SHAH ABDUR RASHID, J.-The facts on which this petition under Article 199 of the Constitution is founded are these. On 5-6-1974 the Customs Staff of Islamia Collage Check Post, Peshawar, took into possession from Gul Muhammad petitioner a car Bearing Registration No. KAQ-3426 apparently for the contravention of clauses (8) and (89) of the Table to section 156(1) of the Customs Act (IV of 1969) (hereinafter referred to as the Act) when the car was not returned to the petitioner for some time, he through his counsel, on 2-11..1974, served a notice on the Assistant Collector and the Collector respondents Nos. I and 2 herein to release the car under subsection (2) of section 16.8 of the Act as notice. Under section 180 of the Act had not been served. On the petitioner: The petitioner was informed by a letter dated 25-I1-1974 wherein respondent No. 1 took the stand that the car was not seized under section 163(1) of the Act on 5-6-1974, but it had been detained on the date for verification of documents and that the actual seizure had taken place on 14-11-1974. A notice was also sent to the petitioner on 22-11-1974, as contemplated by section 180 of the Act. There was some further correspondence and then the petitioner was given opportunity of being heard. Finally on 11-8-1975 respondent No. 1 ordered the confiscation of the car under clauses
(8) and (89) of the Table to section 156(1) of the Act. He also imposed a personal penalty of Rs.
5,000 on the petitioner. This order was passed without prejudice to the criminal proceedings that might be initiated against the petitioner. An appeal to respondent No. 2 made by the petitioner was rejected on 16-4-1976 from which rejection the petitioner approached the joint Secretary (Customs), Finance Department, Government of Pakistan, respondent No. 3, who accepted the same and remanded the case to respondent No. 2. By his order dated 23-10-1977 respondent No. 2 after the remand, modified the previous order inasmuch as the penalty of Rs. 5,000 imposed on the petitioner was waived and the car was directed to be restored on payment of custom duty and other government dues as prescribed under the law. From this order the petitioner again approached respondent No. 3 in revision but as the revision petition was not disposed of for a long time the petitioner invoked the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 199 of the Constitution, as already stated, for declaring without lawful authority the orders of respondent No. 2 ordering the payment of customs dues etc. The petitioner further prayed that the respondent be directed to release the car to him without any condition.
2. The learned Deputy Attorney-General appearing for the respondents raised a preliminary objection that the petitioner is not entitled to obtain a relief from this Court under Article 199 of the Constitution as other adequate remedy by way of revision to respondent No. 3 is open to him and that he has actually approached the said respondent to avail of the said remedy. This objection was met by the learned counsel for the petitioner by arguing that although a revision petition was filed before respondent No. 3 on 18-11-1977 no decision thereon had been taken by him in spite of repeated reminders and that having failed to obtain redress, he approached this Court on 16-12- 1979 i.e. More than two years after the filing of the revision. It was contended that the revision petition, on the face of it, is not an adequate remedy as the matter stands undecided for a long time and thus the petitioner is entitled to knock at the doors of this Court. In support of his contention, the learned counsel relied on some reported cases but it is not necessary to refer to them here because on the face of it, the failure of respondent No. 3 to dispose of the revision petition gives the petitioner a right to approach this Court as he cannot be expected to wait indefinitely for a decision on his petition. It is pertinent to note that even during the pendency of this petition no order has been passed by respondent No. 3 on the revision petition. In these circumstances we find no force in the preliminary objection raised by the learned Deputy Attorney- General. We are of the view that the petition is quite competent under Article 199 of the Constitution in spite of the pendency of the revision petition.
3. The learned counsel for the petitioner. Has contended that the car belonging to the petitioner was seized on 5-6-1974 presumably under subsection (1) of section 168 of the Act and that since no notice as required by section 180 had been served on the petitioner within the statutory period of two months, the respondents are bound to return the car to the petitioner in accordance with the mandatory provisions of subsection (2) of section 16$. The learned Deputy Attorney-General in his turn argued that the seizure had not taken place on 5-6-1974 as alleged by the petitioner, but that on that date the car was only detained for verification of documents etc. And that formal seizure of the car took place on 14-11-1974 whereafter a notice, as required by section 180 of the Act, was served within the period of two months. In these circumstances, it was argued, the petitioner has no cause of action to claim the return of the car without payment of customs duty and other government dues.
4. We do not feel ourselves inclined to accept the arguments of the learned Deputy Attorney- General that the seizure of the car had taken place on 14-11-1974 and not on 5.6-1974 on which date it was taken into custody by the customs authorities. Section 17 of the Act which refers to the detention only provides that when goods are imported into Pakistan in violation of section 15 or 16 of the Act they shall be "liable" to detention and confiscation. The power of seizure is given under section 168(1) and the penalty is provided for under clauses 8, 9, 89 and 90 of Table to subsection
(1) of section 156 of the Act. Section 168(2) specifically provides that if notice under section 180 of the Act is not served within a period of two months then the goods seized shall have to be returned to the person from whose possession they were seized. Ordinarily, therefore, the petitioner was entitled to get a declaration that the goods seized from him are liable to be returned to him as he has not been served with the notice as discussed above. However, it is obvious and in fact the learned counsel for the petitioner could not deny that the car was brought into Pakistan from outside. The Customs authorities have found that the custom duty and other Government dues payable thereon have not been paid. It is also obvious that the car was brought into Pakistan in violation of section 31 of the Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1950 inasmuch no imports permit had been obtained by any one a9 required by Notification No. S. R. O. 920(1?/3 dated the 25th June, 1973 issued under that Act which was in force at the relevant time. The import of the car was, in these circumstances, in violation of clauses, (8) (9) (89) and (90) of Table to section 156(1) of the Act and as such it was liable to confiscation. However, since the personal involvement of the petitioner in bringing the car into Pakistan in violation of the relevant law was not established, the Customs authorities took a lenient view of the case and did not confiscate the car nor impose any penalty nor launched any prosecution as could be done under clauses (8) (9) (89) and (90) of Table to section 156(1) of the Act. In a somewhat similar case reported as Abdur Rauf Khan v.
Collector, Central Excise and Land Customs (1980 SCMR 114), it was held that the burden of proving that the car was lawfully imported into Pakistan was on the petitioner in view of clause 9 of Table to section 156(1), and section 187 of the Act. No doubt the petitioner herein purchased the car from other person but even then in view of the above provisions it was incumbent upon him to establish that the car bad been legally imported into Pakistan under valid permit and that the custom duty and other Government dues leviable thereon have been. Paid under section 18 of the Act. The car was subject to the levy of custom duty and as such the person in possession of the car is bound to pay the duty of customs and the other Government dues. By mere declaration that the petitioner is entitled to the return of the car under section 168(2) of the Act, he would not be getting any effective relief; for the main grievance is that the petitioner cannot be subjected to the levy of custom duty. For this stand there is no justification whatsoever because the provisions of section 168(2) do not absolve the petitioner from making the payment of the custom duty. In case we give a declaration to the petitioner that he is entitled to the return of the car, he shall still be liable to pay the custom duty which could be recovered from him under section 202 of the Act. The relief in fact, there--fore, would not be an effective relief to give any advantage to the petitioner. Moreover jurisdiction of this Court under Article 199 of the Constitution is discretionary and no writ can be issued in favour of a person in possession of ill-gotton gain. If we issue any direction then it would amount to giving the petitioner the custody' of the car without discharging the liabilities to make the payment of dues which he is legally, as well as, morally bound to pay.
5. In view of the above circumstances we decline to issue any order in this case and dismiss the petition but, having regard to the circumstances of the case, we pass no order as to costs.