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1982 CLC 871

GHULAM NABI vs SAMPAT AND 6 OTHER

Citation1982 CLC 871
CourtSindh High Court
Case No.Civil Revision Application No. 333 of 1978
Date1981-08-31
Judge(s)Saeeduzzaman Siddiqui
ResultH.

2. In order to understand the present controversy it is necessary to state here in somedetail the facts relating to the above two suits. The predecessor---in-interest of respondents Nos. I to 4 one Rora, son of Mehtab had a verified claim of agricultural land against which he was allotted land bearing Survey No. 43, situated in Deh Mate, Taluka Dakri, measuring 3.33 acres. It appears that this very survey number namely Survey No. 43 was also allotted to one Moula Bakhsh in the year 1964 who soon after its transfer in his favour, sold the same by a registered sale deed to the present applicant. Dispute appears to have arisen between the parties soon there--after with regard to allotment of Survey No. 43 before the Settlement and Rehabilitation Authorities and by order dated 3-8-1965, the Deputy Rehabilitation Commissioner, Larkana, held that the allotment in favour of deceased Rora, son of Mehtab was prior in time which was never cancelled and as such it was a valid allotment and the subsequent allotment in favour of Moula Bakhsh and another claimant Chetter being the duplicate transfer were without any legal authority. The D. R. C., Larkana, however in the same order directed the Mukhtiarkar and Assistant Rehabilitation Commissioner, Larkana to re-examine the case and succession of respondents Nos. 1 to 4, who claimed themselves to be the legal heirs of Rora son of Mehtab. This order of Deputy Rehabilitation Commissioner, Larkana, dated 3-8-1965 was challenged by Moula Baksh through his attorney the applicant and the Additional Settlement Commissioner (Land), Larkana, accepted the revision filed by Moula Baksh and set aside the order of Deputy Rehabilitation Commissioner, dated 3-8-1965. Respondents Nos. I to 4, then filed a writ petition in the then High Court of West Pakistan, Karachi Bench being No. 194/66 which was accepted by a learned Single Judge of the Sind & Baluchistan High Court by order dated 20th September, 1971.. The learned Single Judge declared the order passed by the Additional Settlement Commissioner, on 30th December, 1965 as an order having been passed without any lawful authority and restored the order passed by D. R. C. On 3rd August, 1965. The learned Single Judge however, in the above order further directed that the allotment made in favour of petitioners (now respondent Nos. 1 to 4) will be subject to an enquiry regarding genuine. Ness of their claim that they are the heirs of late Rora, son of Mehtab. It was further observed by the learned Single Judge that if such an enquiry ended against respondents Nos. 1 to 4 then applicant will be entitled to be beard in support of his right for allotment of survey No. 43. It is an admitted position that after the above order of the High Court the case for determination of the inheritance of respondents Nos.

1. 1, to 4 to the estate of deceased Roca was taken up by the A. R: M. Larkana who after recording evidence and examining the material produced before him held that respondents Nos. I to 4 were the heirs of deceased Rora, son of Mehtab. Against this decision a revision petition under section 19(1) of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958 was presented by Moula Baksh through the applicant, which was later on not pressed and was dismissed as withdrawn. In the meantime, the applicant instituted Civil Suit No. 108/73 in the Court of First Class Civil Judge, Larkana, seeking a declaration that the order dated 1-8-1973 passed by A. R. M. Holding respondents Nos. 1 to 4 as the legal heirs of Rora, son of Mehtab was illegal, ultra vires and mala fide and that the appellant was the absolute owner of survey No. 43, Deb Mato, Taluka Dakri, A permanent injunction was also prayed for by the appellant in the above suit against respondents Nos. I to 4 and others, restraining them from interfering with the possession of applicant over the suit land. Subsequent to the filing of the above suit by the applicant, respondents Nos. 1 to 4 also instituted suit for declaration, possession and mesne profits on 20th April, 1974, being Suit No. 64/74. In their suit respondents Nos.

2. 1 to 4 sought a declaration to the effect that they were the owners of survey No. 43, having inherited the same from deceased Rora son of Mehtab and that a decree for possession, account and mesne profits be granted to them against the applicant. The two suits were consolidated. By the trial Court, as common question of facts and law arise in them, and were disposed of by a common judgment dated 20-10-1977. The trial Court dismissed the suit filed by respondents Nos. 1 to 4 and partially decreed the suit of applicant holding that the order dated 1-8-1973 passed by A.

