' ARSHAD MAHMOOD TABASSUM, J. --- This appeal has been directed against judgment dated 20.10.2010, passed by the District Consumer Court, Bahawalpur, whereby learned Presiding Officer of the said Court accepted the complaint under Section 25 read with Section 30 of the Punjab Consumer Protection Act, 2005, lodged by Sayyed Mohammad Areeb Abdul Khafid Shah Bukhari, respondent herein and directed the appellant to make payment of Rs, 30,000/- as compensation and damages. The respondent had filed the complaint under the above provisions of law, complaining of provision of defective services by the appellant to him in respect of SIM card No, 0320-5653040 and had prayed for removing, rectifying and redressing the fault and defect in the services in respect of the above said SIM card and payment of Rs, 50,000/- on account of compensation and damages.
2. The appeal has been preferred after the prescribed period of limitation, as against the decision of the learned District Consumer Court dated 20.10.2010.- the appeal was preferred on 14.05.2011.
Alongwith the appeal, an application under Section 151, CPC has also been filed for treating the appeal as within time on the ground that the application for issuance of certified copy was submitted on 16.11.2010, but no date/slip for delivery of the certified copy of the impugned order was issued to the appellant by the Copying Agency, nor he was intimated as to when the copy would be ready for delivery; that whenever clerk of the learned counsel for the appellant approached the Copying Agency to collect the certified copy, he was told that the same had not till then been prepared; that ultimatel, when execution proceeding were initiated against the appellant on 11.05.2011, he contacted the Copying Agency without further loss of time and obtained certified copy on 13.05.2011, hence, the appeal is liable to be treated within time.
3. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner, respondent in person and have myself perused the record.
4. The appellant though claimed that the clerk of his learned counsel had been. Contacting Copying Agency time and again and he had been told that the certified copy was not ready for delivery, but in this regard, no affidavit of the said clerk of the learned counsel for the appellant has been annexed with the application, thus, such claim of the appellant I without any proof. The application for issuance of certified copy was submitted on 16.11.2010. Certified copy of the said application form is available on the, record, which shows that the same was submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant. Obviously, it was well within. The knowledge of the learned counsel for the appellant that copy would be ready within a few days, if at all, it is considered that the date of delivery of certified copy was not given to him, yet slackness on the part of the learned counsel for the appellant is manifest from the fact that till 13.05.2011, he did not collect the copy. This fact clearly indicates that he was indolent in the prosecution of his cause. It is well-settled law by now that the law helps the vigilant and not the indolent. The fact that the appellant obtained certified copy when he received notice from the learned executing court, suggests that he remained silent for quite sufficient time and did not collect the copy intentionally. In the similar circumstances, the Apex Court has ruled that condonation of delay in filing of appeal cannot be allowed. Reliance in this regard may be placed on the case of Muhammad Nawaz (1997 CLJ 444), relevant portion whereof reads as under:- "This petition seeking leave to appeal against the judgment of Lahore High Court, Multan Bench dated 9-6-1996 is barred 18 days. Petitioner seeks condonation of delay on the ground that the certified copies were prepared and completed on 15-7-1996 but the' Copying Agency gave no intimation to him with the result that he collected the copies on 6-111996. According to the learned counsel, the entire time spent until the collection of copies by the petitioner would be a time requisite" for obtaining the copies within the meaning of section 12 of the Limitation Act. In support of his submission, learned counsel relied upon West Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation, Karachi v. Aziz Qureshi 1973 SCMR 555 and Fazal Rahman v. Rahim Gul and others 1981 SCMR 1258.
Both .These cases are distinguishable on facts because in the first case, the impugned order of the High Court was passed on 7th September, 1964; application for certified copy of the order was made on the same. Day; Copy was made ready on 14th October, 1964, stamp was supplied on 15th October, 1964 on which date the copy was certified and the copy was supplied on 17th October, 1964. This shows that the petitioner in the precedent case was actively pursuing the matter and the copy of the order was supplied to him within three days of its having been made ready, while in the instant case petitioner took almost four months in collecting the copies and no reasonable explanation has been given for this inordinate delay. Petitioner appears to have acted with utter negligence. Similarly in the second case, too, the copies of the judgment and decree were made ready on 27th of June, 1968 and were delivered on 12th of July, 1968 i.e, within 15 days. As observed above, petitioner in the present case acted negligently and, therefore, we are not persuaded, .In the peculiar facts of the case, to allow his request for condonation of delay. His application for condonation of delay is accordingly dismissed with the result that the petition for leave to appeal stands dismissed as time-barred."
5. It is also relevant to mention here that the Consumer Protection Act is a special law and Section 33 thereof provides a period of 30 days for filing an appeal against an order, passed by the Consumer Court. In view of Section 29 of the Limitation Act, 1908, Section 5 of the Limitation Act is not applicable to the instant case. The said provisions of law are reproduced herein below for the sake of convenience:--- "29. Saving. (1) Nothing in this Act shall affect Section 25 of the Contract Act, 1872.
(2) Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed therefor by the First Schedule, the provisions of section 3 shall apply, as if such period were prescribed therefor in that Schedule, and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law---
(a) the provisions contained in section 4, sections 9 to 18, and section 22 shall. Apply only in so far as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law; and
(b) the remaining provisions of the Act shall not apply.
(3) Nothing in this Act shall apply to suits under the Divorce Act (IV of 1869).
(4) Sections 26 and 27 and the definition of "easement" in section 2 shall not apply to cases arising in territories to which the Easements Act, 1882, may for the time being extend."
5. In the light of above discussion, the appeal filed by the appellant, is hopelessly barred by time and the delay in filing the appeal cannot be condoned, therefore, the same is hereby dismissed on this score alone. F.A.O. Dismissed.