have been noted in the impugned judgment but remain un-adjudicated.
4. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties on the three objections canvassed before us and listed in paragraph-2 above. It is plainly manifest from the agreement to sell (Ex.P/1) that it was executed by the vendors on 31.10.1987 and also registered on the same day in the record of the Sub-Registrar Burewala. The front side of the stamp paper bearing the terms of the agreement is signed by only the respondent No,5 as general attorney on behalf of the vendors. The reverse side of the stamp is signed again by respondent No,5 and by respondent No,1 on behalf of the vendees.
Their signatures appearing on the reverse side of the stamp paper are affixed below the stamped endorsement of the Sub-Registrar wherein the parties acknowledge both the contents of and the execution of agreement to sell (Ex.P/1) before the Sub-Registrar. The signing of the said agreement to sell (Ex.P/1) by the respondent No,5 vendor is not in dispute and has been proven on the record.
The signing of the agreement to sell (Ex.P/1) by the respondent No,1 vendee on 31.10.1987 in the presence of the Sub-Registrar, Revenue Officer PW-3, the lambardar PW-2 who identified the parties to the agreement and the vendor-respondent No,5 DW-1 is also undisputed. The vendee respondent No,1 has acknowledged before the Sub-Registrar both his subscription to the agreement to sell (Ex.P/1) and the binding effect of its terms.
5. The principle laid down by the judgment of this Court in Gulshan Hamid v. Abdul Rehman (2010 SCMR 334) which is forcefully relied by the learned counsel for the petitioners is that an agreement to sell becomes valid and enforceable after it is signed by both the parties thereto. That authority deals with a case of an unregistered agreement to sell and is inapplicable in the present case. The agreement to sell (Ex.P/1) is a registered document which is admittedly signed by 'respondent No,1 vendee and respondent No,5 vendor before the Sub-Registrar Burewala and the parties have also admitted the binding effect of its terms before the said authority. The agreement to sell (Ex.P/1) is therefore valid and the suit filed thereon by the vendee is clearly maintainable.
6. The next objection by the petitioners is that two vendees under the agreement to sell (Ex.P/1), namely, respondents Nos.3 and 4 have frustrated the said agreement by withdrawing/ relinquishing their rights under the same. Both these vendees are non-signatories to the agreement to sell "(Ex.P/1). Under the principle laid down in Gulshan Hamid v. Abdul Rehman (2010 SCMR 334) which is relied above by the petitioners, these vendees cannot acquire any right under the agreement to sell (Ex.P/1) nor affect its enforceability. Therefore, the argument by learned counsel for the petitioners is without merit.
7.Assuming, however, that the respondents Nos.3 and 4 have locus standi as joint-promisees to enforce the agreement to sell (Ex.P/1), the governing principles for specific performance of a contract at the instance of some (and not all) of the joint-promisees in a contract are well settled by statutory law. Section 23 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877 and section 45 of the Contract Act, 1872 are germane to the issue. It is manifest from section 23 ibid that any one out of several joint- promisees can sue for specific performance of the agreement. However, a plaintiff joint-promisee must make the disinterested promisees as defendants in the suit. To enforce an agreement to sell against the promisor a plaintiff joint-promisee must establish his readiness and willingness to perform the entire bargain agreed in the contract. Unless expressly agreed otherwise in the contract, the non-cooperation or opposition of other joint-promisees for the enforcement of the contract cannot prejudice enforceability of the contract between the parties so long as its terms are fully performed. These principles are well settled since before partition and may be gathered from Jaffar Khan v. Muhammad Achar (PLD 1961 Karachi 335), Ziaulkhalique v. Tanveer Ismail (1989 MLD 3940) and Sher Muhammad v. Ali Muhammad (1986 MLD 597). The facts of and finding given in Muhammad Ishaq v. Sufia Begum (1992 SCMR 1629) relied by the learned counsel for the petitioners also exemplify the principle noted above. As the contract was not severable the judgment makes the acts of one plaintiff joint-promisee who is "the kingpin behind the show" to bind the supporting joint-promisee. Accordingly, the argument canvassed by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the agreement to sell (Ex.P/1), stands frustrated by the opposition of two non-signatory and proforma respondent joint vendees does not carry weight. Such a view would require the Court to re-write the contract or to enforce a different contract, either of which actions the Court cannot do.
8.In the light of the above noted law, the non-disposal by the learned High Court of the pending compromise/relinquishment application filed by the respondents Nos.3 and 4 who are co-vendees and joint-promisees under the agreement to sell (Ex.P/1) is inconsequential. The applicant compromise-vendees lack locus standi to compromise the suit filed by the plaintiff-respondent No,1 who can competently maintain the suit for specific performance. At best the compromise- applicants are disinterested co-vendees who can and were transposed as proforma respondents in the proceedings of the appeal. Consequently the pending compromise application by respondents Nos.3 and 4 co-vendees cannot materially affect the outcome of the revision petition by the learned High Court. The insistence upon disposal of an application that has no bearing on the result of the proceeding is an exercise in futility meant merely to prolong the litigation which in the present case is pending since 11.06.1988. To our minds such a course of action in the facts of the present case was ill advised and unnecessary. Therefore the objection taken has no force.
9.Finally, the contention that a request by the respondent plaintiff for time to deposit the requisite amount of Court fee is proof of the vendees' inability to arrange funds for meeting their financial obligations under the agreement to sell (Ex.P/1) is misconceived. The grant of time requested in the plaint is of a procedural nature available under the law for fulfilling the procedural conditions for mobilizing a suit before a learned Trial Court. The grant of time by the learned trial Court neither concerns nor affects the substantive merits of the claim made in the suit wherein no order for deposit of balance price was passed by the learned Trial Court.
10.In the light of foregoing discussion, we do not find any error in the concurrent findings given by the learned High Court and the learned Appellate Court. Consequently, leave is refused and the petition is dismissed