3. S. O./A. R. M. Larkana, dated 1-8-1973 was an order without jurisdiction. The reason which prevailed with the trial Court for holding the order dated 1-8-1973 as an order without jurisdiction was that upon examination of the order dated 1.8-1973 the trial Court came to the conclusion that the order was based on no evidence and was passed contrary to the directions given by the High Court in petition No. 194/66. On appeal the first appellate Court took the view that the order passed by the Settlement and Rehabilitation Authorities determining the question of inheritance were immune from attack in the civil Court and even otherwise on exami--nation of the order dated 1-8-1973 the first appellate Court came to the conclusion that the ,order did not suffer from any such infirmity which could render the order without jurisdiction and void and accordingly the judgment and decree of trial Court was reversed. As a consequence of reversal of the decree of the trial Court the suit filed by respondents Nos. 1 to 4 was decreed by the 1st appellate Court for declaration and possession only while the suit instituted by the applicant was dismissed.

4. I have heard Mr. Abdul Fateh Memon, Advocate, for the applicant and Mr. Ashiq Ali Abdullah for respondents Nos. 1 to 4 in this revision application. The official respondents did not contest these proceedings.

5. The learned counsel for the applicant urged that the first appellate Court while decreeing the suit of respondents Nos. 1 to d failed to notice that the suit instituted by them suffered from the defect of non-joinder of necessary party after withdrawal of the suit by respondents Nos. 1 to 4 against Moula Baksh and as such no decree could be passed against the applicant in the absence of necessary party. Elaborating his contention, the learned counsel for the applicant contended that the title to the suit property enjoyed by the applicant was derived from Moula Baksh who in turn acquired the same by virtue of allotment made in his favour and if the allotment in favour of Moula Baksh was to be h.-Id as without lawful authority and jurisdiction then it was necessary for the Court to hear him first before passing any such order. It is alternatively contended by the learned counsel -for the applicant that the effect of granting the declaration prayed for in the suit by respondents Nos. 1 to 4 by the 1st appellate Court amounted to setting aside the allotment in favour of Moula Baksh by implication and therefore, it was necessary to hear Moula Baksh before granting the declaration. It is also contended by the learned counsel that the appellate Court did not specifically set aside the finding of the trial Court on the issue that Moula Baksh was a necessary party in this suit and . In the absence of reversal of this finding of trial Court no decree could be granted to respondents Nos. 1 to 4 by the 1st appellate Court. Mr. Memon, lastly contended that Moula Baksh was a necessary party in the proceedings before the A. R. M. For determination of succession of respondents Nos. 1 to 4 to the estate of deceased Rora in terms of the order of High Court passed in Petition No. 194/66 and was therefore entitled to be heard in the proceedings before A. R. M., Larkana. The order dated 1-8-1973, it is accordingly contended by the learned counsel, having been passed without hearing Moula Baksh, was a nullity in the eye of law. Mr. Ashiq Ali Abdullah, the learned counsel for the respondents Nos. 1 to 4, in reply to the above contention of Mr. Abdul Fateh Memon, has urged that Moula Baksh having disposed of the suit land as late as in 1964 by means of a registered sale deed, the interest in the suit land thereafter was represented by the applicant alone. It was alternatively contended by the learned counsel for respondents Nos. 1 to 4 that the applicant. In all proceedings after 1964 represented Moula Baksh as his attorney and there--fore his presence in the cases in these circumstances should be held to be sufficient representation of Moula Baksh who had ceased to have any interest in the land after its sale in favour of the applicant. I find consider--able force in the submission of the learned counsel for respondents Nos. 1 to 4. From what has been stated above it is abundantly clear that allotment in favour of Moula Baksh was set aside as a duplicate allotment by D. R. C., Larkana, by order dated 3- 8-1965. This order of the D. R. C., was later upset by the Additional Settlement and Rehabilitation Commis--sioner, on 30th December, 1965. The order of Additional Settlement & Rehabilitation Commissioner was however declared as an order without jurisdiction in Writ Petition No. 194/66 and earlier order of D. R. C., Larkana, dated 3-8-1965 was restored. Therefore, there can be no doubt in so far the allotment in favour of Rora, son of h4ehtab was concerned it was held to be valid allotment while allotment in favour of Moula Baksh was cancelled as a duplicate allotment. The only question which was left open to be decided was the claim of inheritance of respondents 1 to 4 as heirs of Rora, son of Mehtab. It is admitted before me that the order of the learned Single Judge dated 20th September, 1971 passed in petition No. 194/66 was not challenged further by the applicant and as such this order has become final and binding on all the parties. By the above order of High Court the allotment of Rora, son of 1Aehtab was upheld and only the question of inheritance of respondents Nos. 1 to 4, as heirs of Rora was left open to be decided. It is not in dispute that after the above order of High Court the Rehabilitation Authorities took up the case of inheritance of respondents Nos. 1 to 4 and held that they were the legal heirs of Rora, son of Mehtab. The grievance of the learned counsel for the applicant however is that Moula Baksh was not heard by the Rehabilitation Authorities before passing of the order dated 1-8-1973. 1 have gone through the order dated 1-8-1973 by which respondents I to 4 were held to be the heirs of late Rora, son of Mehtab and found that the present applicant did appear in the above proceedings and was represented through a counsel. It is stated in the order that the opponent (Moula Baksh) was afforded opportunity to ascertain the names of legal heirs of Rora, son of Mehtab but he was unable to do so and he also failed to produce any satisfactory evidence that respondents Nos. 1 to 4 were not the legal heirs of deceased Rora, son of Mehtab. Mr. Abdul Fateh Memon, the learned counsel for the applicant attempted to argue that the A. R. M. While passing the order dated 1-8- 1973 did not consider the evidence of witnesses which were examined before him and as such the order is rendered void and therefore, the trial Court rightly held the order dated 1-8-1973 as without jurisdiction and void. I am unable to accept contention of the learned counsel. The civil Court has no jurisdiction to scrutinise the orders passed by the Rehabilitation Authorities determining the question of inheritance, on merits. The exami--nation of such orders by a civil Court will be limited only to the `~ defects of jurisdictional character alone which is apparent on the face of the order.

6. The civil Court cannot examine such orders of Rehabilita--tion Authorities as a Court of appeal so as to go into the sufficiency or otherwise of the material before the Rehabilitation Authorities for passing the order. On the face of the finding recorded in the order dated 1-8-1973 that the opponent was afforded opportunity and that the evidence led by him was not satisfactory, I am of the view that the Civil Judge had no jurisdiction to examine whether the order passed by A. R. M.

7. Was passed after proper appreciation of evidence produced before him or not. I is not contended before me that the A. R. M. Had no jurisdiction t pass the order dated 1-8-1973. All that persuaded the trial Court to hold that the order was invalid and without jurisdiction was that certain allege pieces of evidence produced before the said officer were ignored. This was hardly sufficient to give jurisdiction to the Civil Judge to hold the order dated 1-8-1973 as an order without jurisdiction.

8. "That under the orders of the High Court the plaintiff or Moula Baksh claimant was not supposed to come in the picture during the course by the defendant No. 2, unilaterally.

9. Apart from this, the order dated 1-8-1973 clearly states that opponent (Moula Baksh) was afforded opportunity but he failed to produce any evidence in support of his contention. In these circumstances, I find no substance in the submission of Mr. Memon, that the order dated 1-8-1973 was a void order because Moula Baksh was not heard in the proceedings. The other contention of the learned counsel for the applicant that Moula Baksh was a necessary party in that suit and in his absence the Court could not grant any decree in favour of respondents Nos. 1 to 4, has equally no force. In paragraph 8 of the plaint in Suit No. 108/73 the applicant categorically asserted that he is a bona fide purchaser of the land in suit for considera--tion without notice and therefore his interest in the property is protected under the law. Similarly in paragraph 13 of his plaint, the applicant sought relief of declaration to the effect that he is absolute owner of Survey No. 43, situate in Deh Mate, Taluka Dekri, Distt. Larkana. It may also be mentioned here that when summon in Suit No. 64/74 instituted by respondents Nos.. 1 to 4 were served on the applicant, the applicant filed a joint written statement on his behalf as well as on behalf of Moula Baksh, although at that time Moula Baksh was not served in the suit. In the joint written statement filed by the applicant and Moula Baksh, common pleas have been raised. In these circumstances, the withdrawal of suit by respondents Nos., 1 to 4 against Moula Baksh did render it as improperly constituted as the controversy in the suit with regard to the title of survey No. 43 could be effectively death with by the Court in presence of the applicant, who for all practical purposes, legally represented all interests in the said property. Mr. Abdul Fateh Memon, has drawn my attention to the case of Salma Abbasi v. Ahmed Suleman (1981 G L C 462), decided by a learned Single Judge of this Court in support of his above contention but the facts of this case are quite distinguishable. In that case in a suit for partition of a joint property all the co-owners were held to be necessary party to such a suit, which has no application to the present case. The learned counsel for the respondent on the other hand referred to the case of Ahmed Din v. Abdul Khalid (PLD 1979 Lab. 898). In this case a Division Bench of the Lahore High Court held that when a share-holder has transferred his share in the land and entire estate is represented by the purchaser, then it is not at all necessary to either implead the share-holder as a necessary party or his legal heir on her death. This case fully supports the contention of the learned counsel for. Respondents Nos. 1 to 4 and I am in respectful agreement with the view expressed in the above case. I accordingly find no merit in this revision application which as a consequent is dismissed but in the circumstance of the case there will be no order as to costs.

10. After I have dictated the judgment Mr. Abdul Fateh Memon, learned counsel for the applicant contended that in pursuance of the order of this Court dated 7-4-1979 the applicant had furnished security to the satisfaction of District Judge, Larkana. This fact is not admitted by Mr. Ashiq Ali Abdullah. But that as it may, if such a security has been furnished it will be dealt with in accordance with the above order of this Court.

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